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Large-scale disasters severely damage local information and communication technology 
(ICT) infrastructure. This negatively impacts responders’ ability to communicate and 
collaborate with one another. As a result, humanitarian assistance (HA) response 
organizations cannot maintain situational awareness and efforts remain disjointed and 
inefficient. 
Out of the rubble of the Haiti earthquake, a cross-organizational collection of first 
responders created the Rapid ICT Assessment Team (RTAT) to conduct and share a 
holistic assessment of the ICT environment. However, RTAT has yet to solve the 
problem of efficiently and effectively collecting the ICT data and creating a shareable, 
common, ICT operational picture. Employing a campaign of experimentation (COE), this 
thesis analyzes RTAT with an Enterprise Architecture framework and Savvion process 
modeler and employs the Android based, mobile, spatial data collection applications 
Lighthouse and Open Data Kit (ODK) Collect to exploit the open source form builder 
ODK. RTAT founders, along with Bicol University and local volunteers, field tested the 
ODK forms with crowd sourcing techniques and when Typhoon Haiyan struck; they 
validated the organizational RTAT model and integrated assessments into the Pacific 
Disaster Center’s (PDC) DisasterAWARE collaborative website. 
This thesis highlights the disjointed rapid response ICT assessment community 
which lacks standard forms and unifying data standards. The COE validates using open 
source, spatial data collection tools and crowdsourcing techniques for even highly 
technical needs. However, the COE revealed programming logic limits of the ODK 
forms, and the imperfect back-end integration between RTAT and the PDC. Debates 
remain over the validity of qualitative, crowdsourced ICT assessments. Going forward, 
RTAT must refine its forms and lead the movement to harmonize HA community 
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Cataclysmic events such as the Indonesian tsunami in 2004 and hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 leave a wide and devastating wake of destruction. The horrific human suffering 
in these events is exacerbated by the inability of governmental and relief organizations to 
operate in a chaotic environment (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Specifically, their inability 
to collectively assess the situation, prioritize efforts, and effectively allocate/direct scarce 
resources (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (2014a) stated that 
unfortunately, 
 The humanitarian community’s existing data-sharing practices usually involve 
one-to-one exchange of non-standardized spreadsheets or individual figures over email at 
irregular intervals. These ad-hoc methods can cause a significant delay between the 
collection of data and the formulation of that data into a common operational picture. In 
the worst case, information is simply not shared at all, leaving gaps in the understanding 
of the field situation.  
This lack of shared information is due, in large part, to an ineffective or missing 
overarching collaboration organization and further compounded by severely damaged 
host nation communication infrastructure (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; and Steckler, 2009). 
Most organizations “don’t know what they don’t know” when they arrive and, as a result, 
incorrectly equip themselves for the information and communication technology (ICT) 
environment (Steckler, 2009). Further, with the commoditization of smart devices and 
sensors, every organization is haphazardly collecting and sharing raw data in an 
unstructured manner. Kennerly & Mason (2008) described a growing concern that 
organizations are now “drowning in data, whilst thirsting for information.” 
Several organizations assess various aspects of the ICT infrastructure, but none 
collate the information into an ICT current operational picture or a complete 
understanding for decision making (Steckler, 2009). To fill the gaps and help make sense 
of the data noise, the Rapid ICT Assessment Team (RTAT) was created to conduct a 
2 
holistic assessment of the ICT environment and share this information in a coherent 
manner with other responding organizations. The problem of efficiently and effectively 
collecting the data, creating an ICT common operational picture and getting this 
information into the right hands, however, has yet to be solved. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Understanding the information and communication technology (ICT) 
environment in a post disaster environment is difficult. Compounding this problem is the 
potential lack of host nation ICT infrastructure that could facilitate information 
collaboration between relief organizations. The Rapid ICT Assessment Team (RTAT) 
program was created to assess the ICT environment and give ICT prioritization 
recommendations. The current assessment form that uses Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, 
however, is not optimal for sharing ICT team findings in an efficient and expeditious 
manner to the rest of the humanitarian assistance (HA) response community (HARC). 
Without an adequate assessment platform, RTATs will not be able to efficiently 
or effectively communicate the current disaster area ICT situation. As a result, HA 
response organizations may not have the required ICT tools and supporting infrastructure 
to respond adequately to the situation. Worse, they will not know what to bring to the 
disaster area to facilitate required collaboration and communication between the affected 
population, host nation officials and responders, international HA relief organizations, 
and US entities (DOD/DOS) further exasperating the dynamic and difficult problem of 
large scale disaster response.  
This research will explore the use of mobile software applications on established 
existing networks, wireless meshed networks (WMNs), and exercise/real world hastily 
formed networks (HFNs) by RTAT members in an effort to bridge the gap and provide a 
more useful optimal ICT assessment tool for end users. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the limitations of the current Microsoft Excel based assessment 
form? 
3 
2. What are the costs and benefits of moving RTAT forms from a laptop 
based Microsoft Excel to a mobile data collection tool?  
3. What are the best mobile data collection tool/ electronic form interface 
options available to RTAT? 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this analysis is to research and create a mobile data collection tool 
and assessment form that can be used by the Rapid Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) Assessment Teams (RTATs) in the field. This research/project will 
result in a more efficient and effective working mobile data collection platform that will 
have significantly greater capability than the current Microsoft (MS) Excel spreadsheet 
model. This improvement includes a working mobile spatial-data collection tool and 
backend aggregate server with links to an online collaboration website. 
This research can be transferred to any DOD entity that has a need to transmit 
standardized reports from an off-the-grid, austere environment and allow those reports to 
be importable into a useful database that feeds a current operational picture (COP) 
website to enable a cohesive overview and, thereby, better decisions. 
D. CONTRIBUTION 
This project contributes to the understanding of how organizations make sense of 
chaotic environments by exploring possible improvements to rapidly collect and share 
accurate information to develop a current operational picture. This current operational 
picture leads to a shared understanding among participants and improved collaborative 
decisions. 
Without an adequate assessment platform, RTATs will not be able to efficiently, 
or effectively, communicate the current ICT situation in the disaster area. In turn, 
Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response (HADR) organizations may not have the 
expected ICT tools and supporting infrastructure to adequately respond to the situation. 
Worse, they will not know what to bring to the disaster area to facilitate required 
collaboration and communication between the affected population, host nation officials 
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and responders, international HA relief organizations and U.S. entities (DOD/DOS) 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The major topics for discussion in the literature review include: A. Information, 
B. U.S. Disaster Response, C. UN Disaster Response, D. Other Information and 
Communication Technology Non-Governmental Organizations, E. Rapid Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) Assessment Team (RTAT), F. Categories of Post 
Disaster Assessment Data Sets, G. Current Post Disaster Assessment Forms, H. 
Enterprise Architecture Analysis, I. Savvion Business Process Management, J. Hastily 
Formed Network, K. Mobile Device Operating Systems, L. Mobile Data Collection 
Methods, and M. Available Mobile Electronic Form Interfaces.  
A. INFORMATION 
DOD (2006) stated, “There are two basic uses for information. The first is to help 
create situational awareness (SA) as the basis for a decision. The second is to direct and 
coordinate actions in the execution of the decision.” 
Kennerly & Mason (2008) reiterated this view stating the purpose of information 
is to make better decisions further positing that, “research evidence suggesting that better 
use of information can improve decision making.” Unfortunately, Davenport, Harris, De 
Long & Jacobson (2000) brought to light that “one of the most enduring traits of the 
information age is that we have focused too much on mastering transaction data and not 
enough on turning it into information and knowledge that can lead to business results.” 
Reaffirming this, Chopoorian, Witherell, Khalil and Ahmed (2001) found that 
“businesses currently analyze less than 7 percent of the data that they collect.” Therefore, 
a focus on data collection is not enough; information must be processed into an 
actionable or usable form, and this process must add value to the organization within its 
market for it to thrive (Kennerly & Mason, 2008). Figure 1 shows the process of 
processing raw sensor data into actionable situational understanding for decisions.  
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Figure 1.  Process from Raw Data to Situational Understanding (after Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 2002) 
While the problem of collecting data is being solved through the proliferation of 
smart devices and sensors, the ability to turn this data into actionable information and 
situational awareness in a disaster zone is an on-going issue (Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). Asterisked within Figure 1, the Rapid Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) Assessment Team (RTAT) seeks to interject at key 
points in the information process to enable and facilitate better decision making (Steckler, 
2009). RTAT processes the raw data reports by conducting assessments and collating and 
promulgating this processed knowledge, along with recommended courses of action, via 
a shared current operational picture (COP) (Steckler, 2009). 
1. Raw Data to Understanding 
This section briefly outlines the process of taking raw data (Figure 1) and turning 
it into understandable data that adds value to HADR organizations. This thesis will use 
the collection of weather data to illustrate each stage. 
a. Data 
Merriam Webster (2014) defined data as: 
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1: factual information (as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for 
reasoning, discussion, or calculation. 2: information output by a sensing 
device or organ that includes both useful and irrelevant or redundant 
information and must be processed to be meaningful. 3: information in 
numerical form that can be digitally transmitted or processed.  
Kennerly & Mason (2008) furthers the definition: 
The word data is the plural of Latin datum, past participle of dare, “to 
give,” hence “something given.” Thus in general, data consists of 
propositions that reflect reality. A large class of practically important 
propositions is measurements or observations of a variable. Such 
propositions may comprise numbers, words, or images.  
Raw data in this context is a reported ICT outage or the omission of electronic 
reports in a disaster indicating an outage. Once raw data has been processed into a shared 
understanding, humanitarian Assistance (HA) workers, assuming they have the ability to 
communicate, can begin to deconflict and collaboratively organize and prioritize their 
efforts.  
For illustration purposes, raw data are the numbers coming out of a sensor; in the 
weather example this would be the temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, and 
precipitation at a location at a specific time. 
b. Processed Data (Information) 
Kennerly and Mason (2008) described information in the following terms: 
The way the word information is used can refer to both “facts” in 
themselves and the transmission of the facts. The double notions of 
information as both facts and communication are also inherent in one of 
the foundations of information theory: cybernetics introduced by Norbert 
Wiener (1948). 
Processed data would be the collection of weather data (such as temperature) for a 
period. 
c. Knowledge 
Knowledge communicated concerning some particular fact, subject or 
event; of which one is apprised or told; intelligence, news. 
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Information is the result of processing, manipulating and organizing data 
in a way that adds to the knowledge of the receiver. In other words, it is 
the context in which data is taken. 
There are many epistemology and cognitive definitions for “knowledge;” simply 
put “knowledge is what is known” (Kennerly & Mason, 2008). Plato stated that 
knowledge is a subset of what is true and what is believed, Figure 2 (Kennerly & Mason 
2008). For the purposes of this thesis, knowledge will be will be t defined as a refined set 
of facts that are pertinent to a narrow subset of the overall situation and can be acted upon 
in and of themselves.  
  
Figure 2.  Plato’s Knowledge is a Subset of What is Both True and Believed 
Knowledge is organized into two categories: Explicit and tacit. 
(1) Explicit knowledge 
Explicit knowledge is easily codified and shared with others (Dienes & Perner, 
1999). How to use a particular tool or do a specific process within an organization should 
be explicit knowledge.  
(2) Tacit Knowledge 
Tacit knowledge can be described as “head knowledge,” that is knowledge that is 
trapped in one’s head and not easily transferred to another (Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, 2012). This knowledge is gained through years of experience and gives rise to 
gut feelings and intuition. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that one may not know that they 
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know it (Dienes & Perner, 1999). Further, tacit knowledge “representations merely reflect 
the property of objects or events without predicating them of any particular entity” 
(Dienes & Perner, 1999). Making it difficult for an organization to identify the existence 
of tacit knowledge because the person who has it may not know they have it and it is 
difficult to associate this knowledge to an entity/object to codify it explicitly (Dienes & 
Perner, 1999). Unfortunately, a significant amount of knowledge for disaster response is 
currently tacit and difficult to transfer between people (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Worse, 
turnover and unpredictability of disaster location, i.e. rarely in the same local area twice, 
leaves much of the tacit knowledge gained and “lessons learned” to be relearned by the 
next group of responders at the next event (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Tacit knowledge 
examples may include cultural awareness, financial market understanding, and expert 
salesmanship.  
Using the weather construct, knowing the average rainfall for an area or the fact 
that it is raining is tacit knowledge. Knowing the streets sometimes flood in Manila when 
it rains is tacit, until someone misses their flight or thinks to share the information. 
d. Situational Understanding  
Situational understanding combines both types of knowledge (tacit and explicit) 
to develop a complete mental picture of the situation allowing the development of a plan 
furthering decision making (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2002). 
Knowing to leave three hours early to get to the airport because the streets often 
flood, for example, shows situational understanding on a micro scale. 
2. Relational Database 
In order to organize, retain, and share explicit information, companies often look 
to information technology solutions. One such common solution is the use of relational 
databases. 
According to Oracle, a leading database company,  
A database is a means of storing information in such a way that 
information can be retrieved from it. In simplest terms, a relational 
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database is one that presents information in tables with rows and columns. 
A table is referred to as a relation in the sense that it is a collection of 
objects of the same type (rows). Data in a table can be related according to 
common keys or concepts, and the ability to retrieve related data from a 
table is the basis for the term relational database. (Oracle, 2014)  
Telvent (2014) stated, “A database that contains only one table is called a flat 
database.” Excel is an example of a flat database. To realize the true power of a relational 
database, however, one must learn how to tie multiple tables together to represent 
potentially complex relationships between the items stored therein (Yank, 2009, p. 71).  
3. Spatial Data 
A world leading mapping non-governmental organization (NGO), MapAction 
(2011), stated: 
Spatial data is any data that has a “where” component that can be recorded 
and mapped. Attributes can be any data about the specified place. So, by 
adding the coordinate data to an existing data set, you have created a 
spatial database—data that can be mapped.  
Spatial-relational databases can be accessed and queried via entity attributes or 
location, as well as posted to a responder shared current operational picture map.  
4. Data Collection 
The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (2013b) defined data collection “as 
the ongoing systematic collection of data (quantitative and/or qualitative) necessary for 
identifying and prioritizing needs for disaster relief assistance.” 
Jung (2011) defined mobile data collection (MDC) as “the targeted gathering of 
structured information using devices such as smartphones, PDAs, or tablets.” 
5. Microsoft Excel 
Currently, the Rapid Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
Assessment Team (RTAT) utilizes a Microsoft (MS) Excel spreadsheet to conduct its  
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assessment. To understand why they are seeking an alternative data collection method, 
one must understand the capabilities and limitations of their current MS Excel based 
solution. 
Microsoft’s (MS) Excel spreadsheet is prevalent throughout the HA response 
community and is widely adopted to track HA efforts (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). Additional benefits of Excel include: wide adoption and 
use, pivot table functions to perform complex analysis, solver functions for optimization 
problems, auto fill features based on previous input, data visualization with various charts 
and graphs, exportability as a text file (tab or comma separated), Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) data and comma separated value (CSV) ((Microsoft [MS], 2014).  
Unfortunately Excel has some serious drawbacks: has no skip logic, i.e. it can’t 
walk a user through an assessment, requires MS Excel compatible program, and is 
limited on the number of fields. Additionally, a limitation exists as to the size and number 
of relations, views and their intermediate results, imposed by the maximal available 
number of worksheets, columns and rows in the spreadsheet system if one attempts to 
create a stand-alone Excel database (Tyszkiewicz, 2010). Finally, “the size of the data 
values (integers, strings, etc.) is also limited. The variety of data types in spreadsheets is 
also restricted when compared to database systems” (Tyszkiewicz, 2010). 
B. U.S. DISASTER RESPONSE 
Between 1980 and 2010, 640 disasters have occurred within the U.S. which 
accrued a staggering $18 trillion cost from damages and the loss of over 12,000 lives 
(PreventionWeb, n.d.). This section outlines how local, state, territorial, regional and 
federal governmental entities respond to disasters within the U.S. and its territories, with 
primary focus on the U.S. federal government. 
The first analysis focuses on the U.S. federal government’s response to disasters. 
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1. U.S. Federal Government Response to Disasters Within the U.S. and 
its Territories 
The outdated United States (U.S.) National Response Plan (NRP), resulting from 
Presidential Policy Directive Number 5 (PPD-5) in 2004, recognizes that planning, 
preparing for, and responding to natural and other disasters are primarily responsibilities 
of the individual states. This reflects the U.S. Constitutional perspective and results in a 
pull response assumption. Local authorities have the lead at the start, escalating to state 
level and then to federal level, if necessary and if requested, in the event of a disaster 
(Moffat, 2008).  
The Stafford Act outlines the process by which state governors request t h i s  
assistance from the federal government when the event becomes one of national 
significance. The President of the United States (POTUS) then has to decide 
whether the event of national significance merits designation as an emergency 
(releasing limited resources to the states), a major disaster (releasing much greater 
resources to the states) or a catastrophe. The first two of these result in a pull 
response; the states requesting and drawing down (pul l ing)  from these federal 
resources as they see the event unfolding. The third category of catastrophe would have 
resulted in a proactive push of resources to the region, states and local level, 
irrespective of the states’ requests (Moffat, 2008). The Stafford Act attempts to 
organize and capture all federal costs associated with the significant event. Its processes, 
however, can be cumbersome, slow and ill-suited to a dynamic situation where a rapid 
response, vice monetary accountability, is the gauge of success (Cannon, Beeson, 
Mitchell, Spencer, & Liguori, 2012).  
Under the NRP, a comprehensive framework of response to significant event is 
established. At the federal level, the Homeland Security Operations Centre, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Response Centre and the 
Interagency Incident Management Group jointly coordinate the response across 
government departments. The federal coordinating officer (FCO), a representative of the 
Secretary for Homeland Security, is authorized to lead a joint field office (JFO). This is a 
temporary federal facility established locally at the time of a disaster to coordinate the 
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local, state, and federal response. It consists of senior representatives from all agencies 
and responders involved and development of objectives, strategies, plans, and priorities 
(Moffat, 2008). The membership of this office is envisaged as growing and adapting over 
time as the incident escalates or diminishes (Moffat, 2008).  
In summary, at pre-hurricane Katrina landfall, the NRP and Stafford Act 
delineated that states have the lead in handling natural disasters within their state and, 
with the exception of “catastrophic events,” were required to request assistance from the 
federal government as necessary. FEMA is the lead federal command and control (C2) 
agency for handling “nationally significant” events (Meeds, 2006). Unfortunately as 
shown in Katrina, the entire system was set up in a strict, regimented, hierarchical 
system, which involved local, state, regional and federal entities respectively and was 
shown to be ill-suited and deficient for the dynamic task at hand (Cannon et al, 2012). 
In response to the shortfalls experienced during hurricane Katrina, President 
Barack Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): The National 
Preparedness System (NPS) in 2011 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
PPD-8 outlines the U.S. current approach to national preparedness (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011). Hence, National Response Program (NRP) was changed to 
the National Response Framework (NRF) to reflect this change. The Department of 
Homeland Security (2013) further elaborated on this change:  
The National Response Framework (NRF) is an essential component of 
the National Preparedness: System mandated. PPD-8 is aimed at 
strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through 
systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the 
security of the Nation. PPD-8 defines five mission areas—Prevention, 
Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery—and mandates the 
development of a series of policy and planning documents to explain and 
guide the Nation’s collective approach to ensuring and enhancing national 
preparedness. The NRF sets the doctrine for how the Nation builds, 
sustains, and delivers the response core capabilities identified in the 
National Preparedness Goal (the Goal). The Goal establishes the 
capabilities and outcomes the nation must accomplish across all five 
mission areas to be secure and resilient.  
This thesis will concentrate on the response mission. 
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Added to the federal response, the U.S. also has an established response to 
international disasters which is comprised of three parts: the U.S. Department of State 
response, the U.S. Department of Defense response, and the Interagency Coordination for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. These will be examined in the following section.  
2. U.S. Response to International Disasters  
The Department of State (DOS) leads the U.S. response for international disasters, 
with USAID as its lead agency. Upon disaster striking, the ambassador or the 
Chief of Mission (COM) may send a disaster declaration cable outlining 
the extent of the damage, possible needs, and may recommend assistance 
in the form of funding, material, or technical assistance. When the 
President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Secretary of State have 
determined that a U.S. humanitarian response to a foreign disaster or crisis 
is required, the National Security Council (NSC) normally directs the 
Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance to convene an 
International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy 
Coordination Committee (PCC) to review all pertinent information and 
recommend policy and specific actions. The PCC; which consists of senior 
DOS and DOD representatives, the COM, USAID representatives, and 
heads of other concerned agencies; concurrently develops a 
comprehensive strategy for emergency response and develops tasks for 
each key participant. (Department of Defense, 2014). 
a. U.S. Department of State Response to Foreign Disasters 
As stated, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) is the lead department for the U.S. 
response to foreign disasters (Department of Defense, 2011). The DOS has many 
agencies that work in concert to achieve the strategic goals or disaster preparedness and 
response. Two of these agencies are outlined below. 
(1) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lead office of 
USAID for immediate disaster relief. OFDA lies within the USAID Bureau for 
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) (Department of Defense, 
2011). OFDA is delegated the responsibility to “provide international disaster and 
humanitarian assistance and coordinate the USG response to declared disasters in foreign 
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countries” (Department of Defense, 2011). OFDA gets its authority from the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, § 491-493 and from delegated Presidential 
Authority. In the performance of such tasks, OFDA “maintains stocks of emergency 
relief supplies in warehouses worldwide and has the logistical and operational 
capabilities to deliver them quickly” (Department of Defense, 2011). 
(2) Disaster Assistance Response Team 
OFDA has a responsibility to respond to disasters quickly and it uses to the 
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to quickly assess the situation. DOD (2011) 
aptly summed DART, 
When disaster strikes, OFDA sends regional and technical experts to the 
affected country to identify and prioritize humanitarian needs. In the wake 
of a large-scale disaster, OFDA can deploy a Disaster Assistance 
Response Team (DART) to coordinate and manage an optimal U.S. 
Government response, while working closely with local officials, the 
international community, and relief agencies.  
DART teams are the first responder eyes and ears of the OFDA. 
The second tier of U.S. international disaster response is the Department of 
Defense. 
b. U.S. Department of Defense Response to International Disasters 
The U.S. government (USG) responds to “approximately 70–80 natural disasters 
across the globe each year. In approximately 10–15 percent of these disaster responses, 
the Department of Defense (DOD) lends support to the overall U.S. effort” (Department 
of Defense, 2011). In these instances, DOD acts in support to the Department of State 
(DOS) in concert with USAID efforts and in close coordination with the effected country 
and the international humanitarian assistance (HA) response community organizations 
(HARC) (Department of Defense, 2011). These HARC entities include other donor 
countries and participating international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOS), key NGOs will be discussed in greater detail later. The U.S. DOD 
role in foreign disasters is governed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 under U.S. 
Code Title 22. DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, “establishes policy and 
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provides for component participation in foreign disaster relief operations only after a 
determination is made by DOS that foreign disaster relief shall be provided” (Department 
of Defense, 2014). U.S. DOD Joint Publication (JP) JP 3–29 calls these types of 
activities—Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) operations (Department of Defense, 
2011). According to the DOD (2014), 
FHA consists of DOD activities, normally in support of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of 
State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and 
possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or 
privation. While, U.S. military forces are not the primary U.S. 
Government (USG) means of providing FHA, the foreign assistance they 
are tasked to provide is designed to supplement or complement the efforts 
of the host nation (HN).  
Typical DOD FHA operation missions include:  
 Relief missions: Missions that include prompt aid that can be used to 
alleviate the suffering of disaster victims (Department of Defense, 2014).  
 Dislocated civilian support missions: Provide assistance and protection for 
dislocated civilians (Department of Defense, 2014). 
 Security missions: “Establish and maintain conditions for the provision of 
FHA by organizations of the world relief community to include secure 
areas for storage of relief material, provide protection and armed escorts 
for convoys and personnel delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters 
for dislocated civilians, and security for multinational forces” (Department 
of Defense, 2014). 
 Technical assistance and support functions: “Advice and selected training, 
assessments, manpower, and equipment” (Department of Defense, 2014). 
 Foreign consequence management (FCM): DOD assistance to a “HN to 
mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack or event and to 
restore essential government services” (Department of Defense, 2014). 
Coordination between the numerous FHA responding agencies can be 
overwhelming for new entrants. The third and final tier of U.S. international disaster 
response is the Interagency Coordination for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; the 
diagram shown in the next section is helpful and outlines the organizational relationships 
between the U.S. DOS and U.S. DOD agencies. 
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c. The Interagency Coordination for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
Under the President of the United States lay the various departments and agencies 
shown in Figure 3. During a disaster response, the affected country’s Chief of Mission is 
the focal point of the U.S. effort. The Chief of Mission falls under the Department of 
State but has direct contact with the President of the United States. One should note that 
while lines of coordination to the Chief of Mission exist from the responding DOD Joint 
Task Force commander and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), those organizations do not work for the Chief of Mission but for their parent 
organization, a minor detail that can lead to major consequences.  
 
Figure 3.  Interagency Coordination for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (from DOD, 
2011) 
C. UNITED NATIONS DISASTER RESPONSE 
The United States is but one player in a much larger humanitarian assistance (HA) 
response community (HARC). The United Nations (UN) has taken on a large role for 
coordinating international humanitarian event response and relief efforts. This section 
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outlines how the UN responds to large scale disasters and is comprised of four sections: 
UN Humanitarian events, UN resident coordinator, United Nations Emergency Relief 
Coordinator, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and 
UN Emergency Telecommunication Cluster. 
1. United Nations Humanitarian Events 
UN characterizes its responses to human suffering and disasters as humanitarian 
events (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b). Humanitarian 
events are characterized into two broad categories of natural disaster and complex 
emergency.  
a. Natural Disaster 
Natural disaster occurs when a “disaster-affected country requests international 
assistance in coping with a natural disaster and requires additional international 
coordination resources” (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b).  
b. Complex Emergency 
Complex emergency is defined as “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or 
society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal 
or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the 
mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations’ country 
program” (Department of Defense, 2011). DOD (2011) further described complex 
emergencies as involving:  
 Extensive violence or loss of life. 
 Massive displacements of people. 
 Widespread damage to societies and economies. 
 The need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance. 
 Hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and 
military constraints. 
 Security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas.  
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c. United Nations Level of Crises. 
The UN further categorizes humanitarian events by level of crisis. 
 Level 1 (L1) Emergency is “an emergency where the national and 
international resources in-country can handle the response and no outside 
assistance is needed” (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2013b).  
 Level 2 (L2) Emergencies require “some support from neighboring 
countries, regional entities and possibly agency headquarters will be 
needed” (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b). 
 Level 3 (L3) Emergency is “a major sudden-onset humanitarian crisis 
triggered by natural disasters or conflict that requires (UN) system-wide 
mobilization” (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
2013b). 
The affected country’s resident coordinator or designated humanitarian 
coordinator (HC), with the permission of the effected nation and the help of a 
humanitarian Country Team (HCT), will request event tailored support from the UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) via the UN Regional Coordinator (RC) (Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b). Normally requests are reserved for L3 
Emergencies.  
2. UN Resident Coordinator 
 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) stated (2011),  
The overall coordination of United Nations activities falls primarily to the 
United Nations’ (effected country’s) Resident Coordinator (RC) in 
consultation with relevant United Nations agencies. The position equals 
the same rank as an Ambassador of a foreign state and is the designated 
Representative of the Secretary-General. The RC also leads the United 
Nations Country Team (UNCT). Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b) 
The RC is designated as or will designate a humanitarian coordinator (HC) to 
oversee a humanitarian event (natural disaster or complex emergency) (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b).  
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3. United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator 
The UN, in providing emergency assistance, is guided by General Assembly (GA) 
resolution 46/182, Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency 
Assistance of the United Nations. The resolution, adopted 19 December 1991, 
strengthened the then existing position of the Disaster Relief Coordinator (DRC) to 
include both natural disasters and complex emergencies and renamed the position 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2013). The ERC is an Undersecretary position within UN and reports directly to 
the Secretary of the UN on matters of emergency response (Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b).  
4. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
ERC utilizes the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) to respond operationally to RC/HC and the affected nation’s requests. DOD 
(2011) stated, “OCHA is the arm of the UN Secretariat that is responsible for bringing 
together humanitarian response participants to ensure a coherent response to disasters.”  
In 1998, as part of the Secretary-General’s program of reform, Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized into the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Its mandate was expanded 
to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development 
and humanitarian advocacy. (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2014b). 
a. United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination Team 
In 1993, the UN OCHA created the United Nations Disaster Assessment 
Coordination (UNDAC) organization to improve response to humanitarian events (Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014b). UNDAC has the primary mission 
to “help the United Nations and governments of disaster-affected countries during the 
first phase of a sudden-onset emergency” (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2014b). To clarify, the UNDAC lies within OCHA and has teams that can deploy 
within 12–48 hours of disaster striking in order to help the RC/HC coordinate the initial 
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disaster response (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014b). The 
UNDAC can be likened to the USAID DART teams. 
b. Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
In an effort to delineate organizational responsibilities, coordinate international 
NGOs, and improve the operational responses to humanitarian events, the UN OCHA 
created the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2013a).  
OCHA carries out its coordination function primarily through the IASC, 
which is chaired by the ERC. Participants include all humanitarian 
partners, from United Nations agencies, funds and programs, to the Red 
Cross movement and NGOs. The IASC ensures inter-agency decision-
making in response to complex emergencies. These responses include 
needs assessments, consolidated appeals, field coordination arrangements 
and the development of humanitarian policies. (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013a)  
The IASC was established in June 1992 under the UN General Assembly (GA) 
Resolution 46/182 and affirmed in GA resolution 48/57 as the “primary mechanism for 
inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance” (Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee, 2011a). OCHA (2011) stated,  
IASC brings together international organizations working to provide 
humanitarian assistance to people in need as a result of natural disasters, 
conflict-related emergencies, global food crises and pandemics. 
The IASC is made of both members and standing invitees (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  IASC Members and Standing Invitees (from Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee, 2011a) 
The IASC is organized along functional lines called “clusters” (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013a). Following the recommendations of an 
independent Humanitarian Response Review in 2005,  
The cluster approach was proposed as one way of addressing gaps and 
strengthening the effectiveness of humanitarian response through building 
partnerships. The cluster approach ensures clear leadership, predictability 
and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies 
by clarifying the division of labor among organizations and better defining 
their roles and responsibilities within the different sectors of the response. 
It aims to make the international humanitarian community better 
organized and more accountable and professional, so that it can be a better 
partner for the affected people, host governments, local authorities, local 
civil society and resourcing partners. (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 
2012b) 
Each cluster is headed by a cluster lead agency, see Figure 5. Intra-cluster 
information management (IM) is the responsibility of the Cluster Lead agency, inter-
cluster IM is the responsibility of OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2011). This thesis will be primarily concerned with the UN Emergency 




Figure 5.  Inter-Agency Standing Cluster (from Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
2012b) 
5. UN Emergency Telecommunication Cluster 
The cluster lead agency for the UN-ETC is the World Food Programme (WFP) 
(World Food Programme, 2013b). The WFP (2013b) stated, The UN “Emergency 
Telecommunications Cluster (UN-ETC) provides humanitarian workers with the 
communications services they need to operate effectively and efficiently, and to save 
lives.” WFP (2013b) further stated, “The ETC is a network of organizations that work 
together to provide shared communications services in humanitarian emergencies.”  
The UN-ETC provides vital security communications’ services and voice and 
Internet connectivity to assist humanitarian workers in their life-saving operations (World 
Food Programme, 2013b). The UN-ETC advertises that its first responders can deploy 
within 48 hours of a disaster to provide basic emergency services with service expansion 
for continued emergency relief within four weeks (World Food Programme, 2013b).  
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Specifically, the ETC provides humanitarian workers with information and 
communication technology (ICT) services to meet three broad goals (World Food 
Programme, 2013b): 
 Enhance response and coordination among humanitarian organizations 
(World Food Programme, 2013b). 
 Improve operational security environment for staff and assets (World 
Food Programme, 2013b). 
 Facilitate decision making through timely access to critical information 
(World Food Programme, 2013b). 
In order to help meet the immediate ICT needs of responders (within 48 hours), 
the UN-ETC utilizes the Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications 
Emergency and Support Team (FITTEST) , comprised of two elements. 
a. Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency and 
Support Team 
The Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency and 
Support Team (FITTEST) establishes information and communication systems and 
services where they have been disrupted by disasters (World Food Programme, 2013a).  
b. Emergency Preparedness Integration Centre  
In order to create a simple and consistent ICT solution, the UN-ETC has created 
Emergency Preparedness Integration Centre (EPIC) suite of information systems and 
applications. WFP (2011) stated,  
EPIC is an inter-agency innovation program to support improved disaster 
preparedness and enable faster, more cohesive emergency response. 
Initiated and led by the World Food Programme (WFP), EPIC is being 
developed for the humanitarian community, by the humanitarian 
community.  
EPIC consists of the EPIC Portal information management platform, humanitarian 
assistance specific EPIC Apps, EPIC Unified Comms that enable field communication, 
EPIC Interaction that enables users to have the ability to interact with collected 
information, and EPIC Situation Room that allows for collective interaction and the 
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display of near real time information updates (World Food Programme, 2011). EPIC is 
the UN-ETC attempt at a single ICT solution to manage data information flow. 
D. OTHER INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
There are countless international organizations committed to reducing the human 
suffering brought on by natural disasters and complex emergencies. Outlined below are 
five of the key players (and their subsets) that have information and communication 
technology (ICT) responsibilities pertinent to this thesis. 
1. The International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent  
The International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC) consists of 
both the International Committee of Red Cross (Red Cross) and the International 
Committee of Red Crescent (Red Crescent). Most Westerners are more familiar with the 
Red Cross and most Middle Easterners are familiar with the Red Crescent. The 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS) are 
headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland and “act as a secretariat for the national Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, and assist in disaster management and response.” The IFRC 
supports national societies in disaster situations (Department of Defense, 2011). The 
ICRC is a world-wide organization that was established in 1863 (Red Cross, n.d.). The 
mission of the ICRC to “provide humanitarian help for people affected by conflict and 
armed violence and to promote the laws that protect victims of war” (Red Cross, n.d.). 
The Red Cross is an independent and neutral organization; its mandates stem from the 
law of armed conflict Geneva conventions of 1949 (Red Cross, n.d.).  
a. National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies 
DOD (2011) stated, “The 186 recognized national Red Cross or Red Crescent 
Societies are auxiliaries of their governments; national societies assist in both disasters 
and conflict situations.” Members of these societies can be seen at refugee camps and 
disaster relief centers. 
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b. Red Cross/Red Crescent First Assessment and Coordination Team  
First Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) “members have technical 
expertise in relief, logistics, health, nutrition, public health and epidemiology, 
psychological support, water and sanitation, finance and administration, as well as 
language capabilities” (IFRC, 2014). 
FACT can deploy within 12–24 hours, for 2 to 4 weeks, this allows operations to 
begin while longer-term support is mobilized (IFRC, 2014). FACT is similar to the 
DART or FITTEST teams but without the same capability. 
2. NetHope 
A NGO consortium, NetHope’s mission is to “act as a catalyst for collaboration, 
bringing together the knowledge and power of 41 leading international humanitarian 
organizations so that the best information communication technology and practices can 
be used to serve people in the developing world” (NetHope, 2014a). NetHope enables 
standard ICT and help desk capabilities as well as economies of scale through its Shared 
Services program to the aforementioned humanitarian organizations under six 
fundamental values (NetHope, 2014a): 
 Technology matters. 
 Benefiting all benefits one. 
 Learning through collaboration. 
 Build for the field. 
 Bias for action. 
 Trust above all else. 
NetHope works with the UN-ETC to collaborate and provide ICT services for its 
member organizations (NetHope, 2014a). NetHope works with its member NGO’s in a 
manner similar to how World Food Programme (UN-ETC lead agency) provides ICT 
services for the other UN cluster agencies. Additionally, NetHope has its own 
“FITTEST” team that immediately responds to disasters to establish ICT services for its 
member organizations known as the Emergency Response Working Group (ERWG) 
(NetHope, 2014b). 
27 
3. TÉLÉCOMS SANS FRONTIÈRES  
Telecoms Sans Frontieres (TSF) was formed in the crucible of both the Balkans 
crisis and in Kurdistan in the aftermath of the first Gulf War in the 1990’s (Telecoms 
Sans Frontieres, 2013). TSF’s mission is to provide information and communication 
technology (ICT) support to both emergency humanitarian events (HE) (natural disaster 
and complex emergency) and non-emergency support to affected people and HE 
responders. Non-emergency support comes in the form of general ICT support to the 
United Nations (UN) and more specifically telecoms assessments support to the UN 
Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) (Telecoms Sans Frontieres, 2013). TSF 
was named a “first responder” of the Emergency Telecoms Cluster in 2006 (Telecoms 
Sans Frontieres, 2014). During such missions, TSF provides emergency ICT services in 
three broad categories:  
a. Humanitarian Calling Operations 
TSF provides three minute, satellite based, phone calls free of charge to any HE 
affected family. This allows people to pass critical information status and location to 
loved ones during a time of crisis (Telecoms Sans Frontieres, 2013).  
b. First Responder Emergency Telecommunications Centers  
Simultaneously, TSF specialists,  
Establish emergency telecom centers for emergency responders. The 
centers offer—at no charge—broadband Internet access, voice 
communications, fax lines and all the IT equipment needed for a field 
office. These centers enable emergency NGOs, the UN agencies, and local 
authorities to communicate right at the heart of a crisis. They also 
facilitate the coordination of aid efforts. First responders use TSF’s 
telecommunications services to communicate vital information, stay 
connected with headquarters and other emergency responders in the 
country who are often spread across a wide geographic area. Information 
management and sharing has become critical for an effective humanitarian 
response. (Telecoms Sans Frontieres, 2013) 
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c. Information and Communication Technology Assessments 
Finally, the TSF rapid response teams also assist local governments and 
emergency response coordinators to perform ICT assessments of damaged areas. TSF 
uses its ICT experience to assist organizations and the effected nation to reestablish 
commercial networks or planning to build the ICT support infrastructure needed for the 
recovery stage following an emergency (Telecoms Sans Frontieres, 2013).  
4. Humanity Road 
Founded in 2010, Humanity Road uses Internet volunteers and tools to monitor 
social media to help save lives and reduce suffering.  
Humanity Road delivers disaster preparedness and response information to 
the global mobile public before, during, and after a disaster. Humanity 
Road is a leader in the field of online disaster response, providing social 
media disaster training and participating in both civilian and military 
communications exercises worldwide. Humanity Road support aid 
agencies and first responders during natural disaster and relay urgent 
needs to those who can response. (Humanity Road, 2014) 
Humanity Road concentrates on unstructured social media posts and tweets to 
conduct social network analysis (SNA) to obtain actionable information (Humanity Road, 
2014). While SNA is outside this thesis’s concentration, Humanity Road is technically a 
mobile data collection organization when users use their mobile devices to Tweet or post 
to their Facebook and are worth mentioning. 
5. Humanitarian Data Exchange 
One hindrance to data sharing, aggregation, and processing to situational 
awareness (see Figure 1) is the inability to fuse incompatible raw data sets. Incompatible 
data sets will be defined and further discussed in the next section. The Humanitarian Data 
Exchange (HDX) is an initiative within OCHA that seeks to solve this problem. The goal 
of HDX is “to make humanitarian data easy to find and use for analysis” (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). This initiative attempts to link collected 
raw data from various entities and sensors into one collective humanitarian assistance 
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repository (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). While still in the 
pilot stage, the HDX effort continues along three lines: 
a. Repository  
Sensors and data providers can upload their “raw data spreadsheets for others to 
find and use” into the HDX repository (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2014a).  
b. Analytics  
HDX analytics is “a database of high-value data that can be compared across 
countries and crises, with tools for analysis and visualization” (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014).  
c. Standards  
HDX has created an open source data standard called the Humanitarian Exchange 
Language (HXL) (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). The goal 
of HXL is to create standards to help share humanitarian data through the use of the 
above HDX Repository and HDX Analytic tools (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a).  
E. RAPID INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT TEAM 
The Rapid Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Assessment Team 
(RTAT) concept was started out of the rubble of the 2010 Haiti earthquake as a way to 
improve disaster response (Steckler, 2009). The need to quickly assess the ICT 
environment post disaster has been recognized in nearly every major disaster event where 
immediate efforts were less than optimal due to the inability of respondents to 
communicate, much less collaborate, with each other (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). All of 
the ICT organizations listed in paragraphs B, C, and D of Chapter II Literature Review 
have some ICT assessment expertise and responsibilities; none are independent, however, 
of the competing responsibility to set up their parent organization’s ICT infrastructure 
(Steckler, 2009). RTAT has the sole mission to assess the post disaster ICT environment 
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and share those assessment results on an ongoing basis to the rest of the humanitarian 
assistance (HA) response community. RTAT’s independent lens allows them to make 
unbiased ICT recovery prioritization recommendations to the HA response community on 
a continual basis (Steckler 2009). However, RTAT is a fledgling organization that has not 
perfected its processes and is not fully integrated into the rest of the HA response 
community (Cannon et al., 2012). This thesis will become a first step towards that end. 
“The Rapid Technology Assessment Teams (RTAT) concept seeks to provide a 
pool of multi-disciplinary experts who will rapidly deploy to the disaster zone to provide” 
a holistic assessment of the ICT environment (Steckler, 2012). “While there are existing 
disaster assessment teams from major organizations that deploy to such events, these 
teams primarily focus on sector specialty areas other than ICT and Information Sharing” 
(Steckler, 2012). 
Additionally, RTAT is not looking to add more data noise but to enhance and 
complete the information process shown in Figure 1. That is, an end-to-end solution that 
automatively processes its assessment data into a shared collective understanding of the 
ICT environment for better decision (Steckler, 2012). 
F. FOUR CATEGORIES OF POST DISASTER ASSESSMENT DATA SETS  
Nearly all of the aforementioned organizations have some ICT assessment form to 
accompany their rapid response teams (DART, FITTEST, FACT, ERWG, etc.). 
Information on the ICT environment is vital in the initial phases to enable better 
communication and collaboration. The existence of the assessment is not enough, “the 
timeliness and quality of assessments help determine an effective humanitarian response” 
(Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). Additionally, “experience 
has shown that there are significant benefits to coordinating needs assessments and that 
doing so can help save more lives and restore more people’s livelihoods” (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). Finally, this information must be shared 
with the people who can make decisions and enact change for the better (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). Unfortunately not all assessments, and 
their corresponding data sets, are compatible. The UN categorizes assessments by the 
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degree to which they can be integrated with one another and hence aggregated into a 
collective common operational picture or understanding. 
1. Coordinated Assessments  
The UN describes coordinated assessments as,  
Those which are planned and carried out in partnership with other 
humanitarian actors, with the results shared for the benefit of the broader 
humanitarian community to identify the needs of the affected population 
of a humanitarian crisis. Such assessments range from inter and intra 
cluster/sector joint assessments to single agency assessments that are 
harmonized. (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2011b) 
Unless RTAT is absorbed by the UN-ETC, its assessments cannot be 
characterized as coordinated. 
2. Harmonized Assessment  
Harmonized assessments are conducted by external UN entities, but their 
assessment data set structures allow for their integration. The Humanitarian Data 
Exchange (HDX) initiative discussed earlier strives to put more data sets into this 
category. 
Data collection processing and analysis is undertaken separately, however 
the data is sufficiently comparable (due to the use of common operational 
datasets, key indicators, and geographical and temporal synchronization) 
to be compiled into a single database, and to serve as the subject of a 
shared analysis. (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2011b).  
 RTAT is striving to ensure data collected falls within this category. 
3. Joint Assessment  
Joint assessment is the aggregation or combining of multiple cluster reports into a 
single assessment.  
The IASC (2011b) defined joint assessments as the “data collection, processing 
and analysis form one single process among agencies within and between 
clusters/sectors. This leads to a single report. This is sometimes also referred to as a  
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‘common assessment’” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2011b). The Multi-
Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment report, discussed in detail later, is an example of 
a joint assessment. 
RTAT wants its collected data to be included in the UN-ETC ICT common 
operational picture. 
4. Uncoordinated Assessments 
In contrast to the above assessments, uncoordinated assessments are those in 
which “data sets are not interoperable, and the results cannot be used to inform the 
overall analysis” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2011b). RTAT’s previous Excel 
assessment form fell into this category. 
G. THREE CURRENT POST DISASTER ASSESSMENT FORMS 
The literature reviewed revealed that nearly all of the aforementioned 
organizations have some sort of ICT assessment form or questions that pertain to the 
ability to communicate information. Unfortunately, these forms are not harmonized 
(integrated) with one another (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
2014a). The current forms discussed below, however, were an important starting point for 
the RTAT ICT assessment form development and, as such, should be discussed.  
1. United States Agency for International Development  
United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Field 
Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response Appendix II Assessments 
includes Section 12. Infrastructure, Subsection a. Communication with an itemized 
assessment checklist that has some similar items to Appendices G-J to include (United 
States Agency for International Development, 2005, p. II-54–II-57). Its areas include 





 Describe where the system’s facilities are located. 
 Determine the broadcast/reception area or zone of influence (e.g., towns 
serviced by the system). 
 Identify the organization/firm responsible for operation and maintenance 
of the system.  
 Is there a disaster response plan with identification of priority facilities, 
material supply, and priority screening of messages? 
 Obtain technical information, such as: 
 Broadcast power. 
 Operating frequencies, call signs. 
 Relay/transmission points. 
 Hours of operation. 
 Standby power sources. 
 Mobile capability. 
 Repair/maintenance facilities, including capabilities of 
manufacturer’s local agent. 
 Language of transmission. 
 Identify key personnel (owners, management, operations, and 
maintenance). 
 Determine the degree of integration of military and civilian 
communications networks. 
 Note the source(s) of the above information. 
 Determine which communications facilities exist that are operable or 
easily repaired and could be used to pass on assessment information and 
assist in coordination of lifesaving responses. 
 Identify the type of system assessed: 
 Radio. 






 Citizens band. 
 Public systems. 
 Police. 
 Armed forces. 
 Government agencies. (Which ministries have communications 
facilities?) 
 Telephone. 




 Describe specific reasons why a system is not operating. 




 Access to facilities. 
 Damage to system: 
 Broadcast/transmission equipment. 
 Antennae. 
 Buildings. 
 Transmission lines. 
 Relay facilities. 
 Power source. 
 Other. 
 Note source(s) of the above information. 
 Outline options for restoring minimum essential services. 
 Identify local/regional suppliers of communications equipment and 
materials available for repair. Check cost and availability. 
 Determine the local/regional availability of technical services available for 
repair. 
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b. Electric Power 
 Describe the power system, including: 
 Base load facility. 
 Peaking facility. 
 Number of units. 
 Fuel source. 
 Plant controls. 
 Output capability (specify voltage and cycle). 
 Mobile plants. 
 Other standby capability. 
 Switching facilities. 
 Transmission facilities. 
 Distribution facilities (number of substations). 
 Interconnections. 
 Inventory auxiliary equipment that may be available locally (e.g., from 
construction companies). 
 Determine why power is not available (i.e., at what point the system has 
been damaged). 
 Ascertain the condition of generating units. 
 Check the integrity of the fuel system. 
 Determine whether towers, lines, and/or grounding lines are down. 
 Assess the condition of substations. 
 Outline the impact of power loss on key facilities, such as hospitals and 
water pumping stations. 
 Describe the options for restoring minimum essential services. 
 Ascertain whether load shedding and/or switching to another grid can 
restore minimal services. 
 Identify local/regional suppliers of equipment and materials. 
 Check the cost and availability. 
 Determine the local/regional availability of technical services available for 
repair. 
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2. United Nations Assessments
This section includes four subsections: a. Assessment Phases, b. Situational 
Analysis, c. MIRA, and d. Disaster Assessment Coordination. 
a. United Nations Assessment Phases
 Phase 1, the initial 72 hours: Initial assessments—Situational Analysis
 Phase 2, weeks 1–2: Rapid assessments.
 Phase 3, weeks 3–4: In-depth assessments.
 Phase 4, week 5 onwards: In-depth assessments, including recovery needs
(Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2011b).
Table 1 outlines the UN assessment reports due within each phase. RTAT works 
within phases zero (coordination and baseline) through phase two (weeks one and two 
post disaster). 
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Table 1.   IASC Phase Assessment Reports (from Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2011b) 
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b. UN Situational Analysis (Phases 1–2) 
A Situational Analysis (SA) report provides,  
An initial overview of the situation, priority humanitarian needs and 
information gaps. It informs the Strategic Statement and the initial 
decision-making about scale and resource allocation. The SA should be 
updated regularly, until the next phase of the assessment is complete. 
(Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b).  
This report is typically conducted by the earliest responders such as the UNDAC 
teams and FITTEST within the UN-ETC sector (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian AffairsOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b). 
Situational Analysis assessment includes the following (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian AffairsOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b): 
 Drivers of the crisis and underlying factors 
 Scope of the crisis and humanitarian profile 
 Status of populations living in affected areas 
 National capacities and response 
 International capacities and response 
 Humanitarian access 
 Coverage and gaps 
 Priority needs 
c. Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment  
The UN Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) is an assessment product 
of the UN’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and is completed by the IASC’s 
Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2012). 
MIRA is joint assessment of the IASC clusters and is designed to,  
Identify strategic humanitarian priorities during the first weeks following 
an emergency. The main benefit of the MIRA is the elaboration, from the 
onset of the crisis, of a concerted operational picture based on the best 
information available from primary and secondary sources. This picture is 
expressed through two key products: a preliminary scenario definition, 
issued 72 hours after the disaster’s onset, and a MIRA Report, released 
after 2 weeks. (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2012).  
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MIRA assesses crises along eight axes (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian AffairsOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b): 
 Drivers of the crisis and underlying factors. 
 Scope of the crisis and humanitarian profile. 
 Status of populations living in affected areas. 
 National capacities and response. 
 International capacities and response. 
 Humanitarian access. 
 Coverage and gaps. 
 Priority needs. 
Unfortunately, MIRA is a broad overarching assessment that does not yield the 
specific detail to meet all the needs of the RTAT stakeholders. 
d. United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination Team Assessments 
UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) teams deploy within 48 hours 
of disaster and they contain sector experts from each of the clusters. Therefore, UNDAC 
teams are a primary means for Phase 1 Situational Analysis assessments and have a large 
supporting role in future MIRA reports (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairss, 2013b). Additionally, UNDAC teams have a “primary responsibility to assist 
the government of an affected country in its decision making through the identification 
and prioritization of needs for international disaster relief assistance” (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b). “UNDAC teams must develop an 
adequate and efficient structure and flow of information to disseminate the analysis of 
emergency needs to national authorities and other disaster responders in a timely manner” 
(Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b). RTAT looks to help 
facilitate the ICT portion of this information flow.  
UNDAC reports include the following (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b): 
 Summary (highlights and key issues). 
 Situation (general description of the situation, response and recent 
incidents). 
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 Coordination overview: 
 Overall coordination mechanisms in place, both national and 
international. 
 Summary of meeting times and frequency. 
 Constraints in coordination. 
 Operational considerations: 
 Relief entry point. 
 Logistical constraints in relief delivery. 
 Relief delivery issues (e.g., customs information). 
 Special administrative concerns. 
 Security issues. 
 Urban search and rescue (USAR) activities (only applicable in USAR 
phase): 
 Number of teams, name and sending area/country. 
 Differentiation between national and international response. 
 Areas covered/not covered. 
 Cluster overview: 
 List of operation clusters. 
 Overview of coordination within clusters. 
 Specific details for each operational cluster under new headings. 
 Clearly identified national response in each cluster. 
 List of relief provided or in the pipeline for each cluster. 
 National response: 
 Other national response not covered in the cluster section. 
 Bi-lateral response: 
 In-kind contributions. 
 Cash contributions. 
 Other: 





 General context of the situation. 
 Attached maps and lists where applicable, or included in the report 
itself. 
The FITTEST teams reside within the UN-Emergency Telecommunication 
Cluster (UN-ETC). FITTEST teams are the primary means of assessing ICT 
infrastructure in the early phases. FITTEST teams have the added responsibility to 
establish infrastructure to facilitate emergency inter and intra UN agency communication. 
RTAT looks to assist FITTEST teams by conducting ICT assessment while they 
concentrate on establishing communication means (Steckler, 2009).  
No explicit ICT assessment checklist was found in either the Situational Analysis 
or MIRA report. Nor could a standalone ICT checklist for either the UNDAC or 
FITTEST teams be located. One question was located within the Logistics checklist of 
Annex Z of UNDAC Handbook (2013b) in regards to logistical communication.  
No explicit ICT assessment checklist was found in either the Situational Analysis 
or MIRA report. Nor could a standalone ICT checklist for either the UNDAC or 
FITTEST teams be located. However, one question was found within the Logistics 
checklist of Annex Z of UNDAC Handbook (2013b) in regards to logistical 
communication: 
“Communications: Do telephone and/or radio systems exist? What is their 
reliability/usefulness? Is there cell phone coverage? If yes; what system, 
i.e., roaming or procurement of scratch cards?” (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013b). 
The World Food Programme, UN-ETC lead agency, also has a section on ICT 
assessment within their Field Operations Pocketbook. 
3. World Food Programme Emergency Field Operations Pocketbook 
Section 11.4 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) of World Food 
Programme’s (WFP’s) Emergency Field Operations Pocketbook stated that responders 





 Normal phones: coverage and reliability of the network; whether 
all offices are connected. 
 Mobile phones: coverage and reliability of the network(s); which 
offices/staff are using them 
 Satellite phones: whether each office has one; as of security phase 
2, the security focal point and the CD should each have a satellite 
phone 
 in their residence 
 Faxes: which offices have fax machines and are able to 
send/receive 
 Radios: 
 WFP/UN radio room(s): the location(s) and hours of operation. 
 HF/VHF radios: which offices, vehicles and individuals have 
them? 
 VHF base stations and repeaters: locations.  
 Lightning protection: whether all radio equipment with external 
antennas is protected. 
 Local technical support: availability and quality of service; 
availability of spare parts. 
 IT Environment: 
 The numbers of functioning desktops, laptops, printers; whether 
there is a local area network (LAN). 
 E-mail services: whether offices have ‘Notes’ connectivity and 
deepfield mailing (DFMS) 
 Anti-virus software; Whether installed on all computers; the 
regularity of updating 
 Local technical support: availability and quality of service; 
availability of spare parts 
 Electric power: 
 The local power grid: hours that power is available; its reliability 
and stability 
 Whether UPS stabilizers are installed to protect equipment 
 Back-up capacity: generators, solar panels, batteries 
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Table 2 is a synopsis of WFP’s minimum communication requirements based on 
phases, as indicated above, based on the phases of relief above.  
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Table 2.   World Food Programme Communication Requirements by Phase (from WFP, 2002, pp. 282–283)  
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H. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
According to the capability maturity model integration (CMMI) model, system 
requirements analysis must be done before designing a solution (Huang & Lien, 2012). 
The Enterprise Architecture Analysis marks the starting point for the discovery stage of 
the COE. Appendix B includes a detailed enterprise architecture assessment for RTAT; 
however, definitions and highlights are included in this section.  
1. Enterprise Architecture 
Ross, Weill and Robertson (2006) defined Enterprise Architecture as,  
The organizing logic for business processes and IT infrastructure, 
reflecting the integration and standardization requirements of the 
company’s operating model. The enterprise architecture provides a long-
term view of a company’s processes, systems, and technologies so that 
individual projects can build capabilities—not just fulfill immediate needs. 
Companies go through four stages in learning how to take an enterprise 
architecture approach to designing business processes: Business Silos, 
Standardized Technology, Optimized Core, and Business Modularity [see 
Figure 6]. As a company advances through the stages, its foundation for 
execution takes on increased strategic importance. (p.9)  
 
Figure 6.  Four Stages of Enterprise Architecture Maturity (from Ross et al., 2006, p. 72) 
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Summarily, the RTAT “enterprise” is defined as the people, equipment and 
processes associated with the collection, storage and promulgation of pre and post 
disaster ICT data collection (Beeson, 2013).  
2. Operating Model 
Ross et al. (2006) stated, “The operating model is the necessary level of business 
process integration and standardization for delivering goods and services to customers” 
(p. 8). Figure 7 breaks up the different operating models to be discussed in a 2 X 2 matrix 
based on the levels of business process integration and process standardization between 
units in an organization. 
 
Figure 7.  Four Operating Models with Description (from Ross et al., 2006, p. 39) 
RTAT is trying to improve standardization within the organization and within the 
forms, as well as become more integrated with other HA organizations thereby increasing 
its organizational agility, see Figure 8 for this shift (Beeson, 2013).  
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a. Standardization 
With the use of standardized capabilities (gear), the developed mobile data 
collection tool (standard data forms) and standardized training (how qualitative questions 
within the forms are assessed), RTAT hopes to improve, standardize, and add value to its 
assessments with the HA community. 
b. Integration 
Integration is defined as the ability of stakeholders (Pacific Disaster Center) to 
seamlessly import and display RTAT collected assessment data in a value added, 
intuitive, easily understood manner to the end-use customer (UN-ETC and other NGOs).  
RTAT seeks to increase the standardization of its processes from a diversified to a 
replication organization, see Figure 8 for this movement. 
 
Figure 8.  Shift from Diversification to Replication Operating Model (after Ross et al., 
2006, p. 39) 
a. Agility 
Agility is the ability to get assessment information in the hands of those who need 
it and the ability to re-task as required within the ICT assessment realm. Agility includes 
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time training assessors, speed and accuracy of assessment, speed and ability to send 
assessment information to end users, and the ability to modify forms quickly as need 
arises.  
RTAT currently uses a Microsoft (MS) Excel spreadsheet that is manually 
updated by subject matter expert (SME) assessors and emailed to other team members 
and organizations. RTAT has agreed upon the questions to ask and the items to assess, 
but they have not agreed to their associated standard answer/assessment metrics. The 
current MS Excel spreadsheet method does not expeditiously collate the raw data and 
export processed information. To obtain actionable information from RTAT, an 
individual must collect all of the spreadsheets and individually review each one. This is a 
painstakingly, time consuming process that does not work when time equates to lives 
lost.  
In response, RTAT is looking into alternatives that will better meet the current 
and future data collection, processing, and sense-making needs. In the process, RTAT has 
discovered that it needs to change its operating model to remain relevant (Beeson, 2013). 
To enable this operating model change, RTAT is seeking an IT solution that will foster 
standardization while enabling integration. 
This developed IT solution must enable RTAT to efficiently collect and distribute 
baseline/post-disaster ICT information in (near) real time. (Near) real time is situational 
dependent but should be less than 1 hour from collection by RTAT to receipt by the end-
use customer (UN-ETC/NGO). Potential IT solutions will be discussed later; all available 
options, however, require a data connection to work. This is problematic because the ICT 
infrastructure is typically in ill-repair in a post disaster scenario. HA organizations have 
been experimenting with and developing Hastily Formed Network (HFN) concepts and 
technologies to cope with this problem. Before exploring the technologies, RTAT wanted 
to examine its processes. Savvion process modeler was chosen to do this. 
I. SAVVION BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT 
Savvion is a comprehensive, model-based business process management (BPM) 
system that empowers a user to build and simulate business process alternatives (Aurea, 
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n.d.). Savvion (2006) has identified that, “The first step in improving a business 
processes is to articulate precisely where bottlenecks exist, and the most efficient way to 
do that is by simulating existing processes using business process modeling software.”  
Based on input, Savvion calculates the cost (time and or monetary) of the created 
business process map (Figure 6). This enables a quantitative comparison of alternatives. 
Savvion delivers real-time, context-relevant insight into critical business operations and 
tools to change business rules and logic (Aurea, 2014). Savvion was used to simulate and 
improve the RTAT assessment business processes; detailed results are included in 
Chapter III and in Appendix C. Figure 9 shows a screen capture of the RTAT old “as is” 
assessment business process using Savvion. 
 
Figure 9.  Savvion RTAT Old “As Is” Business Process (from Beeson, Gladem, & 
Gonzalez, 2014) 
Starting in the top left portion of Figure 9, a member of a responding NGO 
needing information requests the UN-ETC to conduct an ICT assessment at a particular 
site or region of interest. UN-ETC requests support from RTAT who assigns one of three 
available teams to support. The team conducts the assessment using the outdated Excel 
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spreadsheet and manually inputs GPS coordinates via an external device. Completed 
assessments are emailed to the UN-ETC for quality assurance and map plotting. Errors 
and ambiguity are sent back to the RTAT for correction and or clarification. Once 
reviewed and plotted by the UN-ETC, results are shared with the requesting NGO via 
email dissemination. Review and rework are the largest sources of delay, outside of 
RTAT travel to the assessment site. Manual, point-to-point email is the least desirable 
form of information sharing; if collaboration, and a collective shared understanding of the 
operational environ is desired (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
2014a).  
J. HASTILY FORMED NETWORK 
All RTAT means of forwarding the ICT assessment require an Internet 
connection. This section will discuss how RTAT can leverage hastily formed network 
organizations, gear and procedures to obtain an Internet connection within a disaster 
zone.  
1. Wireless Mesh Network  
Wireless mesh networks is the term used to describe the ability of devices to 
automatically connect to other networks within a network. Akyildiz, Wang & Wang 
(2005) explained,  
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) offers an inexpensive, quickly 
deployable, stable and fault tolerant solution for wireless coverage, 
requiring zero maintenance. The WMN based on (IEEE standard) 
802.11(s) is most popular due to easily available and inexpensive radios. 
There are currently many implementations of wireless mesh networks 
based on 802.11(b,g,n) hardware. All of these (solutions) run some 
proprietary mesh protocol at the network layer.  
Furthermore, WMNs provide: 
[n]etwork access for both mesh and conventional clients. The integration 
of WMNs with other networks such as the Internet, cellular, IEEE 
802.11(b,g,n), IEEE 802.15 (WIMAX), IEEE 802.16, sensor networks, 




the mesh routers. Mesh clients can be either stationary or mobile, and can 
form a client mesh network among themselves and with mesh routers. 
(Akyildiz et al., 2005).  
Any individual or organization with a Wi-Fi device (laptop, phone, etc.) within 
range, on the move or stationary, can access the WMN and the support and/or reach back 
capability that it offers. WMNs can quickly and cheaply replace failed host nation 
infrastructure and are a key enabling component to hastily formed networks. 
2. Hastily Formed Network 
Hastily formed network (HFN) is a type of hyper-network that is 
(a) put together quickly in response to an emergency, crisis, or urgent 
situation (b) from a collection of entities who have expertise or local 
responsibility to help but have not worked together before (c) and who 
accept no higher decision-making authority. (Denning & Hayes-Roth, 
2006). 
 The lack of a recognized, over-arching authority may further compound the ad 
hoc/complex nature of disaster relief. Like “networks” and “hyper networks” defined 
above, HFNs are a composition of both the organizational make up and their equipment. 
a. Hastily Formed Network Organization 
HFN’s are neither a hierarchy nor flat organization, but an ecosystem or a 
federation of organizations with a shared purpose (Denning & Hayes-Roth, 2006). HFNs 
may be made up of a loose federation of hierarchical organizations, but success depends 
on their ability to create a collective “network” that shares more in common with ‘edge’ 
organizations, as defined later by Alberts and Hayes (2003). Denning (2000) further 
described a HFN as “the newest form of a hyper-network, having the special 
characteristic that the participants have little time to learn and adapt before producing 
results” (Denning, 2000). According to Denning (2000), 
An HFN has five elements: it is (1) a network of people established 
rapidly (2) from different communities (3) working together in a shared 
conversation space (4) in which they plan, commit to, and execute actions, 
to (5) fulfill a large, urgent mission.  
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Furthermore, “HFNs must employ organizational forms compatible with the 
nature of the organizational challenges at that level. Decentralized decision making and a 
focused sharing of high value situation information should be base principles” (Denning, 
2000). Successful HFN organizational forms are more similar to “Edge” organizations as 
described in Alberts and Hayes’s (2003) classic book, Power to the Edge than 
hierarchical organization typical of the military or most host nation governments. Alberts 
and Hayes (2003) described entities on an organizations edge as those on the “tip of the 
spear,” on the edge of the empire, and or in direct contact with the customer. People on 
the edge have the most up to date, local, situational awareness and should be empowered 
with the right information, tools, equipment and authority to enact rapid decisions and 
change. Alberts and Hayes (2003) described this process in Power to the Edge. Edge 
organizations are empowered with the ability to smart pull of resources and information 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2005, p. 119). Suppliers in edge organizations must post information 
and available assets and resources for the consumers to pull (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 
119). This is similar to a Craig’s List or eBay posting format that efficiently links 
resources to needs and suppliers with consumers. 
b. Hastily Formed Network Equipment 
Denning (2000) asserted, “The heart of the (HFN) network is the communication 
system… and the ways they (participants) interact within it. We call this the 
‘conversation space’ of the HFN.” Denning (2000) continues that conversation space is 
made of three key aspects: “(1) a medium of communication among (2) a set of players 
(3) who have agreed on a set of interaction rules.” The physical equipment systems vary 
greatly from humanitarian event (HE) to event. Some are brought by nongovernmental 
organizations for specific tasks, but, by definition, the HFN quickly becomes a 
compendium of ad hoc meshed networks brought to bear by the collective. Figure 10 
shows the various puzzle pieces (systems, procedures, etc.) required for an HFN and 
includes power systems, as well as cellular, Internet, radio, and communication means 
(Steckler, 2009).  
The RTAT collection tool will leverage HFN technologies. 
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Figure 10.  Hastily Formed Network (HFN) Puzzle Pieces (from Steckler, 2009) 
K. MOBILE DEVICE OPERATING SYSTEMS 
Several competing operating systems in the mobile (smart) device arena currently 
exist. Competitors include: Microsoft Windows Mobile, Symbian Operating System 
(OS), Research In Motion Blackberry OS, Apple iPhone OS (iOS) and the Android™ 
OS. Currently, iOS and Android make up 94 percent of this market, justifying further 
study. 
1. iPhone Operating System 
iPhone Operating System (iOS) was created for Apple’s iPhone in 2007 in 
response to Windows Mobile, Palm OS, Symbian, and BlackBerry (Verge Staff, 2014). 
Apple revolutionized the smart phone market through its innovative use of the capacitive 
touch screen. Apple removed all but five physical buttons and perfected its touch screen 
to allow multi-touch commands such as “pinch-to-zoom and inertial scrolling to make 
apps feel more natural and immediate” (Verge Staff, 2014). Additionally, Apple 
integrated iOS into its Apple ecosystem that included iTunes and the Apple Appstore; 
this combined with its ultra-usability propelled iOS to the forefront of the smart phone 
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market (Verge Staff, 2014). Unfortunately, iOS is available only on Apple products and 
the Appstore has a more rigorous vetting process for the creation of third party 
applications than other competing operating systems and has inadvertently limited the 
mobile data collection applications as a result. 
2. Android Operating System 
The Open Handset Alliance (OHA) Android™ initiative was created as a way to 
cost effectively develop a mobile device operating system. While Google is the lead 
entity of the OHA, there are a total of 84 technology and mobile companies contributing. 
These entities include: Acer, ASUS, HTC, Huawei, LG, Kyocera, Motorola, Samsung, 
Sony and ZTE to name but a few (Open Handset Alliance, 2014). OHA created Android 
as an open source operating system to promote the smart phone market and get the most 
out of emerging cell phone technologies. According to Reed (2014), Android makes up 
approximately 46 percent of smart device operating systems; however, research has 
shown that market share estimates vary slightly by source and time frame (Figure 11). 
What is clear is that Android has been increasing its market share over the years, 
especially in developing nations and is poised to take over the smart phone market in 
2014 (Levine 2014). Currently, Android phone shipments make up approximately 85 
percent of smart phone market, but that could change with the scheduled release of the 
iPhone 6 in fall 2014 (Levine, 2014). 
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Figure 11.  Mobile Device Operating System Market Share (from Reed, 2014) 
Android allows a user to download applications (app(s)) that interface with 
certain capabilities organic to the device. These capabilities include: Camera (video and 
still), microphone, GPS, network (cellular and Wi-Fi), touch screen capacitance, 
accelerometer, memory, and the device’s computing power. Any user can create their 
own Android compatible application (Lighthouse is one such example) using the OHA 
standards, or the user can simply download the appropriate application from an app store 
such as GooglePlay or Amazon (Open Handset Alliance, 2014). The One Platform 
Foundation (OnePF) tracks over 30 popular app stores and found that GooglePlay makes 
up about 1/3 of the market with approximately 2.5 billion downloads/month (One 
Platform Foundation, 2014). In comparison, the next largest competitor is Tencent at 300 
million/month and Amazon accounts for comparatively low 25 million downloads (One 
Platform Foundation, 2014). Comparatively, iOS users download approximately 1.56 
billion applications from Apple’s App Store every month (Levine, 2014). 
L. MOBILE DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Historically, data collection methods in undeveloped areas or disaster zones have 
been lacking and reliant upon paper forms in interview or checklist assessment format. 
Unfortunately, the paper forms require additional processing to collate their associated 
information into a data base for further refinement that enables logical and cogent 
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delineation of needs and decisions. With the advent of laptops and Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDA), some forms have been migrated to electronic format. The formats can 
be integrated into data base formats, but their forms require extensive programming or 
understanding of the software to do so. Additionally, these forms typically could not 
update information in (near) real-time. With the “proliferation of smartphones, low cost 
mobile connectivity with good coverage and availability of several data collection 
applications that can work around the connectivity concerns, pen-paper surveys are now 
being replaced by mobile based data collection applications” (Gupta, Thapar, Singh, 
Srinivasan & Vardhan, 2013).  
Mobile phone data collection options fall into three main methodologies, 
Electronic Form Interface, Short Messaging Service (SMS) + Cue Card Interface, and 
Voice Interface (Patnaik, Brunskill, & Thies, 2013). The strengths and weaknesses for 
each are outlined in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Mobile Phone Data Collection Methods (from Patnaik et al., 2013) 
1. Electronic Form Interface  
The term “electronic forms” denotes “any external application that can be placed 
on a phone and that automatically guides the user how to enter data, through the use of 
text, menus or other tools” (Patnaik et al., 2013). The term “developed electronic form 
interface” is interchangeable with mobile data collection tool/platform, RTAT tool, or by 
its associated application Lighthouse or Open Data Kit (ODK) Collect, to be discussed 
later. 
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2. Short Messaging Service + Cue Card 
Patnaik et al. (2013) referred to Short Messaging Service (SMS) as “data 
collection systems that involve information entered by a structured text message: in 
particular we assume that the information is entered by following a small cue sheet with a 
flowchart that directs the collector how to enter the data.” This method assumes a SMS 
(text) service works in the area being assessed. 
3. Voice Interface 
Voice interface relies upon a voice connection and an interviewer to collect 
information. Gupta et al. (2013) found that voice interface is the most accurate of the 
three methods when answers are relayed to a live person or by voice mail. They require 
only a basic phone. Questions and answers can be modified or explored further and the 
education level and training of the interviewer is the lowest of the methods (Gupta et al., 
2013). Unfortunately, the method relies upon a working phone network that may not be 
available in a post disaster environment. Further, voice takes up more bandwidth than 
SMS, and small data transmissions leading to interruptions in calls and voice services are 
typically more expensive than SMS services in developing regions. For these reasons, 
Voice Interface was not further considered for RTAT.  
M. AVAILABLE MOBILE ELECTRONIC FORM INTERFACES 
NOMAD (n.d.-a and b) and MobileActive (2013) have extensive listings of 
available Mobile Data Collection Platforms; below is an overview of pertinent platforms.  
Chapter III includes an extensive discussion as to how the final platform was 
selected. The basic mobile data collection tool requirements include:  
 Small form factor.  
 Ruggedized. 
 Android compatible. 
 Free to develop and use. 
 Ability to make and tailor forms quickly and easily. 
 KML file exportable (importable into a database). 
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 GPS location enabled 
 Able to take and include photos. 
 Skip logic pattern supportable (able to ask/skip questions based previous 
answers).  
 Not restricted to SMS (text message) only. 
 Forms must be stored on the device until they can be opportunistically 
uploaded when a data connection is available.  
1. The HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition of Data 
The HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition of Data (NOMAD) is a non-
governmental organization (NGO) project that “links organizations with the latest 
information management tools to more easily collect, analyze and manage data” 
(HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition Of Data, 2012). NOMAD utilizes its 
Online Selection Assistant (OSA) to connect organizations with one of 39 established 
mobile data collection (MDC) solutions (HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition 
Of Data, 2014). Participants are asked a series of questions regarding their requirements 
and the OSA returns viable options for further research, test and evaluation. According to 
NOMAD (2014), established MDC tools include:  
Acquee, COMMANDmobile, CommCare, CommTrack, CSPro, 
CyberTracker, DevInfo, do Forms, droidSURVEY, Enketo Smart Paper, 
EpiCollect, FrontlineSMS, Fulcrum, GeoChat, GeoPoll, Humanitarian 
Data Toolkit, Imogene, iSURVEY, KoBo, Last Mile Mobile Solution, 
Magpi, Majella Insight, Mobenzi Researcher, Nokia Data Gathering 
system, Oasis Mobile, Open Data Kit, openXdata, Pendragon, Poimapper, 
PSI Mobile—Fusion, RapidSMS, RDMS, Smap, SoukTel, Telerivet, 
ViewWorld, Voxiva, and Wepi.  
One notable popular disaster information management solution is Ushahidi’s 
CrowdMap. Ushahidi is a Kenyan based initiative and its CrowdMap differs from the 
listed mobile data collection tools in that it uses a “crowd-sourced data aggregation 
paradigm... Data aggregators collect unstructured data found as posts to services such as 
Twitter, Facebook, email, and SMS, and they mine this data for information (Jung, 2011). 
In contrast,  
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Mobile data collection systems run designed surveys which collect 
specific information from a target audience. The audience can be either 
organizational staff trained to conduct surveys/assessment or the target 
population being studied can be surveyed directly via their personal 
mobile devices. In either case, the specific questions and structured 
responses can be important to rapidly collecting information deemed 
essential to an emergency response. (Jung, 2011). 
Developers of the aforementioned established tools are allowed to update their 
tool’s information within the OSA to ensure the latest information. The results for free, 
Android operating systems, with Keyhole Markup Language (KML) output options are 
outlined in the next sections. 
2. Android Options 
Android is a product of the Open Handset Alliance (OHA), led by Google (Open 
Handset Alliance, 2014). Android currently makes up approximately 46 percent of smart 
device operating systems and has been slowly increasing its market share (Reed, 2014). 
The following sections briefly discuss the Android compatible mobile data collection 
(MDC) tool applications that HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition Of Data 
(NOMAD) suggested for further research by the NOMAD Online Selection Assistant 
(OSA) program. Full OSA results are available from the author upon request. 
a. Open Data Kit  
According to Brunette, Sundt, Dell, Chaudhri, Breit, and Borriello (2013),  
Open Data Kit (ODK) is an open-source, modular toolkit that enables 
organizations to build application specific information services for use in 
resource-constrained environments. ODK is one of the leading data 
collection solutions available and has been deployed by a wide variety of 
organizations in dozens of countries around the world. 
ODK has a robust community of practice and Google group forum located at 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/opendatakit-developers. In addition, 
Developmental support is available for a fee if required. ODK is a suite of systems that 
include the following tools:  
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 Build: ODK Build enables users to generate forms using a drag-and-drop 
form designer. Build is implemented as an HTML5 web-based application 
and targets the common use case of a simple form” (ODK, 2014). 
 Collect: ODK Collect is a “powerful phone-based replacement for your 
paper forms. Collect is built on the Android platform and can collect a 
variety of form data types: text, location, photos, video, audio, and 
barcodes” (ODK, 2014). 
 Aggregate: ODK Aggregate “provides a ready to deploy online repository 
to store, view and export collected data. Aggregate can run on Google’s 
reliable and free infrastructure as well as on local servers backed by 
MySQL and PostgreSQL” (ODK, 2014). 
 Form Uploader: ODK Form Uploader facilitates the uploading of a blank 
form and its media files to ODK Aggregate (ODK, 2014). 
 Briefcase: ODK Briefcase is “the best way to transfer data from Collect 
and Aggregate” (ODK, 2014). 
 Validate: ODK Validate “ensures that you have an OpenRosa compliant 
XForm—one that will also work with all the ODK tools” (ODK, 2014). 
 XLS2XForm: ODK XLS2XForm allows XForms to be designed using 
MS Excel (ODK, 2014). 
b. Lighthouse Application 
The Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Common Operational Research 
Environment (CORE) lab developed Lighthouse. Lighthouse leverages the above ODK 
technologies (ODK Build forms and ODK Aggregate) to collect, aggregate and display 
spatial data on a common operational picture (COP) display. This data can then be further 
analyzed using social network analysis (SNA) tools to develop a better understanding of 
the commonalities and groupings of events and data sets. In the context of the DOD, 
Morganthaler and Summers (2011) defined SNA as “a type of applied art where social 
science and mathematics are integrated to flesh out the strategic options within both the 
kinetic and non-kinetic approaches of a counterinsurgency campaign” (p. 10). These tools 
have been used by the CORE lab with success in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Thailand to 
combat improvised explosive device (IED) threats and to better understand insurgent 
cells (Bumatay, & Graeber, 2014). While SNA is out the scope of this thesis, these tools 
can be used to link cellular providers with tower locations, determine hardest hit disaster 
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areas, and even piece together the structures/areas that remain the most resilient for later 
research. Ushahidi, mentioned above, is a SNA tool. 
Unfortunately, Lighthouse only works for Android operating system based 
devices and thus will not work for 54 percent of smart device users (Reed, 2014). Further, 
Lighthouse is not available in the GooglePlay store making distribution and installation 
of the application difficult. Lighthouse, however, is supported by the NPS CORE lab staff 
and they were instrumental in the development of the early RTAT forms. Unfortunately, 
due to budget restraints and operational commitments, updates to the Lighthouse 
application have not kept pace with feature developments of the ODK Forms. Further 
Lighthouse developments have been halted in favor of the development of a Hypertext 
Mark Up Language 5 (HTML5) based solution that is operating system independent and 
will work on both Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS.  
A direct competitor to Lighthouse is Open Data Kit (ODK Collect). 
c. Open Data Kit Collect 
Like Lighthouse, “ODK Collect is a mobile platform that renders complex 
application logic and supports the manipulation of data types that include text, location, 
images, audio, video, and bar-codes” (Hartung, Anokwa, Brunette, Lerer, Tseng, & 
Borriello, 2010). 
ODK Collect is available on the GooglePlay store and works with the created 
ODK Build forms and can be synched to the CORE lab’s ODK aggregate server, just like 
Lighthouse. ODK Collect solves the distribution and update problems of Lighthouse. 
ODK has an extensive wiki and online community of practice, but their level of support 
does not match that of the CORE lab’s walk-in face to face help when it comes to form 
building. 
Like Lighthouse,  
ODK Collect renders forms into a sequence of input prompts that apply 
form logic, entry constraints, and repeating sub-structures. Users work 
through the prompts and can save the submission at any point. Finalized 
submissions can be sent to (and new forms downloaded from) a server. 
Currently, ODK Collect uses the Android platform, supports a wide 
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variety of prompts (text, number, location, multimedia, barcodes), and 
works well without network connectivity. (Open Data Kit Collect, 2014) 
d. Field Information Support Tool  
As Longley (2010) explained, 
The Field Information Support Tool (FIST) is a field data-collection 
system using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) smartphones, customized 
software, and a robust information management backend known as 
FusionPortal with a deployable sensor fusion system known as 
FusionView that enables information to flow from the point of capture to 
an analyst in near real-time regardless of location or physical proximity. 
 FIST is free for a Naval Postgraduate student to develop, RTAT would be 
expected to pay, however, for ongoing future support. FIST became a pay for service 
option when it expanded the Lighthouse data collection capability into a more robust 
social network analysis platform. 
e. CyberTracker  
According to NOMAD (n.d.-a),  
CyberTracker is a downloadable solution for mobile data collection that 
can be implemented on PalmOS, PocketPC, Windows Mobile or Android. 
The CyberTracker designer enables the creation of graphical collection 
forms, originally targeted at non-literate animal trackers. No coding is 
required and it automatically generates the required database schema in 
MS (Microsoft) Access. CyberTracker exports data in 14 formats 
including ESRI Shape file. CyberTracker can send data from mobile 
device or smartphone to remote FTP (File Transfer Protocol) site.  
CyberTracker Consists of a Desktop Windows Application to design sequences to 
use in the mobile application, a Mobile Application (see Figure 13) to capture data and 
another Desktop Windows application to query, visualize, and export the data using 
Microsoft (MS) Access (CyberTracker, 2014).  
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Figure 13.  CyberTracker in use (from CyberTracker, 2014) 
Forms are customizable, but there is no ability to use skip logic (CyberTracker, 
2014). Photos can be manually added to the database only after the form has been 
uploaded thus necessitating a two-step processes (CyberTracker, 2014). The requirement 
to manually attach a photo after upload in the database and physically attach the device to 
a laptop/desktop to manually download a assessment file to the computer for export gives 
the tool low marks for usability. Additionally, Cybertracker has no way of synching 
downloaded assessments or resuming a download should the link between the computer 
and the server be disconnected. The supportability of CyberTracker is minimal with no 
established community of practice or wiki. 
f. Humanitarian Data Toolkit 
NOMAD (n.d.-a) stated,  
The Humanitarian Data Toolkit (HDT), developed by Internews and Modi 
Research Group at Columbia University, is a ruggedized, self-contained 
data collection toolkit that makes it possible to conduct rapid mobile and 
paper based data collection and analysis in an off-line and off-grid 
environment. The HDT consists of a laptop running a local instance of the 
Formhub data collection software, a scanner, Wi-Fi network and phones 
that fit in a carry-on sized Pelican case and an additional portable solar 
panel / battery that are able to reliably power the toolkit when electricity is 
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not possible. Powering the HDT is Formhub, an open source mobile data 
collection platform, bamboo, a data analytics service, both developed by 
the Modi Research Group, and Captricity service that rapidly converts 
paper forms into structured data. In the HDT, these tools are integrated 
together make it possible to author a survey offline in Excel, collect data 
using Android phones/tablets, offline enabled webforms and paper forms, 
with all data managed in a central place where they can be quickly 
analyzed in almost a real-time basis allowing responders to make quick, 
evidence-based decisions on how best to intervene.  
Unfortunately, this system does not meet the small form factor (laptop, scanner, 
solar panel, etc.) requirements of the on-the-go assessor model and was not considered 
further (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14.  Humanitarian Data Toolkit (Humanitarian Data Toolkit, 2014) 
3. iPhone Options 
The NOMAD OSA program was used to narrow the Apple iOS compliant mobile 
data collection tool options, with the following results: Fulcrum, GeoChat, Majella and 
ViewWorld. All three were iOS compliant, but all three required payment for their use in 
the scale required by RTAT (HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition Of Data, n.d.-
b). Full OSA results are available upon request. 
a. Fulcrum 
Fulcrum allows a user to “create, deploy, and manage field data collection apps 
for iPhone, iPad, and Android” (MobileActive, 2010). Fulcrum includes a web-based 
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drag-and-drop app designer for creating customized survey forms to control the data 
captured from the field. Fulcrum has offline mobile support but there is a charge for its 
services (MobileActive, 2010). As of August 6, 2014, plans go from $29/month for one 
user to $749/month for 50 users (Fulcrum, n.d.).  
b. GeoChat 
GeoChat is,  
A collaboration tool that allows users to chat, report, and get alerts on their 
phone that can be represented on a map. It facilitates a slightly different 
communication paradigm based on collaboration rather than one way data 
collection. Geochat is an open source solution that supports GeoRSS, 
KML and http API’s on any mobile device. (HumanitariaN Operations 
Mobile Acquisition Of Data, n.d.-b) 
GeoChat is an interesting way to track personnel and simple data points; the 
system, however, was not supported like the Open Data Kit community, and it is better 
suited to track personnel with simple data messages such as: “I’m here,” “I’m going to 
__,” or “Send Help!” 
c. Majella 
“Majella Insight is a complete Mobile Data Collection and Integration System” 
(HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition Of Data, n.d.-b). Majella provides a 
“secure cloud application and the ability to collect and integrate data on both a web and 
mobile mapping application” CSV, XML, KML and PDF export formats (HumanitariaN 
Operations Mobile Acquisition of Data, n.d.-b). 
d. ViewWorld 
ViewWorld is a plug and play mobile data collection platform hosted in the cloud, 
designed for organizations collection data in harsh conditions” (HumanitariaN Operations 
Mobile Acquisition Of Data, n.d.-b). ViewWorld is an end-to-end solution that allows a 
user to create a form, collect data, and view the data on a web console (HumanitariaN 
Operations Mobile Acquisition Of Data, n.d.-b). Results can be exported to the web, 
social media, or on line map (HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition Of Data, 
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n.d.-b). Data can also be manipulated on ViewWorld’s dashboard with simple visual 
analytics such as graphs and pie charts (HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition Of 
Data, n.d.-b). ViewWorld’s API facilitates data exportation into various data formats 
(HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition Of Data, n.d.-b). 
e. DataKeep 
A Formhub/Open Data Kit based application is available in the Apple appstore 
called DataKeep. Released in March 2014, DataKeep version 1.01 is a free XForm 
format compatible application. Like ODK Collect, DataKeep allows forms to be retrieved 
from and returned to any setup server, Formhub or ODK Aggregate for example. 
Unfortunately, this application does not support all XForm features like ODK Collect and 
does not work with developed RTAT forms (iTunes App Store). The application, 
therefore, would not work with established servers. This application may become a viable 
option once all ODK Form features are incorporated into DataKeep. 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
This chapter documents a campaign of experimentation to develop an improved 
mobile data collection tool for the Rapid Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) Assessment Team (RTAT) organization and mission. This chapter will explain 
what a campaign of experimentation is and what was done at each stage of the campaign 
to research, develop, test, analyze and ultimately demonstrate a viable RTAT solution. 
A. CAMPAIGN OF EXPERIMENTATION 
Alberts and Hayes (2002) stated that the objectives of experimentation are “to 
develop and refine innovative concepts of operation and to coevolve mission capability 
packages to turn these concepts into real operational capabilities. One experiment cannot 
possibly achieve this objective. Rather, it will take a well-orchestrated experimentation 
campaign consisting of a series of related activities to accomplish this” (p. 16). Alberts 
and Hayes (2002) further described the linking of several related experiment, discovery, 
hypothesis and /or demonstration experiments, in a systematic and coherent manner to 
achieve a much larger end state goal as an “experimentation campaign” (p. 25). Alberts 
and Hayes (2002) explained that an experimentation campaign is, 
A series of related activities that explore and mature knowledge about a 
concept of interest…experimentation campaigns use the different types of 
experiments in a logical way to move from an idea or concept to some 
demonstrated military capability. Hence, experimentation campaigns are 
organized ways of testing innovations that allow refinement and support 
increased understanding over time. (p. 25).  
Simply put, “Campaigns of experimentation explore and mature knowledge about 
a subject” (Hudgens & Bordetsky, 2009). Elaborating further on campaigns of 
experimentations, Alberts and Hayes (2002) stated, 
Campaigns (of experimentation) are designed to provide comprehensive 
insight across a set of related issues. The focus of campaign planning is to 
ensure that each important aspect of force capability is addressed and that 
no critical issues are overlooked. As a result, the various axes of the 
experimentation campaign employ a range of conditions and methods for 
investigating different types of issues. The fundamental planning question 
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for an experimentation campaign is: ‘Are we addressing all of the 
important aspects of the problem?’ (p.45) 
Alberts and Hayes (2005) characterized COE experimentation activities within 
three categories: discovery, hypothesis and demonstration (pp. 72–76).  
1. Discovery Experiments 
Alberts and Hayes (2002) defined discovery experiments as those experiments 
that “involve introducing novel systems, concepts, organizational structures, 
technologies, or other elements to a setting where their use can be observed and 
catalogued” (p. 9). Further, “discovery experiments are designed to generate new ideas or 
ways of doing things. They seek to create opportunities for individuals and organizations 
to ‘think outside the box’ and thus to stimulate creativity” (Alberts & Hayes, 2005, p. 
73). The result, product, or output of a discovery experiment “is a promising idea or 
approach (Alberts & Hayes, 2005, p. 73). 
2. Hypothesis Testing 
Alberts and Hayes (2002) stated, “hypothesis testing experiments are the classic 
type used by scholars to advance knowledge by seeking to falsify specific hypotheses 
(specifically if then statements) or discover their limiting conditions” (p. 22). Alberts and 
Hayes (2005) continue that,  
Depending on the nature of the hypotheses tested, this type of experiment 
provides ‘proof’ that a theory, idea, or approach is valid; establishes its 
value under specific conditions; establishes the exceptions and limits of its 
application or utility; and establishes a degree of credibility. (p. 75).  
3. Demonstration Experiments 
Alberts and Hayes (2005) explained demonstration experiments as a, “venue in 
which known truth is recreated…They are used to show potential customers that some 
innovation can, under carefully orchestrated conditions, improve efficiency, 
effectiveness, or speed” (p. 75).  
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B. RAPID INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT TEAM CAMPAIGN OF EXPERIMENTATION 
Following Alberts and Hayes’s (2002, 2005) campaign of experimentation model 
outlined above, this section describes a campaign of experimentation to research, explore 
and mature mobile data collection technology and methodology. The specific goal for 
this COE is a working mobile data collection tool for the RTAT organization and 
mission. 
Alberts and Hayes (2005) stated, “campaigns of experimentation (COE) should 
generally move along an axis that takes them from discovery experiments to preliminary 
hypotheses experiments, to refined hypotheses experiments, and finally, when the state of 
knowledge is mature enough to support serious policy and acquisition decisions, to 
demonstration experiments” (p. 77). Naturally, COE flows in three stages from the 
discovery stage and investigation phase to the demonstration stage. Below is a listing of 
the actions taken during the RTAT COE within each stage. Details for each action follow 
in sections within each stage heading. 
1. The Discovery Stage 
 Research and literature review 
 Enterprise architecture analysis 
 Mobile data collection tool prototyping 
 Mobile data collection tool analysis of alternatives  
2. Investigative Stage 
 Savvion process modeling 
 Legazpi City field experiment 
3. Demonstration Stage 
 Typhoon Haiyan field deployment 
 Joint Interagency Field Exercise (JIFX) 2014–4  
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C. THE DISCOVERY STAGE  
The discovery stage is marked by research and discovery experiments which “are 
meant to provide the inspirational spark that gives life to a new piece of knowledge or a 
disruptive innovation—a spark that would otherwise not occur or occur at some unknown 
time in the future” (Alberts & Hayes 2005, p. 78).  
The research purpose for the discovery stage was to assess current RTAT 
data collection methods, organization and processes and to explore possible 
alternatives that might better serve the RTAT organization.  
It was discovered early in this stage that the current MS Excel assessment solution 
needed to be replaced (Beeson, 2013). At the conclusion of the discovery stage, RTAT 
selected Android based smart phones and Open Data Kit (ODK) for form development 
and integration and RTAT had a working prototype assessment form for experimentation 
in the Investigative Stage. Actions taken during the Discovery Stage included: 
1. Research and Literature Review  
Research related to the humanitarian assistance (HA) response community 
(HARC), formal and informal organizations, as well as various related topics are included 
in the literature review. 
2. Enterprise Architecture Assessment 
The author conducted an enterprise architecture analysis of RTAT to understand 
the organization, what it does, and what it wants to accomplish; this is outlined in greater 
detail in Appendix B. Strategic outputs of the assessment include: RTAT mission 
statement, stakeholder analysis, operating model, and operating model change 
recommendations; the COE and its developed RTAT solution must meet the strategic 
vision of this assessment. Stakeholders judge the success and failure of the RTAT 
solution.  
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a. Organization Mission  
The mission of RTAT is: “Conduct and promulgate baseline and post-disaster 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure assessments, in order to 
facilitate host nation and international disaster relief efforts” (Steckler, 2012). “Facilitate” 
includes the management and dissemination of a shared common operational picture and 
ICT recovery prioritization recommendations (Beeson, 2013).  
b. Stakeholder Analysis 
Several stakeholder organizations are associated with RTAT which include: 
United Nations (UN) Emergency Telecommunication Cluster (UN-ETC), Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), U.S. Pacific 
Command, the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as other HA governmental and non-
governmental organizations (NGO) (Steckler, 2012). 
c. Operating Model Analysis 
As discussed in the literature review, RTAT must move from a Diversification 
model with low process integration between teams and with stakeholders and low 
standardization of processes to a Replication operating model with integration minimally 
with Pacific Disaster Center and standard processes enabled by an enterprise wide mobile 
data collection tool solution. Figure 15 is an adaption from Ross, Weill, & Robertson’s 
(2006) Enterprise Architecture as a Strategy “characteristics of four operating models” 




Figure 15.  RTAT Recommended Change in Operating Model  
(after Ross et al., 2006, p. 29) 
d. Enterprise Architecture Assessment Conclusions and Recommendations 
Standardizing and refining the assessment forms in a query-able format is the top 
priority of the RTAT architects. This enables the forms to be programmed into an 
envisioned mobile data collection tool solution (Beeson, 2013).  
Concurrently, RTAT must integrate their data with Pacific Disaster Center to take 
advantage of their DisasterAWARE website information dissemination capabilities.  
Team training, and standardization of “go-kits” is a low priority recommendation, 
but some training must be conducted to test the various versions of the RTAT assessment 
tool for validity and refinement (Beeson, 2013). 
3. Mobile Data Collection Tool Prototyping 
It was concluded early in the project that concluded that a MS Excel form 
modification would not meet the requirements of the enterprise architecture assessment 
recommendations nor leverage available technologies, see Appendix B for greater 
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explanation. As a consequence, the author created individual ODK Collect prototype 
assessment forms for each ICT category, based on Appendices G–J. The author used an 
iterative, spiral development strategy to prototype and refine these assessment forms. The 
author used the spiral development strategy because not all requirements for the form and 
mobile data collection tool were established from the outset; and new requirements 
emerged through the course of the COE (Hawthorne & Lush, 2002). Further, a spiral 
development strategy provides, 
[t]he opportunity for interaction between the user, tester, and developer. In 
this process, the requirements are refined through experimentation and risk 
management, there is continuous feedback, and the user is provided the 
best possible capability within the increment. Each increment may include 
a number of spirals. (Hawthorne & Lush, 2002) 
This strategy forces interaction feedback early and often from RTAT teams. The 
multiple prototype tests also lines up the multiple experiments required in the COE thesis 
strategy. See Figure 16 for a spiral development diagram, note the use of multiple 
prototypes and tests to flesh out the requirements and develop the product. Prototype 1, 2, 
etc. of Figure 16 could be replaced by the various experiments (Legazpi City, Typhoon 
Haiyan, etc.) for RTAT tool development, or the various RTAT form versions (e.g., 
rtat_mobile_assessment_philippines_130924, v4, v5) found in the “RTAT Assessment 
Form Development” section below.  
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Figure 16.  Spiral Development Diagram (from Osmundson, 2014) 
The “Mobile Data Collection Tool Analysis of Alternatives” and “RTAT 
Assessment Form Development” sections found below give more information on form 
development. The lack of RTAT development funding was the single most significant 
factor for tool development (B. Steckler, personal communication, September 3, 2014). 
According to Brian Steckler, RTAT plans to charge zero dollars for its services hence any 
solution must be free to develop and operate (personal communication, September 3, 
2014). 
4. Mobile Data Collection Tool Analysis of Alternatives  
The author attempted to modify the then current MS Excel RTAT assessment 
form spreadsheets found in Appendices G-J to improve their practicality. Practicality 
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here means a intuitive, user friendly interface and data is integrated easily into the larger 
humanitarian assistance community. All initial attempts failed to convert the Appendices 
G-J into a relational database.  
This initial failure suggested that current processes were outdated, and that 
the campaign of experimentation should move to the hypothesis testing phase, to 
investigate whether a mobile device (i.e., a smart phone) solution might prove better.  
In response, the author spoke informally with several people working with various 
aspects of disaster response, researched via the various academic papers, Internet search 
engines related to disaster response and smart device application (app) stores for potential 
alternatives to MS Excel. Various applications were downloaded from the app stores for 
first impressions. The analysis of alternatives included the use of the HumanitariaN 
Operations Mobile Acquisition of Data (NOMAD) Online Selection Assistant (OSA) to 
both expand and narrow the field of potential mobile data collection tool options. More 
information on NOMAD and the OSA can be found in Appendices E, F and Jung’s 
(2011) Mobile Data Collection Systems a review of the current state of the field research 
report. NOMAD and the analysis of application alternatives will be explored later. 
a. Requirements  
Rapid Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Assessment Team 
(RTAT) mobile data collection requirements include: Small form factor, rugged, free to 
develop and use (no formal budget), ability to make and tailor forms quickly and easily, 
KML file exportable (importable into a database), GPS location enabled, ability to 
include photos, skip logic pattern supportable (able to ask/skip questions based previous 
answers), not restricted to SMS (text message) only, and ability for forms to be stored on 
the device until they can be opportunistically (when data connection is available) 
uploaded.  
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b. Selected Operating System: Android 
After analyzing the capabilities and limitations of the various operating systems, 
Google’s Android OS was down-selected during the analysis of alternatives for 
development for several reasons.  
 Compatible device availability: Availability of free Android 
based Samsung S2/S3 and Google Nexus devices within Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Hastily Formed Network (HFN) Lab and 
Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab enabled 
form development and testing. This was the single largest factor in 
this decision. 
 Support: Recent research, development and use of the CORE 
Lab’s Android based data collection tool Lighthouse enabled better 
direct development support.  
 Android market share: Research in the literature review found 
that Android’s market share has been steadily increasing over iOS 
in recent years especially in developing countries where the tool 
would most likely be employed.  
 Free data collection platforms: Availability of free mobile data 
collection platforms such as ODK Collect and Lighthouse enabled 
form development without financial cost. Cost was the single 
largest deciding factor. 
c. Selecting the Data Collection Application: Lighthouse and ODK Collect 
The researcher utilized the HumanitariaN Operations Mobile Acquisition of Data 
(NOMAD) OSA feature to help narrow the field of options. NOMAD (n.d.-a and b) 
contained a detailed list of questions asked, results, and detailed comparison between 
valid application options. Three RTAT requirements narrowed the field to the final three 
contenders: Open Data Kit, CyberTracker and Humanitarian Data Toolkit (HDT). 
 Android operating system: The operating system requirement 
narrowed the field to 33 options. This requirement stems from the 
availability of Android operating systems available and the lack of 
project funding to purchase unlocked iPhones. 
 Keyhole Markup Language (KML) export file format: This 
requirement narrowed the field to 10 options. KML is one of the 
file formats supported by the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) to 
import spatial data sets for display on its DisasterAWARE website 
(personal communication with T. Bosse August 11, 2014). This 
website link is critical for the attainment of RTAT’s end state goal 
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of a shared ICT environment situational understanding via a 
current operational picture (COP) visual display. 
 Cost (free): As discussed in the previous section, this requirement 
narrowed the field to the final three (B. Steckler, personal 
communication, September 3, 2014).  
As discussed in the literature review, the Humanitarian Data Toolkit was not 
selected due to its form factor size, which includes a laptop, scanner and printer, as well 
as a handheld device, see Figure 14. 
CyberTracker did not have the community support comparable to ODK Collect 
and the forms that could be created could not incorporate the complex skip logic of “If 
any ___ selected then ___” or “If any but ___ selected then___.” CyberTracker has form 
development support available for purchase, but this violated the third requirement 
above.  
As a consequence the Open Data Kit suite of tools was down selected for RTAT 
form and mobile data collection tool development and will be further discussed below.  
The discovery stage hypothesis became: an ODK based solution would better 
meet the needs of RTAT and would enable desired organizational operating model 
changes. 
5. RTAT Assessment Form Development  
To test the above hypothesis, ODK forms needed to be created. 
RTAT forms are intended to be the principle data collection drivers of a data to 
situational understanding processing chain. The aim of this RTAT assessment interjection 
chain is to help the humanitarian aid leaders make better decisions. As Kennerly & 
Mason (2008) aptly stated, 
If decision making is to be informed by information (the developed RTAT 
forms) then clearly it is important what data is available (collected). Not 
only does the availability of data enable a decision to be made, but in 
many circumstances data can indicate when a decision needs to be made. 
Therefore it is vitally important to get the RTAT assessment/data collection forms 
correct. 
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As stated earlier, RTAT originally used an excel spreadsheet to conduct its ICT 
assessments. This method relied heavily upon assessor’s professional judgment to assess 
non-standardized markings within the MS Excel spreadsheet (Steckler, 2009 and 2012). 
Email was the original method to disseminate findings (Steckler, 2009 and 2012). These 
spreadsheets were not set up with established entity or attribute relationships and 
therefore could not be exported into a query-able, relational database. According to 
OCHA (2014a), unstructured Excel documents are poor means of communicating time 
critical humanitarian assistance data due to their poor ability to be imported into shared 
databases. Further, email is a poor means of data transfer due to its singular point-to-point 
characteristic in an environment with frequent personnel turnover (Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2014a). This research supports the original and 
refined discovery stage hypotheses. 
Additionally, RTAT looks to add spatial data attribute information to the 
assessment so that it can be imported into an easily understood current operational picture 
(COP) map that could then be rapidly promulgated to HA responders (Beeson, 2013). 
ODK collected data can be exported into a myriad of formats (to include KML) and 
could therefore be importable into Pacific Disaster Center (Open Data Kit Collect, 2014). 
A quick re-examination of currently available ICT centered disaster response 
surveys in the Literature Review found that the various reputable, established 
humanitarian assistance organizations, specifically USAID, UNDAC, UN-ETC, 
FITTEST and WFP, all lack the level of fidelity desired by RTAT and its customers 
(Steckler 2009, 2012). This confirms RTAT’s pre-thesis decision to develop its own ICT 
centric disaster assessment forms based on what forms were available at the time and 
what the collective RTAT member disaster experience deemed necessary (Steckler, 
2012). The original RTAT MS Excel forms can be found in Appendices G-J. 
As stated earlier, the author iteratively refined the RTAT forms were during each 
campaign stage. For simplicity, a discussion on all form changes are consolidated in this 
section. More information on the various stage events can be found in their respective 
sections. 
81 
The RTAT forms were built using the Open Data Kit (ODK) XLS2XForm, the 
resultant EXtensible Markup Language (XML) forms were then compiled and checked 
for errors with ODK Validate. Forms were uploaded to the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
(NPS) Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab managed ODK 
Aggregate server via ODK Form Uploader. Once on the CORE lab’s ODK Aggregate 
server, the forms could be accessed (downloaded), filled out and submitted via ODK 
Collect or the CORE Lab’s Lighthouse application on an Android based smart device.  
One initial thought by the author was to make a separate form for each of the 
services outlined in Appendices G-J, but the researcher quickly realized that one form 
could be created that included all of the services with the use of ODK’s skip logic 
feature. Table 1 is the breakdown of “service” and “sub-service” as discussed throughout 
the rest of this section. They were taken directly from Appendices G-J.  
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The major form capabilities/changes are outlined below using the following time 
periods: beginning through Legazpi City field experiment, post Legazpi City through 
Typhoon Haiyan (October-December 2013), post Typhoon Haiyan to today (December 
2013-September 2014). Names of the forms are taken verbatim from the ODKAggregate 
website. All forms were tested using Samsung S2/S4 and the Google Nexus smart phones 
using Lighthouse exclusively until RTAT Assessment v4. Thereafter forms were tested 
with both Lighthouse and ODK Collect. 
a. Beginning Through Legazpi City Field Experiment 
This period of form development starts at the author’s involvement in the RTAT 
mobile data collection tool development and ends at the conclusion of the Legazpi City 
field experiment. This occurred from the beginning of June 2013 through the first week 
of October 2013. 
(1) rtat_mobile_assessment_philippines_130924 
This represents the first ODK form tested within the campaign of 
experimentation. This version was used to show the art of the possible to RTAT members 
at the Legazpi City experiment. Capabilities included: GPS location, video and audio 
recording as well as standard form questions and simple skip logic. Below is a more 
detailed review of the form version. User feedback was taken from RTAT conducted 
after action discussions and a nightly “hot wash” meeting attended by the author 
(author’s notes, available upon request). 
rtat_mobile_assessment_philippines_130924 had one overall status marked for 
the location (working, operational with some degradation, highly degraded, broken, or 
disconnected from the infrastructure/electrical grid etc.) (see Figure 17). Unfortunately, 
only one service could be assessed per form, i.e. a tower with both cellular and broadcast 
television service antennae would require two separate assessments. 
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Figure 17.  RTAT Assessment Status Option Screenshot 
Other specific questions included: type of assessment (training, test, baseline, post 
disaster), GPS or fill in location (Latitude / Longitude or Military Grid Reference 
System), lengthy address and point of contact telephone number input. Lengthy status 
drop down menus were included throughout the assessment. Examples include required, 
primary, secondary, and tertiary “Cause of the issue?,” “What’s the issue?,” and “What’s 
needed to fix” the issue options. There were very detailed power questions (voltage, 
cycle, phase, Hz, etc.), to include what power assets are on location (generator, inverter, 
uninterrupted power supply, etc.). Towards the end of the form there was the option to 
take a photo or record a video audio message.  
The following issues/recommended fixes were taken from the author’s after 
action notes generated during the various hot washes and can be furnished upon request. 
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All questions in the form were required; the assessor had to mark an input before 
moving on to the next question. So if volcano ash were the only cause of the damage at 
the location, the assessor still had to pause to mark secondary and tertiary damage causes. 
While minor, this issue was multiplied throughout the form and led to user irritation 
especially if conducting the assessment in a rain storm. 
Another take away was that too many unknowable or impertinent questions to the 
environment were required. For example, the phase of alternating electrical power (1, 2 
or 3) would need to be answered for an assessment on a broken UHF antenna. Many of 
the first responder volunteers had no idea what phase meant and guessed or left it as 
unknown. The RTAT subject matter experts (SME) dropped this and many other 
irrelevant questions in later form versions. 
While the lengthy drop down menus worked well for a relational database (i.e. 
Tell me all the locations assessed with “2 phase power”), they did not work well for 
speed if the question did not fit the situation. One could argue that many of these 
irrelevant questions did not add value to the assessment or meet the RTAT assessment 
intent. Additionally, many of the questions were deemed redundant, such as the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary causes of damage. 
The point of contact telephone number stopped short of the required number of 
digits for a foreign telephone number, i.e. the integer field was too small. Finally, 
assessments with video recordings could not be uploaded to the NPS servers. It was 
concluded at the time that the size of the assessment file was too big to be accepted by the 
CORE Lab’s ODK Aggregate server. However, this was not investigated further. The 
option to take multiple photos was deemed acceptable by the RTAT SMEs.  
The overall impression is that the assessment was too slow and cumbersome. 
Additionally, users wanted the ability to “slew” their GPS location on a map to an 
“unreachable” location; unfortunately, this is not possible with ODK. Users wanted the 
ability to mark up the taken picture; unfortunately, this was not possible using 
Lighthouse. Finally, users wanted the ability to assess more than one service at the 
location. 
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(2) rtat_mobile_assessment_philippines_130925  
This is the same as rtat_mobile_assessment_philippines_130924, except the 
number of required fields was reduced. Secondary and tertiary causes of issues and a 
number of electrical data questions were made optional to speed up the process. Address 
field was pre-filled to some extent for Legazpi City; telephone number was shortened and 
prefilled for the Republic of the Philippines; the ability to record a video was dropped 
and replaced with the ability to take multiple photos at a location. Users reemphasized 
their desire to assess multiple services at one location. Testing of this form was 
conducted largely in the rain with flash flooding throughout the area. As a consequence, 
teams wanted the GPS and photo at the very beginning of the form so that the assessor 
could take refuge while filling out the rest of the form or move on to the next assessment 
location. 
b. Post Legazpi City Through Typhoon Haiyan 
The goal of this stage was to create a form that could be crowdsourced by novice 
users and assess multiple (sub-) services differently at one location. The time period 
covers roughly the second week in November 2013 to the second week in December 
2013 and is punctuated by the deployment of two RTAT waves to Tacloban City, the 
Republic of the Philippines (ROP) in response to Typhoon Haiyan relief efforts. 
(1) rtat_mobile_assessment_philippines_131110  
The assessor could only give one overall assessment for the location (Figure 17), 
but the assessor could check multiple services and sub-services to be included in the 
assessment (Table 1). There remained no ability to assess sub-services individually and 
the one overarching assessment inferred the same status for the other services checked. 
For example, this form could not state that cellular text was operational but that the radio 
broadcast service was dead lined (see Figure 12). It could only state that something at the 
site was assessed dead lined (see Figure 12) and that cellular text and broadcast radio 
services were assessed. This leads to ambiguity and forces the assessor to make multiple 
assessments at the location if more than one status exists at that location (see Figure 18 
for a screenshot from the Lighthouse application). Electrical power was assessed 
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separately from the rest of the form, however, and operational status of power could 
differ from the services being assessed. This form marks a turning point in assessing 
multiple services at a given location. 
  
Figure 18.  Lighthouse ICT Services Being Assessed at a Location 
Telephone number was changed from an integer variable input to a text variable 
to skirt the input size limitation.  
This form replaced the primary, secondary, and tertiary causes of damage with 
what’s the issue? and what’s needed to fix the issue? open text fields. While less 
searchable via a data base program, this vastly simplified the form and reduced user 
survey fatigue.  
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Unfortunately the photo remained at the end of the form, and, as stated, the ability 
to give different operational status marks to the various sub-services was still not 
programmed into this version. 
(2) haiyan_rtat  
This version cleaned up some typographical errors found in 
rtat_mobile_assessment_philippines_131110 and was used during initial testing in the 
Republic of the Philippines (ROP) during the first RTAT wave while waiting for team 
members to assemble in Manila. This form was not intended to be utilized by RTAT 
volunteers; however, it was accidentally left on some of the phones during the turnover 
between the first and second RTAT waves and was subsequently used by some of the 
volunteers in the second wave to conduct assessments. This led to integration issues 
during the data consolidation and submission to Pacific Disaster Center. (See section on 
Typhoon Haiyan below for more detail.)  
(3) Haiyan Post Disaster  
This change incorporated some of the requested changes that had not been 
incorporated into previous versions. For example, the photo was finally placed at the very 
beginning of the survey immediately followed by the location input (GPS). 
This form was created with the intention of using crowdsourcing techniques, and 
the assessor name and point of contact info dropped due to privacy concerns. 
Figure 18 question remained with some notable improvements. Skip logic was 
introduced into the form. The assessor was taken only to the services being assessed and 
asked what is the operational status of the assessed services checked in the Figure 18 
question. Subsequent radial menus were shown asking which subservices are working 
and which sub-services are not working.  
This change gave much better fidelity to the data collected. An end user could 
now, for example, get the overall operational status of the cellular service and know that 
voice and text sub-services were working, but that 2g, 3g, and 4g data sub-services were 
not, see Figure 19.  
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Figure 19.  Terrestrial Sub-Services 
The form was a little disjointed, reflective of the rapid revision done on location 
at the Typhoon Haiyan relief effort staging area, but an assessor could now assess 
multiple (sub-) services differently at a given location. The form was a success during 
Typhoon Haiyan’s demonstration testing and validated that RTAT could crowdsource a 
simplified RTAT assessment form utilizing ODK tools and the CORE lab’s Lighthouse 
application. Further, this form was the first to be integrated into PDC’s DisasterAWARE 
situational awareness web portal. (See Figure 20 for results.) 
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Figure 20.  Screenshot of DisasterAWARE with RTAT Data  
(from Pacific Disaster Center, n.d.) 
c. Post Typhoon Haiyan to Today 
Unfortunately, getting Haiyan Post Disaster assessment form data onto the 
DisasterAWARE web portal was an arduous and manually intensive task that took more 
than one week to accomplish. Further, the results on the DisasterAWARE web portal do 
not intuitively convey assessment information with the default turquoise assessment icons 
(see Figure 20). Therefore, the goal during this stage was to finalize the form so PDC 
could integrate data seamlessly into DisasterAWARE. Additionally, subsequent forms 
were needed to create a single data field that PDC could use in order to match an 
appropriate icon to the assessment data (i.e. green icon for a working ICT service). This 
would intuitively convey information and situational understanding to stakeholders and 
end-customers visiting the DisasterAWARE web portal. 
(1) RTAT Assessment v4  
This form smoothed out the “disjointedness” of the Haiyan Post Disaster form 
and marked a naming convention turning point for the RTAT forms. 
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Unfortunately, an assessor must go through each subservice regardless of if there 
is an issue or not. For example, radio ICT service is marked operational, but the user has 
to manually check which radio sub-services are working and which subservices are not 
working. 
(2) RTAT Assessment v5 
RTAT Assessment v5 incorporated logic to avoid non-assessed subservices and 
fixed issues of a single attribute for each service versus an attribute assigned for each 
sub-service. This effort required an extensive XML code rewrite and surpassed the 
capabilities of ODK XLS_Form builder. 
(3) RTAT Assessment v6 
This version of the form (v6) is the current RTAT ICT assessment form at the 
time of thesis completion. It includes a type of location added for PDC and other 
cosmetic fixes from v5. V6 is the last form anticipated to be built on the ODK platform. 
Subsequent forms will be built using HTML5 so that they can be utilized on any smart 
device regardless of operating system. Below is an outline of the form. A full training 
brief is included in Appendix I.  
 Admin info 
 Assessor info 
 Location point of contact info 
 Location info (GPS) 
 Photo (multiple) 
 What services are you assessing? 
 Electrical, Terrestrial, Cellular, Satellite, and or Radio service: 
 “What’s working?” 
 “What’s broken?” 
 “What’s needed to fix the issue?” 
 Final remarks 
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D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
This stage in the campaign is marked by hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing 
experiments “build on explanatory knowledge to create predictive knowledge” (Alberts 
& Hayes 2005, p. 81). 
1. Legazpi City Field Experiment 
From above, the hypothesis for the Legazpi City field experiment was that: 
an ODK based solution would better meet the needs of RTAT and would enable 
desired organizational operating model changes. Further, people with first 
responder or ICT backgrounds could be quickly trained to conduct RTAT 
assessments using the ODK/Lighthouse solution.  
RTAT conducted baseline ICT infrastructure assessments in Legazpi City, 
Republic of the Philippines (ROP) from 21–26 September 2014 (Chang, 2013), ironically 
just a couple of months before Typhoon Haiyan. Utilizing the created mobile data 
collection tool from the Discovery Stage, RTAT members from around the world met 
with local leaders, volunteers, and first responders in an effort to conduct baseline 
assessments throughout the Albay Province. As a note taker in attendance at the “hot 
wash” feedback sessions at the end of each day, the author was able to rapidly prototype 
form improvements for the next day’s use. According to DHS (n.d.) a hot wash is an 
informal conversation where participants,  
[s]hare their perspectives on key strengths and areas for improvement. Hot 
washes are important because they mark the transition from actual 
exercise play to the evaluation phase where lessons learned and corrective 
actions are documented. It is important to conduct the hot wash at the end 
of the exercise while all participants are still present and the day’s 
discussions are still fresh in their minds.  
The result from the Legazpi City experiment was a validated mobile data 
collection tool that consisted of a vastly improved ODK based assessment form, 
Lighthouse electronic form interface application and Android powered Samsung S3 and 
S4 phones.  
92 
This field experiment confirmed that an ODK based mobile data collection 
solution would better meet the needs of RTAT and was a step forward in the desired 
organizational operating model changes. See Chapter IV for the analysis supporting this 
conclusion. 
According to the official Marine Forces Pacific official Quick Look after action 
report (Appndix L), the Legazpi City experiment effort consisted of,  
81 participants coming from 42 different entities including those from 
academia, industry, UN, NGO, U.S. government, military, and law 
enforcement as well as Philippines national, regional and local leadership 
and other government agencies. U.S. participants made up about 20 
percent of the people for the overall event. Defense related entities (U.S. 
and Philippines) made up about 15 percent of the total entities.  
Fewer than 10 of the participants were RTAT members, most of whom had not 
seen the created RTAT assessment forms or the Lighthouse application prior to the event.  
a. Format 
Formal training with practical application was followed by real world use of the 
tool and a feedback session at the conclusion of each day.  
Iterative changes were made to the form and tested the following day. This pattern 
was repeated for September 24, 25, and 26. Feedback from the 26th was included in the 
Typhoon Haiyan version. 
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Figure 21.  Legazpi City Hot Wash Feedback Session (from Chang, 2013) 
b. Training 
The author trained the RTAT members and volunteers in a “hands on” classroom 
setting using a brief similar to Appendix I followed by a practical application session. 
Participants were able to download the Lighthouse application on their own Android 
compatible device or use a RTAT team provided Samsung S3 phone for the hands on 
practical application session.  
c. Execution 
Participants were divided into 6 vans and assigned to a specific Barangay (local 
governance district) to meet the local leadership (Barangay Captain) and conduct baseline 
ICT assessments in the area. Barangay is “the smallest administrative division in the 
Philippines and is the native Filipino term for a village, district or ward...the term often 
refers to an inner city neighborhood, a suburb or a suburban neighborhood” (Barangay, 
2014). Teams taught the Barangay Captains how to use the tool, and the teams along with 
the local leadership conducted as many ICT assessments of the local areas as time 
permitted. 
Teams were given a Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) satellite system to 
get access to the live Internet to upload the forms to the ODK Aggregate server in real 
time. Team leads were given unlocked Samsung S4 phones and furnished with local 
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subscriber identity module (SIM) cards with unlimited data for the duration of the 
exercise and other team members could alternatively upload the forms by tethering a 
connection to the Internet via the S4 device. 
d. Results 
The following is a synopsis of what worked and what did not work during the 
exercise. The results were taken from hot wash after action discussions and from the after 
action report found in Appendix J (Chang, 2013). 
(1) What Worked? 
This experiment validated the RTAT mobile data collection tool which consisted 
of an Android device, ODK forms, and Lighthouse application. Specific form questions 
were debated, but the utility and convenience of the Lighthouse applications were 
undeniable. 
The experiment validated a train-the-trainer model. Participants were able to teach 
local volunteers how to use the device with less than two hours of training. Users were 
able to easily and intuitively navigate the form. Even Barangay Captains with no 
experience with touch screen devices were able to quickly pick up on how to use the tool 
with just one use of the device. It was discovered that RTAT Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) could train others to conduct the assessments, thus multiplying their capability. 
RTAT teams were able to use the forms to successfully conduct scores of RTAT 
ICT assessments in various field conditions. These forms could be uploaded to the NPS 
CORE Lab ODK Aggregate server in Monterey, CA via BGAN satellite communication 
or via the local Smart Communications (cellular service provider). Figure 22 is a display 
of one of the day’s data collection results. 
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Figure 22.  ODK Aggregate Map Visualization for Surveys Conducted September 24, 
2013 (from Chang, 2013) 
(2) What Did Not Work? 
While the ODK Aggregate map function did a good job of indicating an 
assessment was conducted, the end user could not easily read the assessment values in 
this view. Further variable names and values were not always intuitively understandable. 
Care was taken in the creation of variable names; questions often remained, however, if 
only looking at the ODK Aggregate output. A database should be created that can import 
the data and export standardized reports. Figure 23 is a screen shot from ODK Aggregate 
and is a typical example of the clutter created when attempting to read the data in the map 
view. 
About half of the participants that had smart phones were utilizing the Android 
operating system. Those with Android phones preferred using the provided Samsung SIIs 
versus downloading the Lighthouse application. Participants had concerns with 
downloading an application that was created by the U.S. government or military, i.e. the 
Naval Postgraduate School, given the then recent U.S. National Security Agency scandal 
that had come to light that summer (The Guardian, 2014). 
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Figure 23.  Data clutter in ODK Aggregate Map View 
Assessments with videos could not be uploaded to the CORE lab’s ODK 
Aggregate server. The option to take a video was dropped in favor of adding the ability to 
take multiple pictures.  
Due to the modifications to the forms between each day of testing, the collected 
data could not be integrated together easily and efforts to create a master spreadsheet 
were abandoned early. This brought to light a shortcoming in the ODK Aggregate server: 
even a simple typographical correction in a form required a new form to be uploaded to 
the server. This required a name change to the new form or the deletion of the corrected 
form and all of its associated data. One can download the data into a spreadsheet or 
import the data into a database and manually join the data sets. 
Users wanted the ability to draw on the photo once taken. ODK supports such a 
function, but, due to circumstances discussed in the literature review, the CORE Lab had 
not updated its Lighthouse application to take advantage of the newer capabilities.  
Users wanted the ability to “slew” their location on a map, that is, move their 
position electronically vice accepting the current GPS position. Rationale: What if the 
assessor cannot be at the actual location to use the device’s GPS due to safety or security 
issues. This cannot be done currently in ODK and may require the use of the Internet for  
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mapping or third party offline map that can be preloaded on the phone before 
deployment. There is no budget to fund this requirement and was deemed a “nice to 
have” by the group.  
Some questions were deemed non-value added and dropped to shorten and 
simplify the form. One example of this simplification was in the electrical power 
assessment. Initial questions taken directly from Appendix G such as 110 volts or 220 
volts, Direct versus Alternating current, 2 versus 3 phase and 60Hz versus XX cycle were 
not understood by many of the first responder volunteers, were unknown by many of the 
points of contacts we met on location, and were dropped by consensus of the RTAT 
members. Even staunch supporters of the original questions conceded that what was 
important was the status of the power (working, not working or intermittent) and do they 
have a generator with fuel on hand.  
The feedback trend was a desire to get at what was really important for each 
service being assessed. Did it work? If not, what did you need to fix it? 
Additionally, users wanted one form to assess multiple services at one location. 
The tested form required the user to create a separate assessment form for each service at 
the location. Unfortunately, this form was too complicated and could not be built/tested 
during the experiment. 
2. Savvion Process Model 
By standardizing the forms and assessment procedures during the Legazpi City 
field experiment RTAT demonstrated that it could teach others to conduct RTAT 
assessments, thus multiplying its reach and speed. Savvion was utilized to quantify how 
much utility there was in the train-the-trainer/crowdsource concept of operations. 
Specifically, Savvion was utilized to test a crowdsourcing model that was modestly 
demonstrated during the Legazpi City field experiment.  
This experiment attempts to quantify the value of the change in the operating 
model proposed in the enterprise architecture assessment (Beeson, 2013), specifically the 
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need to increase organizational agility as enabled by an increase in process 
standardization and process integration. 
a. The Hypothesis for the Savvion Experiments: Utilizing Crowdsourcing 
Techniques Will Reduce RTAT Costs While Decreasing the Time to 
Complete ICT assessments.Experiment Format 
Three Naval Postgraduate School students collaborated to create a model of 
RTAT’s business processes; see Figure 24 for a visual representation and Appendix C for 
complete details. These processes were then modified and tested through Savvion 
simulations.  
The team analyzed the processes from a pre-Legazpi City experiment 
organizational structure (Excel, email and subject matter expert assessor only) to a post-
Legazpi City model that leverages the mobile data collection tool, satellite 
communication, and automated/integrated backend servers for aggregation and 
dissemination as well as incorporating a crowdsource train-the-trainer assessor model. 
Figure 24 shows the “As Is” model that utilizes a hierarchical process that utilizes 
three deployed subject matter expert assessors, the MS Excel spreadsheet that relies upon 
manual inputs, and manual dissemination via email to the UN-ETC for manual review, 
processing and dissemination. This model only utilizes subject matter expert assessors 
(pre-Legazpi City experiment model). 
The “As Is” model, Figure 24, requires the RTAT assessment (supply) to go 
through an intermediary (UN-ETC) before dissemination to the end customer (NGO 
organization). This intermediary must conduct quality assurance and locate the 
assessment on a map. This assumes higher man hours in assessment form processing, 
quality assurance, location services and rework than an electronically automated and 
integrated process.  
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Figure 24.  RTAT “As Is” Process Model (from Beeson et al., 2014) 
b. Process Changes 
Figure 25 shows the highlighted process changes tested with Savvion.  
 
Figure 25.  Savvion RTAT Process Changes (after Beeson et al., 2014) 
100 
The front end cost of crowdsourcing is shown with the training of volunteers. The 
RTAT tool’s integrated GPS ensures valid location, thus cutting out the UN mapper. The 
nature of its electronic form interface ensures compliant spatial data values and facilitates 
the link with Pacific Disaster Center (PDC). Display/link on PDC’s DisasterAWARE 
(Figure 20) closes the data to situation awareness (current operational picture) process 
and ensures that assessments can be delivered in a timely manner to those who need it.  
In the “To Be” model the information management exchange model changes from 
a push or pull model reliant upon point-to-point social contacts (email) in the “As Is” 
process to a bulletin board posting or, in this case, current operational picture format 
model. This is in line with literature review information flow improvement 
recommendations (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006) (Kennerly & Mason, 2005), and (Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). 
Figure 26 shows the “To Be” model that was tested with Savvion. The reader will 
note the expansive number of assessment teams that the crowdsourced model enables. 
The Legazpi City experiment showed that both SME and non-SME volunteers could 




Figure 26.  Savvion “To Be” Process Model (from Beeson et al., 2014) 
c. Conclusion and Results 
Despite doubling the number of assessments from 100 to 200, the “To Be” model 
expenses dropped 87 percent, wait time decreased by 81 percent, and it took only 20 
percent of the time to complete the 200 surveys (Beeson et al., 2014). Unfortunately, 
Assessor utilization remained high (89 percent) but is unlikely to be significantly reduced 
due to the nature of the disaster scenario (Beeson et al., 2014).  
When stretched further, the “To Be” model shows over 500 assessments are 
possible in approximately 1/3 the time required in the original “As Is” model, while still 
reducing costs by nearly 70 percent (Beeson et al., 2014). Figure 27 shows a detailed 
metric comparison of the “As Is” and “To Be” models. 
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Figure 27.  Savvion As Is-To Be Comparison (from Beeson et al., 2014) 
Critical changes included nine satellite BGAN terminals and the train-the-
trainer/crowdsourcing model, which both greatly improved speed and efficiency. The 
addition of the user-friendly but highly (data) structured mobile data collection tool 
application eliminated the redundant internal mapping and quality assurance cycles and 
enabled the use of crowdsourcing/volunteers; both of which drastically improved the 
RTAT performance and capability. 
Quality of assessments was addressed in this experiment through the reduction of 
rework of GPS coordinates and incorrect data values. The quality of the qualitative 
assessment remarks from a crowdsourced novice versus a seasoned information 
technology (IT) professional, however, could not be gauged. A “good enough” 
philosophy was incorporated in this model in that even a novice can tell if something is 
broken, even if all they can say is “a service call” or “new tower is needed” to fix the 
issue, see Figure 27 for an example. 
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Figure 28.  Broken Broadcast Tower Assessed by RTAT in the Aftermath of Typhoon 
Haiyan 
Savvion team concluded that RTAT should switch to a train-the-trainer model and 
crowdsource assessments to significantly reduce costs and wait times. The crowdsourcing 
solution, however, must be simple enough for the layperson to use while providing the 
fidelity and quality required of stakeholders and end customers. 
E. DEMONSTRATION STAGE 
RTAT proved that the ODK/Lighthouse mobile data collection tool was a better 
solution in Legazpi City, and Savvion lab tests validated the crowdsourcing model. 
RTAT needed to demonstrate the train-the-trainer model and prove that its data could be 
displayed on PDC’s DisasterAWARE current operational web portal in a field exercise or 
real world humanitarian event.  
1. Typhoon Haiyan Deployment 
On November 8, 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) made landfall 
in the central Philippines (see Figure 29) at nearly 200 miles per hour, making it one of 
the strongest storms ever recorded (United States Agency for International Development,  
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2014a). As a result, 6,300 people lost their lives, 1.1 million homes were damaged or 
destroyed and 4.1 million people were internally displaced (United States Agency for 
International Development, 2014b).  
 
Figure 29.  USAID Typhoon Haiyan Effected Area (from USAID 2014b) 
In response, RTAT members deployed to the Republic of the Philippines (ROP) 
to conduct information and communication technology assessments to aid in the relief 
efforts and validate the RTAT concept (Steckler, 2013).  
Specifically, RTAT tested and validated the hypothesis that RTAT assessments 
could be crowdsourced using locally acquired volunteers in or near a disaster zone and 
those assessments could be posted to the DisasterAWARE web portal. 
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a. Concept of Operations 
RTAT sent two waves of teams to conduct assessments within the 
Tacloban/Borongan City areas in the Leyte Province (Steckler, 2013). The first wave was 
led by the Roddenberry Foundation with the assistance of the author (Steckler, 2013). 
The second wave was led by this thesis’s advisor, and program development leader, Mr. 
Brian Steckler. Both waves were greatly assisted by Bicol University, Team Patola non-
governmental organization (NGO) and various local volunteers as well as the support of 
both the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) 
(Steckler, 2013). 
The first wave consisted of three NGOs from the Roddenberry foundation, four 
faculty members from Bicol University that helped with the Legazpi City experiment, as 
well as the author. Volunteers were obtained through previously established contacts 
within the Philippine Armed Forces, Philippine National Police and the Team Patola 
NGO.  
The second wave consisted of the aforementioned Mr. Steckler, one other student 
from the Naval Postgraduate School, three faculty members from Bicol University as 
well as several local volunteers (Steckler, 2013). 
b. Execution 
The author trained the Roddenberry members and volunteers in Cebu City (Figure 
30), and the Philippine Armed forces provided logistical support to/from Tacloban City 
the following day. Team Patola provided a volunteer and logistical support within 
Tacloban City and the greater Leyte Province. 
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Figure 30.  Author Conducting RTAT Training in Cebu City 
In Tacloban, the teams contacted the UN established relief center and provided 
ICT assessment support as requested, see Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31.  First Wave Confers with Local Officials 
The first wave then broke up into three teams before heading out to conduct 
RTAT assessments in the local area, see Figure 32. 
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Figure 32.  RTAT Conducting an Assessment in Tacloban City 
c. Results 
RTAT successfully conducted 40 assessments using the Lighthouse application 
and the ODK forms. Assessments were successfully uploaded in the disaster zone to the 
NPS CORE Lab ODK Aggregate servers located in Monterey, CA. Assessments were 
then manually transmitted and displayed on the DisasterAWARE web portal. 
RTAT was able to obtain over 40 volunteers for the first wave alone and had to 
turn volunteers away due to logistical constraints. The sheer numbers of volunteers 
obtained within a 24 hour period validated Savvion process assumptions for the number 
of RTAT teams that could be created in a disaster zone. Further, the ability of volunteers 
to conduct and upload assessments validated the hypothesis that RTAT could 
crowdsource the RTAT assessments with the Lighthouse application and ODK forms.  
Results from the two waves were taken from the author’s notes during the 




(1) What Worked 
The two waves conducted 40 assessments in the Leyte Province in support of 
Typhoon Haiyan “real-world” relief operations. Figure 33 shows the results of the effort 
on the ODK Aggregate mapping view.  
 
Figure 33.  Typhoon Haiyan Mission ODK Aggregate Results 
Local knowledge and language skills were a must. The local volunteers were 
invaluable for both the safety of team members and for communicating with local points 
of contact while conducting assessments. 
Crowdsourcing works. Simplifying the forms enables volunteers with no IT 
experience to contribute to the RTAT effort; volunteers had to be turned away due to 
logistical constraints. RTAT was able to field more teams using simple Crowdseeding 
techniques discussed in the literature review. 
The developed operating model from Savvion was validated, albeit at a smaller 
scale due to logistical constraints. The author obtained and trained 40+ volunteers within 
24 hours of arrival in Cebu City. Three RTAT subject matter experts and four Bicol 
University faculty members, who trained during the Legazpi City experiment, deployed 
along with seven local volunteers to Tacloban City. RTAT was able to deploy three 
separate teams on the first wave; only one team would have been supportable without the 
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volunteers. Additionally the teams could have been made into four teams if more 
transportation assets within the disaster area could have been obtained.  
(2) What Did Not Work 
Two conflicting RTAT forms were utilized during the second wave. The form 
was improved between the first and second RTAT waves; unfortunately, an in person 
turnover could not be accomplished due to length of flights to/from the United States. As 
a result, some of the devices had the older version of the form and some were utilizing 
the new form. This became problematic when it came time to integrate the data with 
PDC. PDC needed one set of variables, thus the two forms needed to be manually 
collated into one data set. This process was delayed for days due to the communication 
issues and competing priorities of RTAT and PDC. 
Integration with Pacific Disaster Center had to be accomplished manually. Late 
form changes precluded the use of any automated import functions developed during 
earlier PDC/RTAT team interactions. As a result, data was manually exported from ODK 
Aggregate into an MS Excel spreadsheet and emailed to a point of contact at PDC for 
import and display on their DisasterAWARE website (see Figure 34). Timeliness of data 
posting was not an acceptable (near) real time posting for decision making use during the 
disaster, but it did prove that the hypothesis was correct. Crowdsourced assessments 
could be displayed on the PDC DisasterAWARE web portal. 
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Figure 34.  DisasterAWARE Screenshot with RTAT Data  
This operation’s success (Figure 34 germane) brought to light some shortfalls 
with the current RTAT assessment display. The icon for an assessment is set to a default 
value on DisasterAWARE. The aqua blue box on DisasterAWARE that denotes an 
assessment does not intuitively convey any information to a viewer. According to 
personal communications with T. Bosse from PDC (December 12, 2013), icons can be 
established and color coded based on a specific variable within the form. Unfortunately, 
the change that fixed the Legazpi City requirement and enabled the assessment of several 
sub-services versus a single assessment for the location did not support the requirements 
of PDC. For example, under Cellular services, cellular data, text and voice were assessed 
but there was not a single assessment value for the Cellular service itself nor one for that 
assessment overall, i.e., something is “not working” at this location. The logic to allow a 
single overarching assessment for the location while allowing for the independent 
assessment of all (sub) services without creating a lengthy form was discovered to be a 
challenge for ODK XLS2Form and required further experimentation to fix. More 
information on this can be found within the form development section. Further discussion 
on DisasterAware display improvements can be found in Chapter V. 
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While outside the scope of the Typhoon Haiyan demonstration experiment, it is 
worth noting: RTAT did not make any attempt to integrate RTAT assessment data into 
the larger UN-ETC current operational picture, Figure 35.  
 
Figure 35.  UN-ETC Current Operational Picture (from WFP, 2013c) 
One other notable challenge during the experiment was that many of the 
volunteers had no information technology background and did not know what to look for 
to start conducting an assessment. An ad hoc class was conducted on various antennas 
types and how electrical power is distributed. A small, weather resistant, quick reference 
card should be developed to help volunteers identify ICT related infrastructure.  
 Many of the participants, as in the Legazpi City experiment, had hesitation 
downloading an application (Lighthouse) that was created by the U.S. government, albeit 
the Naval Postgraduate School. Fortunately, the gravity of the situation and volunteer 
desires to help prevailed. 
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Team member life support was an issue. Water purification methods were 
brought, but no fresh water was available within the disaster area. Energy was also an 
issue; charging stations were available and teams brought alternate power sources, but 
time spent charging a phone was time spent not assessing. See Figure 36 for an example 
of a charging station. Teams need a quick small form factor method of recharging RTAT 
devices 
 
Figure 36.  RTAT Member at a Charging Station in Tacloban City (From Appendix K) 
2. Joint Interagency Field Exercise 2014–4 
The purpose of the Joint Interagency Field Exercise (JIFX) is to, 
[p]rovide a field experimentation resource for the Unified Combatant 
Commands (COCOMs) and other federal agencies. In addition, State, 
local and international emergency management, disaster response and 
humanitarian assistance organizations are most welcome to help create an 
innovative cooperative learning environment. (Naval Postgraduate School, 
n.d.) 
JIFX events are held quarterly, and elements of RTAT participated with other 
organizations from 10–14 August 2014 (Goolsby, & Steckler, 2014). The author 
participated in this event as an RTAT assessment tool subject matter expert.  
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The RTAT goals for JIFX 2014–4 were: To test and evaluate the RTAT 
assessment form version 6 (v6) for finalization, and to test the ODKCollect application to 
ensure that it works as well as the Lighthouse application in a field environment, but with 
the benefit of the Google Play store for application dissemination (Goolsby, & Steckler, 
2014).  
RTAT v6 included the logic to independently assess all of the (sub) services, 
while skipping non-assessed sub-services at the location. RTAT v6 marks the final form 
expected to be developed on the ODK suite of systems. Future RTAT development 
efforts will focus on an operating system agnostic solution; see Chapter V for more 
details. 
a. Concept of Operation 
Building upon the Typhoon Haiyan success, the author trained two teams in the 
same manner: classroom instruction using Appendix I, followed by practical application 
utilizing the required equipment. Teams then deployed in a simulated disaster scenario in 
the Camp Roberts, CA training areas (Chang, 2013).  
The teams consisted of three military officers and five civilians. The mission of 
the RTAT teams was to conduct RTAT assessments throughout the Camp Roberts 
training area in support of other collaborative experiments (Goolsby, & Steckler, 2014). 
None of the team members, save the author, had used the RTAT tool prior to training, 
and all of them had at least a bachelor’s degree. About half had never used an Android 
based smart device before and one had just received his first smart phone (Android) that 
week. All were able to grasp the use of the phone and the RTAT mobile data collection 
tool (Lighthouse and ODKCollect) after just one full assessment use. Participants with 
Android smart phones downloaded the ODKCollect application from the Google Play 
application store. 
b. Results and Recommendations  
Fourteen assessments were conducted during the exercise and no bugs were found 
within the form. Approximately two thirds (2/3) of the assessments were conducted using 
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the ODKCollect application with no issues being recorded. As a side note, participants 
preferred downloading ODKCollect from the Google Play application store versus using 
an “untrusted” application transferred from the author. RTAT v6 was validated at the 
conclusion as ready for use in the next disaster (Goolsby, & Steckler, 2014). 
The team utilized available cellular data networks (AT&T and Verizon), the Cisco 
Rapid Response Kit (RRK)’s BGAN satellite modem or cellular connection, along with 
the Goal Zero Yeti 1250 power system to submit RTAT assessment forms on location.  
The RRK is a lightweight low electrical power networking solution in an austere 
environment (Bharania, 2014). The RRK can connect to the Internet via a satellite 
broadband global area network (BGAN), or via a cellular data connection (Bharania, 
2014). Figure 37 shows the RRK. Note the cases can fit in the overhead compartment of 
most major airlines (Bharania, 2014).  
 
Figure 37.  Two Cisco Rapid Response Kits (from Bharania, 2014) 
The Goal Zero Yeti 1250 is a 1,250 watt power system that can be recharged via 
solar panel or by plugging in some other power source (Goal Zero, n.d.). The system 
fully deployed includes solar panels and the base shown in Figure 38 (Goal Zero, n.d.). 
The base system includes a large marine battery, a built-in inverter, a charge controller, 
alternating and direct current outlets, as well as charging input (Goal Zero, n.d.). 
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Figure 38.  Goal Zero Yeti 1250 (from Goal Zero, n.d.) 
(1) What Worked? 
RTAT form v6 was validated. A sample of the RTAT Assessments is included in 
Figures 39 and 40. 
 
Figure 39.  Sample of JIFX 14–4 RTAT Assessments  
116 
 
Figure 40.  Antennae Hill Assessment Photos, Author is Shown Testing the Goal Zero 
and Rapid Response Kit (from Appendix L) 
The availability of the ODKCollect application on the Google Play store greatly 
aided in RTAT mobile data collection tool adoption and use, albeit it on a micro scale, 
and should be the preferred method of disseminating and promoting RTAT. Lighthouse’s 
ability to be stored on a computer and locally available in an Internet challenged 
environment should not be discounted and should remain as a back-up to ODKCollect.  
The RRK worked as advertised. The Goal Zero easily provided all of the power 
requirements for the RRK and for charging the utilized phones. 
(2) What Didn’t Work? 
RTAT v6 is awaiting official RTAT organizational blessing before attempts to 
integrate v6 data into PDC’s DisasterAWARE web portal. 
The Goal Zero Yeti 1250 system was more than the mission required and was 
extremely heavy to move. Note the use of two people carrying the base in Figure 38.  
(3) Recommendations.  
Consideration should be given to utilizing a much smaller Goal Zero or 
comparable product. 
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RTAT needs to officially approve the RTAT v6 form and continue integration 
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Coordination within the humanitarian assistance response community to 
efficiently and effectively respond to international large-scale disasters is hard. 
Compounding this problem is the widespread destruction of the affected nation’s critical 
information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure, and the lack of ICT 
operational status situational awareness. As a result, most responding organizations don’t 
bring the right communication equipment, have difficulty communicating with one 
another and therefore cannot collaborate to affect a coordinated response. Many 
organizations have been organized to assess the ICT environment and combat this 
problem. However, all of these organizations have a narrow focus pertinent to their field 
and have the added responsibility of providing communication capabilities to their parent 
organization. The Rapid ICT Assessment Team (RTAT) was created to provide a holistic 
assessment of the ICT environment, pass on all pertinent ICT assessment findings and 
provide recommendations for recovery to the humanitarian assistance response 
community. RTAT is a fledgling, ad hoc, unfunded, volunteer organization looking to 
improve and integrate their processes into the larger response community. This campaign 
of experimentation as a first step towards that strategic aim 
During the course of this thesis, RTAT discovered that their current means of 
conducting assessments and disseminating their findings were outdated and inefficient. 
Due to constraints, restraints, and available support, the open source Open Data Kit 
(ODK) suite of tools were down selected for further testing and developing to solve this 
problem.  
The ODK developed assessment forms were successfully tested on both the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab’s 
Lighthouse, and on the Google Play available ODKCollect applications. Unfortunately, 
Lighthouse and ODKCollect are currently limited to Android based smart devices only.  
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Investigative experiments were conducted in Legazpi City, in the Republic of the 
Philippines (ROP), where form refinements were made and it was discovered that 
crowdsourcing the assessments may be possible.  
Investigative experiments with the Savvion process modeler compared the “As Is” 
process to the “To Be” model. The “As Is” process utilized only RTAT subject matter 
experts, the old Excel spreadsheets assessment forms, and email to communicate data to 
points of contact within the humanitarian assistance response community. The “To Be” 
model was comprised of crowdsourced assessments on the developed mobile data 
collection tool with automated backend server integration with the Pacific Disaster 
Center’s (PDC’s) DisasterAWARE web portal. This experiment revealed the “To Be” 
model to be superior in every regard. Using the “To Be” model, the number of 
assessments could be doubled from 100 to 200, expenses dropped 87 percent, wait time 
decreased by 81 percent and it took only one fifth (1/5) of the time to complete the 200 
surveys. Further, the number of surveys in the “To Be” model could be increased five-
fold from 100 to 500 and expenses and time would still be lower than the “As Is” model.  
RTAT’s demonstration experiment and deployment in response to Typhoon 
Haiyan in Tacloban City, ROP tested the findings of the Savvion experiment in a real-
world environment and proved that the RTAT assessments could be crowdsourced given 
the caveats of the “Limitations” section below. Typhoon Haiyan deployment further 
validated that the crowdsourced assessments could be viewed on, and its data 
disseminated through, the Pacific Disaster Center’s DisasterAWARE web portal given 
the boundaries outlined in the “Limitations” section below.  
Finally, the demonstration experiment during Joint Inter-Agency Field Exercise 
(JIFX) 2014–4 at Camp Roberts finalized the RTAT v6 assessment with plans to further 
integrate the forms into and improve their display on DisasterAWARE. See Chapter V 
for further details.  
The campaign of experimentation ended successfully with a usable mobile data 
collection tool and processes that could integrate the process of data collection to 
situational awareness dissemination in near real time. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
The NPS CORE lab’s Lighthouse application, as well as the ODKCollect 
application, were successfully used in real-world testing conditions as the electronic form 
interface to download, fill out, and upload completed RTAT assessment forms to the NPS 
ODKAggregate servers located in Monterey, CA.  
Demonstration experiments further validated that ODK data could be exported 
and assessments displayed on PDC’s DisasterAWARE website with conditions outlined 
below.  
RTAT v6 meets current needs to integrate with Pacific Disaster Center. No 
research was conducted into compliance with the Humanitarian Data Exchange initiative 
which could influence whether v6 will meet RTAT needs going into the future. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
There are many caveats and limitations that are discussed in this section that 
affect the conclusions outlined above. 
1. Lack of Budget 
Given the lack of budget, available Samsung S2 and S3 phones at no charge, the 
prevalence of experience and support within the Common Operational Research 
Environment (CORE) lab at the Naval Postgraduate School, and its ability to meet initial 
mission requirements, the Open Data Kit (ODK) suite of tools was selected for further 
RTAT development and testing. According to research, there were no free ODK 
compatible Apple iOS applications available that met the requirements of RTAT. This is 
an ongoing limitation within the adoption realm and a solution will be discussed in 
Chapter V. Many RTAT design and selection decisions were based primarily on cost. 
Removing this limitation may invalidate the ODK selection. 
2. Displaying Typhoon Haiyan Data on DisasterAWARE 
The Typhoon Haiyan successful demonstration experiment to display RTAT data 
on PDC’s DisasterAWARE was conducted after returning to the United States. Further, 
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this display experiment was a non-automated process that included the manual 
exportation of the data, transmission via email, and then manual importation of the data 
by PDC. This was due to the lack of formal organizational letters of agreement between 
the NPS, CORE lab and PDC; as well as form changes that took place after PDC points 
of contact left the Philippines for other operational commitments. This limitation will be 
further addressed in Chapter V. 
3. Integration with Other Humanitarian Assistance Organizations 
Talks have begun, but there have been no serious efforts to link RTAT assessment 
data into other partner or stakeholder organizations such as USAID, the UN-Emergency 
Telecommunication Cluster, the All Partners Area Network (APAN) web portal, or the 
Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nor has there been an effort to 
ensure data collected is compliant or harmonized with recent open source Humanitarian 
Data Exchange (HDX) developments. Any future database builds and HTML5 
developments must be in line with partner initiatives to ensure widespread use and 
adoption of the RTAT mobile data collection tool. 
4. ODK Form Development Limitations 
The ODK compliant forms were developed initially on the ODK XLS2XFORM 
program until logic within the XLS2XFORM could no longer be supported. 
XLS2XFORM developed Extensible Markup Language (XML) form file lines of code 
were then edited manually to meet the needs of RTAT. This severely limits the simplicity 
of, and time to create, form edits and changes. 
5. Satellite Communication 
Internet connectivity in the form of surviving cellular data service, NGO provided 
Internet café, or BGAN is required within the disaster zone to meet the needs of RTAT 
and validate the Savvion findings. 
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6. Local Language 
Ability to speak the local language is a must in interviewing local points of 
contact in the conduct of RTAT assessments. It should be noted that ODK does support 
numerous languages. However, Filipino (Tagalog) is not one of them. 
7. Crowdsourcing 
There were crowdsourcing limitations during Typhoon Haiyan. All but two 
volunteers had either military, first responder or an ICT background. More research 
should be conducted into the validity of assessments by volunteers with no military, ICT 
or first responder experience (or combinations thereof). Further, no comparative analysis 
was done between those that had prior experience at the Legazpi City demonstration 
experiment and those that were using the RTAT assessment tool for the first time during 
Typhoon Haiyan. 
Vast improvements in the Savvion process costs hinge upon obtaining 10–20 
local volunteers. This is tied to the crowdsourcing limitation above. RTAT members must 
train those crowdsourced volunteers before they can be utilized. Legazpi City and 
Typhoon Haiyan demonstrated that large numbers of volunteers could be obtained in a 
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V. FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The intent of RTAT is to deploy scores of crowdsourced evaluators that could 
conduct ICT assessments and for those collected data points to automatically work its 
way up the information chain shown in Figure 1. The real purpose of this data collection 
effort is the integration of RTAT data into the situational awareness that can be found 
directly in or gleaned from and overarching ICT current operational picture (Figure 41). 
Holistic situational awareness, regardless of cluster, is the means by which better 
collaborative decisions can be made by humanitarian assistance (HA) responders.  
 
Figure 41.  UN-ETC Typhoon Haiyan Current Operational Picture November 27, 2014 
(from WFP, 2013c) 
This chapter outlines efforts that were ongoing at the conclusion of the thesis, 
potential future research areas, as well as some solutions to the limitations discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
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1. Integration with Humanitarian Assistance Response Community 
RTAT should explore collaborating more with the USAID, UNDAC and 
FITTEST teams to align assessment efforts and future assessment developments 
(collection data, form, and tool). As discussed in the Limitations section of Chapter IV, 
efforts must be harmonized with partner initiatives to ensure widespread use and adoption 
of the RTAT mobile data collection tool specific areas for further research and develop 
are outlined and discussed below. 
a. Hyper Text Markup Language 5 
As previously discussed, the RTAT mobile data collection tool is not compatible 
with Apple’s iOS operating system. This is a problem because nearly half of all smart 
phones run on iOS. One potential solution is to create a Hyper Text Mark-up Language 5 
(HTML5) program that would be operating system agnostic while meeting the 
requirements of RTAT. Project requirement discussions are underway to explore this 
avenue with Humanitarian Tool Box (HTBox), an organization that volunteers computer 
programming to HA organizations. Discussions are in the requirements development 
stage and could be accelerated with an upcoming “hack-a-thon.” If, however, the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab’s 
Lighthouse application HTML 5 project is any indication, these efforts will take six 
months to a year to complete. Therefore the ODK RTAT v6 solution must remain viable 
until a follow-on operating system agnostic solution is brought on-line and discussions 
with PDC to integrate v6 forms should continue. 
b. Data Base Development 
ODKAggregate can export a flat file (spreadsheet) that can be imported into a 
database such as MySQL or MS Access. ODK does have some rudimentary query 
capabilities that have thus far met the needs of RTAT. Unfortunately, ODKAggregate’s 
flat file interface will not be able to keep pace as RTAT grows and integration with 
Pacific Disaster Center and the rest of the HA response community continues. Constant 
revisions of RTAT assessment forms have thus far hampered this effort and should be 
addressed as soon as RTAT v6 is officially adopted.  
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c. Humanitarian Disaster Exchange Compliance 
Database efforts should align with current and anticipated Humanitarian Disaster 
Exchange (HDX) requirements to facilitate sharing of collected data to the rest of the HA 
response community. This will ensure assessment harmonization with other UN 
assessment reports. 
2. Pacific Disaster Center Integration 
The primary development partner, in regards to assessment display, has been the 
Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) and its DisasterAWARE web portal. Late form finalization 
has effected both the database development discussed above and with RTAT assessment 
data integration with PDC and will be discussed in greater detail below. 
a. Data Exchange 
RTAT Assessment v6’s successful demonstration test at the Joint Interagency 
Field Exercise (JIFX) in August 2014 marks the unofficial finalization of the RTAT 
assessment form. However, RTAT as a whole still needs to officially bless the form 
before efforts to fully automate and integrate a data exchange can begin. JIFX assessment 
data was sent to PDC on September 9, 2014 with an initial conference call to discuss the 
data and server letters of agreement pending at the time of thesis submission. 
b. DisasterAWARE View 
The current view of a RTAT assessment on DisasterAWARE yields little intuitive 
information, Figure 42. Research is needed to develop the best operational view that 
easily conveys pertinent information to the end user, see Figure 43 for latest proposal.  
128 
 
Figure 42.  Current DisasterAWARE view 
 
Figure 43.  Potential DisasterAWARE view (after B. King, personal communication, 
April 22, 2014) 
In the Figure 43 example, the red lightning bolt indicates that electricity is “Not 
Working” at that assessment location. A quick “Mouse Over” (Figure 43) of the 
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assessment location reveals additional issues with Land Lines/Fiber (sub-) services, 
Cellular (sub-) services, and Broadcasting (sub-) services. Double clicking on the icon 
would return the RTAT assessment report discussed next.  
c. RTAT Assessment Reports 
Tied to the database and HA response community integration, RTAT needs to 
develop a standardized report that can be generated from collected data. Figure 44 is an 
example of one such proposed report. Research into intuitive report design and 
harmonization with common HA response community assessment report practices should 
be conducted before report finalization. Further, integration (coordination or 
harmonization) into USAID reports and the UN’s Situational Analysis and MIRA reports 
are a must going forward if RTAT’s contributions are to remain valid within the larger 




Figure 44.  Proposed RTAT Assessment Report (after B. King, personal communication, April 22, 2014) 
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APPENDIX A. COMMAND & CONTROL CASE STUDY OF THE 
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 
Appendix A is an unpublished paper written as a final project by five officers at 
the Naval Postgraduate School for a command and control class (Canon et al., 2012). 
Quotes and ideas were taken from this paper. This document could not be found by any 
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Introduction 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 4 storm on August 29, 2005 near 
New Orleans, Louisiana. Katrina’s devastation was exacerbated by the subsequent failure 
of the levee system that protected New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain, 24 hours after 
land-fall. The levee failure resulted in wide spread flooding of New Orleans causing 
extensive damage to its infrastructure that in turn hampered the command and control of 
rescue, relief and recovery efforts. The official death toll surpassed 1,200, over 1 million 
people were displaced and damages exceeded $200 billion. Hurricane Katrina created a 
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humanitarian crisis on a scale unseen in the history of the U.S. and is to date the most 
destructive and costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States (Striedl, 
Crosson, & Farr, 2006). 
This paper will explore the Command and Control (C2) inter/intra relationships 
between the involved local, state, federal government entities, as well as, non-
governmental and regional partnership organizations and discuss what worked and what 
should be improved upon. Additionally, this paper will glean from the Katrina lessons 
learned a set of C2 principles that are both Katrina specific and generalizable to other 
complex endeavors. 
Background 
The U.S. National Response Plan (NRP), resulting from Presidential Directive 
No. 5 in 2004, recognizes that planning, preparing for and responding to natural and other 
disasters are primarily responsibilities of the individual states. This reflects the U.S. 
constitutional perspective, and results in a pull response assumption, with local 
authorities having the lead at the start, escalating to state level and then to federal level, if 
necessary and if requested (Moffat, 2008). 
The Stafford Act also outlines the process by which state governors request this 
assistance from the federal government when the event becomes one of “National 
Significance.” The U.S. President then has to decide whether this merits designation as an 
Emergency (releasing limited resources to the states), a Major Disaster (releasing much 
greater resource to the states) or a Catastrophe. The first two of these result in a pull 
response: the states requesting and drawing down from these federal resources as they see 
the event unfolding. The third category of Catastrophe would have resulted in a proactive 
push of resources to the region, states and local level, irrespective of the states’ requests 
(Moffat, 2008). The Stafford act attempts to organize and capture all Federal costs 
associated with the significant event. However, its processes can be cumbersome, slow 
and ill-suited to a dynamic situation where a rapid response, vice monetary 
accountability, is the gauge of success.  
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Under the NRP, a comprehensive framework of response to significant event is 
set up. At the Federal level, the Homeland Security Operations Centre, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Response Centre and the Interagency 
Incident Management Group jointly coordinate the response across government 
departments. The federal coordinating officer (FCO), a representative of the Secretary for 
Homeland Security, is authorized to lead a Joint Field Office (JFO). This is a temporary 
federal facility established locally at the time of a disaster to coordinate the local, state, 
and federal response. It consists of senior representatives from all of the agencies and 
responders involved, and develop objectives, strategies, plans, and priorities. The 
membership of this office is envisaged as growing and adapting over time as the incident 
escalates or diminishes (Moffat, 2008). 
In summary at pre-Katrina landfall, the NRP and Stafford Act clearly delineate 
that states have the lead on handling natural disasters within their states and with the 
exception of “catastrophic” events are required to request assistance from the federal 
government if necessary. FEMA is the lead federal C2 agency for handling “nationally 
significant” events (Meeds, 2006). The entire system is set up in a strict, regimented, 
hierarchical system, local, state, regional and or federal respectively, that will be shown 
to be ill-suited and deficient for the dynamic task at hand.  
Analysis of Principles with Alternate Decisions 
Principle: Fit 
A key C2 principle relevant to the Hurricane Katrina response involves the 
concept of fit. Fit is the match between the organization structure and contingency 
factors that has a positive effect on performance (Nissen & Burton, 2011). Regardless 
of the mission, successful C2 systems “fit” within the constraints of the environment and 
successfully match organizational structure and methodology to the mission. 
Organizations that fail to appropriately design their C2 system to the operational 
environment and mission achieve a “misfit,” which significantly degrades organizational 
performance. 
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The organizational structure and methodology employed by local, sand federal 
agencies during the response to Hurricane Katrina was based off the National Response 
Plan (NRP). The NRP is the federal government’s baseline plan to coordinate disaster 
response, and is designed to facilitate coordination of federal resources in response to a 
catastrophic event. The NRP is based off a structured C2 configuration closely 
resembling a Machine Bureaucracy. Thus, the C2 organization predicated in the NRP is 
hierarchical and utilizes centralized command structure, high degrees of specialization, 
highly formalized vertical communications pipelines, high decision thresholds and 
standardization of work processes for coordination. It is designed around the assumption 
that the environment is stable and simple (i.e. predictable), and seeks to optimize 
responses based off repeatable cause-and-effect relationships. The strength of the 
Machine Bureaucracy resides in its stability; however, this stability also makes it slow 
and inflexible.  
Unfortunately, the bureaucratic machine designed to respond to Katrina was too 
slow and inflexible to handle the chaotic situation in Louisiana, Mississippi and 
Alabama—which “misfit” the situation. The high decision thresholds and “red tape,” 
which accompanied each major decision, slowed recovery efforts. Highly formal and 
vertically oriented communications pipelines slowed information flow that led to poor 
situational awareness. Highly centralized command functions and the lack of self-
contained units exercising initiative in distributed areas resulted in duplicated recovery 
efforts in some areas and total neglect in other locations. Together, these results indicate 
that the recovery effort (particularly during the initial stages of the response) was largely 
conflicted and unsynchronized which caused unnecessary suffering and additional loss of 
life. 
A C2 configuration offering a better “fit” to the highly chaotic and unpredictable 
post-Katrina environment is the Adhocracy. A C2 system organized along these lines is 
the polar opposite of a Machine Bureaucracy. The Adhocracy utilizes decentralized and 
informal command structures, low degrees of specialization, informal communications 
pipelines (particularly horizontal), low decision thresholds and mutual adjustment for 
coordination. It performs best in highly dynamic and unstable environments, by stressing 
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fully distributed patterns of interaction, broad dissemination of information and peer-to-
peer allocation of decision rights (low decision thresholds). The Adhocracy assumes that 
the environment is unpredictable and favors agility to respond to unknown circumstances 
over optimization of responses to predictable scenarios (Machine Bureaucracy approach).  
The strength of the Adhocracy lies in its speed and maneuverability, which comes 
at the cost of accuracy and stability. In catastrophic response scenarios however, the 
critical factor is time not accuracy; therefore, speed of response vice accuracy of response 
should have been the key factor dictating the federal government’s response to Katrina. 
Consequently, the C2 configuration representing the best “fit” to these operational 
requirements should have been identified as an Adhocracy vice a Machine 
Bureaucracy—the improved performance from employing the better fitting C2 system 
would likely have eased suffering and saved lives.  
Principle: Unity of Command 
Another principal that stood out due to not having the right “fit” as stated above 
was the concept of unity of command. C2 is largely about organizing people with aligned 
goals, who coordinate efforts via procedures and leverage capabilities through 
technologies (Van Creveld, 1985, 10). Van Creveld’s biggest learning point was that 
command systems cannot be understood in isolation. Movement towards labeling 
command as a “system” vice a hierarchical chain produces a deeper understanding of 
relationships in a complex environment. Unity of command is paramount in C2. 
Command as a process vice an individual, effectively uses information in a more 
powerful way to coordinate people and equipment. Great leaders understand that the 
organization does not exist to serve them rather that they exist to serve the organization, 
to work with others to help create conditions necessary for success (Alberts and Hayes, 
2003). 
C2 of all support forces was a serious issue during recent disaster relief 
operations... the answer to “Who is in charge?” depended on to whom you 
posed the question. Lack of unity of effort led to overloaded support in 
some areas and not enough in others (Center for Army Lessons Learned 
06–11: Hurricane Katrina, 2006).  
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The above statement from the Army lessons learned amplifies the point that given 
a complex disruption (catastrophe), people often look to a stated person in charge. When 
the “commander” does not appear, chaos and lack of cohesion exponentially rise. Some 
argue that the focus should be on unity of effort vice unity of command. By focusing on 
unity of effort, the cure to a symptom is sought rather than the root cause in that 
command is still a function of the commander vice a process. The principle views 
command as a process emphasizing unity of command that produces unity of effort as a 
bi-product. 
The lack the unity of command unfortunately points out many of the failures from 
the Katrina response. Specifically, the lack of coordination to align goals produced 
duplicate efforts, confusion, frustration and misappropriated assets. By not organizing 
people to coordinate efforts, the system from the start became conflicted. The Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina (2006) listed an overwhelming lack of unity of command 
that spawned dismal coordination. Below are a few key identifiers from the report that 
conveyed a lack of unity and coordination (pp. 3, 4, 299, 315): 
 The C2 of the National Guard units and the federal level could not 
exchange information.  
 No unified C2 system was put in place during the search and rescue, 
evacuation, and supply delivery missions. The effect was that of having 
multiple rescue teams operating in the same area while other areas were 
left uncovered.  
 DOD, FEMA, and the State of Louisiana had difficulty coordinating with 
each other, which slowed the response.  
 DOD-DHS coordination was not effective during Hurricane Katrina.  
 Government did not effectively coordinate private air transport capabilities 
for the evacuation of medical patients.  
 Lack of coordination led to delays in recovering dead bodies.  
 State officials feel there has been a lack of coordination within the 
interagency community causing delay in relocating and housing people. 
The large organizations (local, state, DOD, DHS, FEMA, etc.) may have had 
great intentions to help; however, the leaders decisions broke down in the dynamic, less 
predictable environment that conflicted the entire system. Commanders and top-level 
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officials were making decisions with the understanding they are the C2 of their 
organization vice looking at C2 as a process. The sheer overwhelming event of Katrina 
exposed the vulnerability in the system that gave too much importance to some 
individuals. Fortunately, due to the tireless work of people at the tactical level, 
coordination began to produce direction. As the maturity level grew due to unflagging 
tactical initiatives, the efforts matured and the system evolved to deconflicted with signs 
of coordination at the very end. Specifically, what evolved were multiple organizations 
communicating with liaisons. The steep learning curve came at a very high cost.  
 Unfortunately, many official definitions continue to be focused on the authorities 
associated with command, not on the what and the how of what needs to be accomplished 
(Alberts and Hayes, 1995). To better employ and maximize the stated principle, the 
process must be the focus. By focusing on the process, coordination will prosper. 
Specifically, to increase maturity and coordination rapidly (key in a Katrina like event), 
the frequency of interactions among the entities must be emphasized. These interactions 
shift the focus from the Information domain (from sparse to rich exchange of 
information) to the Cognitive domain (from low to high degrees of shared awareness) and 
to the Social domain (from low to high sharing of resources) (Moffat and Alberts, 2006). 
Concrete examples to employ are to emphasize liaisons and establish coordination 
centers for fusion cells to coordinate efforts. Other key aspects to improve C2 came from 
the White House’s Lessons Learned, 2006. These initiatives began to acknowledge 
coordination and C2 as a process to empower unity of command:  
 Ensure that for events preceded by warning, we are prepared to pre-position an 
interagency federal joint field office (JFO) to coordinate and, if necessary, direct 
federal support to the disaster. 
 Ensure that relevant federal, state, and local decision makers, including leaders of 
the State National Guard, are working together and in close proximity to one 
another in the event of another disaster. 
 Embed DOD points of contact at the JFO and FEMA regional offices to enhance 
coordination of military resources supporting the response (liaisons). 
Principle: Communications must be adaptive 
Poor unity of command exacerbated the third principle concerning 
communications. Communication is broken into two facets to support C2. The need to 
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maintain an informal, as well as a formal network of communications inside the 
organization; as well as the need for a regular reporting and information 
transmission system working both from the top down and from the bottom up (Van 
Creveld, 1985, 270). Communication is a vital aspect to Command and Control (C2) 
whether one is looking at it from a much defined warfighting organizational structure or a 
fairly loose coordinated structure such as a disaster relief effort. Communication must be 
adaptive to provide needed information to the right place at the right time.  
Communication can be viewed as a system with multiple roles to support the C2 
process (JP-6, 2006). One role of the system is to ensure connectivity thus to provide the 
capability to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain operations. Another role is to provide 
the essential tools necessary to collect, transport, process, protect, and disseminate 
information. Finally, it serves a role to provide processes and procedures in which to aid 
in ensuring information availability to facilitate the need for distributed operations in a 
nonlinear process. A communication system that is effective in each of these roles as well 
as being agile, interoperable, trusted and shared forms a network that is linked and 
synchronized in time and purpose to allow a C2 process to successfully implement to 
achieve the mission.  
Now taking a look at the disaster relief efforts of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 from 
a national, regional and local perspective on how well their communication system 
support the operational efforts to accomplish the mission. There were inherent failures at 
all levels of this disaster relief effort from a communication perspective. Starting from the 
top of the U.S. Emergency Structure that was obviously not in place or operating properly 
to effectively deal with the devastation that Hurricane Katrina left behind. The lines of 
communication with respect to the Stafford Act were not at all effective statistically there 
were 1,833 fatalities, winds gusting at 175mph and an estimated 108 billion dollars in 
damages however the response from the federal government was to wait to determine if 
whether the state and local government could handle to destruction that was caused by 
the hurricane. The timeline of responsive action is the biggest indicator of an ineffective 
communication system it took what must have seemed like a lifetime to those affected to 
get the necessary assistance required. As the devastation and destruction played out in the 
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national media civilian and military decision makers throughout the government 
estimated that the inflow of National Guard troops was sufficient to handle the situation. 
On 31 August after being given a “blank cheese” for any DOD resources General Honore 
still “did not believe that federal ground forces were needed.” This proved the breakdown 
or lack of communication from a national level.  
On a regional level the federal government and the governor of Louisiana 
required 24 hours to agree on a structure of separate active-duty and National Guard task 
forces. However, the final agreement was not reached until six days after the landfall of 
Hurricane Katrina. From a local level the coordination of the local law enforcement did 
not take place until eight days after the landfall of the hurricane. Failure to establish an 
effective communication system with identified lines of communication resulted in the 
situation experienced during Hurricane Katrina one of mass chaos and confusion. 
Specifically, multiple units searched for survivors covering the same ground while other 
areas go unsearched.  
Establishing an effective communication networks which allows the necessary 
communication between and among national, regional and local agencies that are agile, 
interoperable, trusted and shared would alleviate issues experienced by Hurricane 
Katrina. Linking and synchronizing the C2 process through communications would 
greatly improve the probability of success in a dynamic environment. Formal and 
informal communications that are interoperable and synced would also increase the unity 
of command as a process with in a coordinated effort against a complex situation.  
Principle: Agility 
The concept of C2 agility and maturity surfaced a fourth principle tied to Van 
Creveld’s idea in that an organization that will make such low-decision thresholds 
possible must provide self-contained units at a fairly low level (Van Creveld, 1985, 270). 
The more uncertain and dynamic an adversary and or the environment are, the more agile 
a C2 organization must be or become (Alberts and Hayes, 2003, 124). 
Alberts and Hayes (2003, 127-128) went on to define agility by six key 
dimensions: robustness, resilience, responsiveness, flexibility, innovation and adaptation. 
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The aforementioned dimensions will be the lens used to analyze the Hurricane Katrina 
C2 organization with respect to the stated principle.  
Robustness is the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, 
situations, and conditions (Alberts and Hayes, 2003, p.128). Mobilized state, National 
Guard, regional partners, and local assets were not capable of handling the C2 
requirements of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent levee failures that flooded New 
Orleans (Meeds, 2006). As federal DOD assets became available C2 of the relief efforts 
became an attainable objective. 
Resilience is the ability to recover from or adjust to misfortune, damage, or a 
destabilizing perturbation in the environment (Alberts and Hayes, 2003, p.128). The C2 
system was not resilient to a hurricane, Dourandish, Zumel, and Manno (2007) found that 
“severe damage to the communications infrastructure created significant difficulties and 
hampered rescue efforts due to the resultant lack of situational awareness by civilian and 
military officials.”  
Responsiveness is the ability to react to a change in the environment in a timely 
manner (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p.128). The entire mobilization effort was not 
responsive, of the 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 federal military personnel 
eventually deployed to the affected areas, only about 11,000, or about 16 percent were on 
the ground within the first three days of the event, including approximately 9,000 
prestaged National Guard personnel (Dourandish, Zumel, and Manno, 2007). 
Flexibility is the ability to employ multiple ways to succeed and the capacity to 
move seamlessly between them; innovation is the ability to do new things and the ability 
to do old things in new ways (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p.128). FEMA provided funding 
for a Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project, and two planning 
conferences were held in the 6-8 weeks leading up to hurricane Katrina for federal, state 
and local entities. Shortfalls were identified, but not corrected, and more importantly no 
one exercised the plan drafted. As a result, the entities involved could not exercise the 
plan created nor adapt as the events did not go as planned (Townsend, 2006). This gives 
rise two applicable combat principles: the plan is nothing, planning is everything 
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(conversations with Colonel D. Crall, USMC, 2007), tempered with, no plan ever 
survives first contact (derived from quotes from Carl von Clausewitz and Helmoth von 
Moltke).  
The final dimension to agility is Adaptation. Alberts and Hayes (2003, p.128) 
defined adaptation as the ability to change work processes and the ability to change the 
organization. The first week post Katrina land fall was chocked full of examples of ad 
hoc and adaptive processes and changes but their efforts were sporadic and overall 
inefficient and ineffective. With that said, the Katrina C2 system matured from non-
existent or conflicted operations to de-conflicted operations after the first week as more 
entities and assets arrived in theater and working relationships were developed (Meeds, 
2006). 
Recommended agility improvements. Scalable, modular capability package 
organizations should be regionally developed/based that can provide Emergency Support 
Functions capabilities to the federal coordinating officer. Specific DOD and National 
Guard units should be tasked with setting up and manning Civil Military Operations 
Centers and those units should participate in annual FEMA exercises with their state and 
local counterparts to exercise C2 capabilities. These organizations should be nimble, 
maneuverable/mobile, self-sufficient and capable of sustained operations for 10 days. 
These entities will be the forerunner to larger more hierarchical capabilities. 
Summary 
By using a number of lenses to analyze C2 during Hurricane Katrina, we 
concluded that the organizational structure and methodology employed by local, state and 
federal agencies were less than adequate. By understanding the guiding documents used 
during the response to Hurricane Katrina (National Response Plan, and Stafford Act) we 
assemble some necessary principles:  
1. Unity of command 
2. Agility 
3. Adaptive communication 
4. Organizational fit 
142 
The lack of unity of command unfortunately points out many of the failures from 
the Katrina response; having individuals, organizations and systems change the way they 
relate to one another will enhance coordination at all levels. In the complex dynamic 
environment where no single entity is in charge, the coordination and process of C2 will 
prevail vice individual commanders. Through this coordination agility will increase 
providing clarity in uncertain and dynamic situations; this agility will provide enhanced 
communication. By establishing an effective formal and informal communication 
network that is agile, interoperable, trusted and shared the necessary communication 
between and among national, regional and local agencies would have decrease issues 
experienced during Hurricane Katrina. 
Subsequently, the C2 configuration representing the best “fit” to these operational 
requirements must be identified and executed to improve performance during the 
employment at the local, state and federal level. Regardless of the mission, successful C2 
systems must have agility with clear communication in order exercise unity of command, 
which ultimately provide the optimal fit. There is no single approach, no best system 
design or configuration, no best process for all situations and circumstances (NATO NEC 
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APPENDIX B. RAPID INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE ASSESSMENT  
Appendix B is a paper written by the author for an enterprise architecture strategy 
class at the Naval Postgraduate School (Beeson, 2013). This paper was instrumental in 
the development of the RTAT “As Is” and “To Be” models tested with Savvion and was 
instrumental in understanding the RTAT organization. Ideas, figures and quotes were 
taken from this paper. 
Rapid Information and Communication Technology 
Assessment Team (RTAT)  




By: Major R. Travis Beeson 




Naval Postgraduate School 




Cataclysmic events such as the Indonesian tsunami in 2003 and hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 leave a wide and devastating wake of destruction. The horrific human suffering 
in these types of events is exacerbated by the inability of relief organizations to 
collaborate efforts, that is collectively assess the situation, prioritize efforts and 
effectively allocate scarce resources. This is due in large part to an ineffective or missing 
overarching collaboration organization, and further compounded by severely damaged 
host nation communication infrastructure. Most organizations “don’t know what they 
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don’t know” when they show up and as a result incorrectly equip themselves for the 
information and communication technology (ICT) environment. Several organizations 
assess various aspects of the ICT infrastructure, but none collate the information into a 
complete understanding. To fill the gaps the Rapid ICT Assessment Team (RTAT) was 
created to conduct a holistic assessment of the ICT environment and share this 
information with other responding organizations. However, the problem of efficiently and 
effectively collecting the data, creating a common ICT operational picture and getting 
this information into the right hands has yet to be solved. This assessment is being 
conducted to help RTAT solve this problem. RTAT is a startup organization that 
currently has no documented Enterprise Architecture (EA) strategy. This assessment will 
be the foundation of that strategy and the building block for its eventual Enterprise 




ASSESS THE ENTERPRISE 
Sengupta (2013) stated, “The architecture must be congruent with the 
organization of the enterprise, technology must be aligned with the “business” 
requirements and “the architecture must be robust and durable.” For the purposes of this 
paper the RTAT “Enterprise” is defined as the people, equipment and processes 
associated with the collection, storage and promulgation of pre and post disaster ICT data 
collection. 
What does RTAT do? 
The mission of RTAT: Conduct and promulgate baseline and post-disaster 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure assessments, to facilitate 
host nation and international disaster relief efforts (Steckler, 2012). “Facilitate” includes 
the management and dissemination of a shared common operational picture and ICT 
recovery prioritization recommendations.  
Currently RTAT is conceptually organized into “rapidly deployable small, 
nimble, multi-organizational, multi-national integrated assessment teams of specialists in 
key ICT areas such as wireless data communications, voice communications, radio 
technologies, power, information sharing, social networking, etc.” (Steckler, 2012). 
These teams would be led by team leader and a “national affected state member (such as 
National Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Communications or equivalent 
affiliated organization)” (Steckler, 2012). RTAT is currently made up of international 
founding member organizations/volunteers, but the aforementioned cadre of standardized 
prepositioned teams and equipment is the future model.  
There are several stakeholder organizations associated with RTAT and include: 
The UN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pacific Disaster Center 
(PDC), U.S. Pacific Command, and the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as several 
other governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) (Steckler, 2012).  
How is the work done? 
Core processes are outlined in the use cases of attachment 1 and include:  
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1. Conduct of baseline, update and post-disaster ICT and power assessment.  
2. Process assessments into a Common Operational Picture (COP) or 
understanding. 
3. Make recovery ICT priority recommendations. 
4. Distribute the ICT assessments, COP and priority recommendations to 
host nation and the international relief community. 
Lines of reporting and responsibilities are still being developed and are a source 
for friction for the organization.  
Current proposed RTAT team roles and responsibility model (based on Steckler, 
RTAT Executive Summary 15 November 2012) 
Team Leader:  
1. Prioritizes the team’s efforts accounting for member strengths and 
environmental requirements/limitations.  
2. Determine the team’s make up and skill sets for the mission. 
3. Coordinates with host nation and other international relief organizations to 
prevent duplication of efforts and add value to the relief efforts. 
4. Receives input from host nation ICT counterpart and team members, to 
make a prioritized ICT repair recommendation list. 
5. Disseminate assessments and recommendations to host nation and 
participating international relief organizations. 
6. Make recommendations/decisions regarding follow on RTAT efforts. I.e. 
Extend the stay for current RTAT, turnover to a relief RTAT, or conclude 
RTAT efforts. 
7. Be prepared to fulfill tasks as a Team Member. 
Team Member: 
1. Maintain the requisite skills in the area of expertise. 
2. Be prepared to deploy within 12–24 hours to the disaster area. 
3. Maintain self-sufficiency within the disaster area for up to 2 weeks. 
4. Conduct assessments and “push” assessments to the server when and 




ASSESS THE OPERATING MODEL 
Assess the Operating Environment 
As repeatedly demonstrated, large scale disasters like hurricane Katrina and the 
Indonesian Tsunami create highly chaotic and turbulent operating environments. Getting 
into and out of the affected country is difficult, physically moving about within the 
disaster zone can be nearly impossible. Many disaster prone countries lack adequate 
logistical and ICT infrastructure, this is further exacerbated by the by the wake of 
destruction these disasters leave. This is a highly uncertain environment with high levels 
of equivocality. While no one knows when and where the next disaster will strike, there 
is certainty that there will be a disaster in certain regions of the earth on an annual basis. 
To increase response agility, “RTAT teams would be stationed at key locations around 
the world, perhaps modeled after the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams 
program, or possibly as associate members of NetHope, the UN Emergency 
Telecommunications Cluster (ETC Cluster) or other similar teams. These teams could be 
called on by the host nation, UN agencies such as OCHA, WPF, or a regional entity such 
as ASEAN” (Steckler 2012). While no one knows for certain what specific ICT 
capabilities will be effected or what the operating environment will be like, there are 
many trends and lessons that can be gleaned from previous disasters. This historical 




Organizational Agility Response 
Decision to respond: RTAT is designed to be a niche organization whose 
services will not be needed for every disaster. RTAT services can be requested by the 
host nation, regional authorities (ASEAN), global organizations (UN, NetHope, Red 
Cross), but RTATs can self-deploy based on the team leaders decision.  
Range of RTAT responses: RTAT may deploy an assessment team, share 
baseline assessment information, act as liaison to host nation, or once Lighthouse is on 
online host/facilitate assessments conducted by locally trained responders. This niche 
ICT assessment range does include power, wireless (TV, radio, Wi-Fi/WIMAX, cellular), 
terrestrial (copper, cable, T-1, fiber optic), and satellite communications (Steckler, 2012). 
Team deployment response: RTAT members/teams will be highly trained on 
both ICT assessment and personal sustainment skills (food, water, shelter, hygiene and 
personal security/safety) to use within the environment (Steckler, 2012). Additionally, 
teams will carry satellite communication and alternative power assets to facilitate mission 
accomplishment within the disaster zone. Finally, baseline ICT assessments need to be 
conducted for disaster prone areas to facilitate faster post disaster assessments (Steckler, 
2012).  
Correct uncertainty organizational response: Forward located, ready to deploy 
teams (within 12–24 hours), capable of self-sustainment (personal survival, satellite 
communication and sustainable electrical power) and armed with baseline ICT 
assessments are a must level of agility to successfully operate in the post-disaster 



















Assess the Current State of IT in the Enterprise 
 
Specify “As-Is” models of operation 
Currently RTAT uses a Microsoft Office host of programs, Skype as well as 
various other communication programs to accomplish its mission. A Microsoft excel 
spreadsheet is used to conduct the assessments and it relies upon assessors professional 
judgment to gauge non-standardized markings within the spreadsheet. These spreadsheets 
are then emailed, via various webmail services, to various points of contacts in the 
disaster recovery effort to disseminate their findings. The current excel assessment 
spreadsheet does not support export into a query-able database that can then be rapidly 
promulgated. There is no centralized COP. No standardized RTAT training, team 
makeup, or “go kit” equipment list. Current capabilities are very ad hoc and vary based 
on responder’s personal assets, skills, and experience. Further compounding these issues 
is the lack of baseline assessments conducted within disaster prone countries (Steckler, 
2012). The current IT model does not meet RTAT mission requirements. 
 
Figure 2 
Current RTAT Operating Model 
Chart from Ross, Weill, and Robertson (2006) 
Currently, RTAT is operating as a start-up/fledgling “Diversification” operating 
model, with few standardized or integrated processes (Ross et al., 2006). This is an 























lack of “shared customers” with “independent transactions” and further argue that the 
disjointedness is par for the industry and or a byproduct of the very chaotic post disaster 
working environment. However, standards within the organization are a must for 
consistency in the assessments, COP, and IT Solution. Minimally, there must standards 
set regionally with a select few nations and NGOs as stakeholder customers. See 
Enclosure 1 for As-Is IT use cases. 
Specify “To-Be” Models of Operation 
RTAT is experimenting with a Lighthouse enabled Open Data Kit based mobile 
data collection tool that will help facilitate core process requirements. This Lighthouse 
program is the future core method for data collection and dissemination. Lighthouse has 
some COP features but they currently do not meet all of the expected needs of the 
international relief community. Lighthouse does have an exportable XML file feature that 
can be imported by other relief organization. As part of the IT strategy, RTAT is 
collaborating with the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) to add ICT related information to 
their disaster COP (see Figure 3 for screen shot). ICT Assessments would be linked under 
the “more information” link. This will meet the intent for a common operational picture, 





Figure 3, Pacific Disaster Screen Shot (atlas.pdc.org/atlas, retrieved 9/17/13) 
Finalizing the RTAT mobile data collection tool would greatly standardize their 
core process of ICT assessment and dissemination integrating and linking RTAT 
information to the end user customer. Importing the findings into the PDC Atlas would 
standardize the COP and better integrate RTAT to the affected nation and responding 
NGOs. Overall RTAT would shift from their current “Diversification” operating model to 
a more process standardized and integrated “Replication” operating model with 
teams/services being interchangeable but with some specialization, see Figure 4 from 
Ross et al. (2006). 
  
Figure 4 Shift from Diversification to Replication Operating Model Chart (After Ross et 




























RTAT is currently using an iterative/spiral software development plan. Versions 
of the RTAT assessment tool were tested in Thailand in July 2013. The tool underwent 
refinement with follow on tests, including “beta” baseline assessments, scheduled in the 
Republic of the Philippines 23–27 September 2013. Stakeholders at Naval Postgraduate 
School, PDC, ASEAN and local/regional governments in the Republic of the Philippines 
are very interested in and supportive of the endeavor to the point of hosting/funding the 
initial baseline site surveys 23–27 September. Figure 5 shows the Actor Role Matrix “to-








R:  Responsible  A: Accountable  
C:  Consulted  I:  Informed
Activity RTAT Team RTAT Leader PDC Host Nation NGOs
Baseline Assessments C A, R C, I I
Assess ICT A R I I
Assess Power A R I I
Make Priority 
Recommendations
C A, R C, I C





FORMULATE PRIORITIES, PLANS 
Currently there is no standard way of conducting post disaster ICT assessments, 
therefore standardizing/ refining the assessment forms in a query-able format has been 
the priority (Steckler, 2012). Running in parallel is the project with PDC to push the 
information to their disaster Atlas. Team training, and standardization of “go-kits” is the 
lowest priority, but some training has been conducted to test the various versions of the 
RTAT assessment tool.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Responding efficiently and effectively to large-scale disasters is difficult in the 
U.S. and near impossible in third world countries. Compounding relief efforts is an 
inability to effectively collaborate due to the nonexistence of or damage to host nation 
ICT infrastructure. International relief organization respondents don’t know the status of 
the ICT infrastructure nor what would normally be available. RTAT may not be able to 
answer the entire uncertainty question of post disaster recovery operation, but it was 
created to answer the simple questions, “What kind of comms can I expect upon arrival” 
and what should the respondents repair first to get the most communication “bang for the 
buck”?  
RTAT is a fledgling organization still developing its IT plan. RTAT recognizes 
that for it to be a viable/ useful part of the international help community it must be able to 
effectively and efficiently communicate their ICT assessments. The RTAT/ Lighthouse 
assessment tool combined with the Pacific Disaster Center Atlas integration is not the 
“silver bullet” Enterprise Resource Planning system, but it is a step in the right direction. 
The proposed “to-be” IT solution gives RTAT and its end customer an intuitive 
standardized data collection tool that is useable on intermittent/ low bandwidth/ ad hoc 
networks. The problem of relief effort collaboration in a post-disaster chaotic 
environment is a complex problem that requires multiple solutions. RTAT and its new 
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APPENDIX C. RTAT SAVVION BUSINESS PROCESS 
MODELING 
Appendix C is an unpublished paper written by three students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School to meet the final project requirements of a business process 
improvement class (Beeson et al., 2014). RTAT was chosen as the organization of 
interest for this project. This appendix contains all of the supporting work mentioned in 
the Savvion model experiments. Tables, figures, quotes and ideas were taken directly 
from this source. This document could not be found by any other means other than by 
inclusion with the thesis. 
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Cataclysmic events such as hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Typhoon Yolanda in 
2013, leave a wide and devastating wake of destruction. The horrific suffering caused by 
these types of events is exacerbated by the inability of relief organizations to collaborate 
their efforts and collectively assess the situation, prioritize efforts and effectively allocate 
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scarce resources. This is due in large part to an ineffective or missing overarching 
collaboration organization, and further compounded by severely damaged host nation 
communication infrastructure. Though several organizations assess various aspects of 
ICT infrastructure, none collate or distribute the information.  
To fill the gaps the Rapid ICT Assessment Team (RTAT) was created to conduct 
a holistic assessment of the ICT environment and share this information with other 
responding organizations. However, the problem of efficiently and effectively collecting 
the data, creating a common ICT operational picture and getting this information into the 
right hands can still be challenging. 
 We analyzed the current “As Is” RTAT method using Savvion to determine weak 
points within the process. This analysis led to multiple recommendations for 
improvement, which were then added to a second “To Be” model of the process. By 
modeling, analyzing, and re-designing the RTAT process we hope to significantly reduce 
ICT recovery time and enable HADR in the future. 
 “As-Is” Model of Operation 
Currently RTAT is conceptually organized into “rapidly deployable, small, 
nimble, multi-organizational, multi-national integrated assessment teams of specialists in 
key ICT areas such as wireless data communications, voice communications, radio 
technologies, power, information sharing, social networking, etc.” (Steckler, 2012).  
“As Is” Scheme of Maneuver (further details are in the “As Is” assumptions section) 
Disaster Strikes  
 NGO request IT assessments from UN 
 RTAT assessors dispatched to conduct assessments via UN 
 RTAT Responsible for all travel arrangements  
 Assessors conduct assessments  
 Forward assessments to UN 
 UN employees process assessments  
 Forward to Mapper (Confirms & Plots location)  
 Mapper forwards back to UN  
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 UN confirms info & forwards to NGO  
 NGO reviews the info for relevance and forwards applicable info to end 
users 
“As-Is” Assumptions  
Key assumptions were made based on the cumulative Fighting Hellfish 
experience with RTAT deployment, these assumptions include: 
 Salary is based on the 2013 GS Salary table. 
 (13) UN Employees all GS 9 Step 6 ($23.23)  
 (3003) NGO Employees all GS 4 Step 6 ($13.71) 
 (3) Mapper Employees all GS 5 Step 1 ($13.14) 
 (3) Assessor Employees all GS 12 Step 5 ($32.73) 
 All assessors are paid hourly with assessors’ pay status beginning when 
they accept the assessment mission and terminating at the end of the 
assessment mission. 
 All requests originate from the NGO group and are forwarded to the UN 
who then decided whether to accept the request or deny the request. There 
is a 50/50 chance that the UN will accept a given request for assessment. 
All UN accepted requests are forwarded to an Assessor. 
 The Assessor evaluates the request and either accepts or denies the 
request. Once the Assessor accepts the request they begin to establish a 
plan for the assessment, which will entail travel time. Travel time is 
broken down into three possible time frames (3, 12 and 24 hours). This is 
contingent on the Assessors current location and the location of the 
assessment as well as the mode of travel (Commercial Air, Military Air, 
Vehicle etc.).  
 The Assessor is allocated “life support” time which would include 
hygiene, food and rest. Combined in the “life support” time is the task of 
populating an excel document with the completed assessments for the day. 
Depending on the Assessors connectivity they will forward this 
information to the UN department. If connectivity cannot be established 
the document is delayed and an attempt will be tried at a later time. Once 
connectivity is established the document is forwarded to the UN.  
 The limitations of Savvion (or our ability to use it) makes it impossible to 
easily replicate the disaster model which assumes the assessor will 
complete as many assessments as possible (unlimited assessments) during 
limited time, instead of completing a set number of assessments (limited 
assessments) with unlimited time like a typical workload model. IE RTAT 
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will assess as much as possible during the limited timeline of disaster 
recovery instead of assuming a national disaster will create an exact 
amount of damage. As such a 100 percent utilization of the assessor is not 
infeasible since in our model this utilization indicates assessor workload 
over assessor workload vice the typical utilization of workload over time.  
 The UN receives the report and begins processing the form and decides if 
the information is beneficial. Depending on the information gathered by 
the assessor and the requirements of the UN the report may be discarded. 
All forms that are deemed beneficial will be formatted and forwarded on 
through the UN chain. Any form not correctly formatted will be reworked 
within the UN personnel. Once the form meets the specification of the UN 
it will be forwarded to the Mapper. 
 The Mapper will receive the report and confirm the format. If there is a 
discrepancy with the format it will be returned to the UN for clarification. 
Once the form is deemed format compliant it will be plotted on the map. 
The Mapper will then notify the UN via the net. The UN will validate the 
plotted location on the map. If the location plotted is accurate the UN will 
send a mass communication to all NGOs for action. 
 NGOs will review the report and begin their process of the report. NGOs 
finding the report applicable to them will disseminate the report to other 
users within their organization for action. For the NGOs that do not find it 
applicable they will discard the information and await further report. 
RTAT “As-Is” Process via Savvion 
The assumed “As Is” RTAT process was modeled and analyzed using Savvion in 
an effort to identify bottleneck areas and determine possible improvements to the RTAT 
process for future HADR operations. This process, shown in Figure 1, utilizes four key 
performing groups: NGO (Customer), United Nations (UN) (Facilitator), Mapper 
(Facilitator) and Assessor (Provider).  
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Figure 1 Savvion Process Model 
Based on the above assessment and process model, a Savvion simulation of 100 
assessments was conducted. The results are depicted in Figures 2 and 3.  
 
Figure 2 Savvion Process Simulation Results 
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Figure 3 Costs and Bottlenecks 
 “As Is” Savvion Results 
The overall path of a single assessment is completed using multiple sub-processes 
within the UN. The assessment is also (potentially) re-worked and re-checked twice, 
which significantly slows down work flow and adds to labor costs. Very little automation 
is used and significant delays appear due to connectivity issues (delaying the uploading 
of data) and travel time to damaged areas. Bottlenecks were also created in the process 
under the Assessors’ travel time section. With the current process bottlenecks are 
unavoidable within the Assessor’s realm. Traveling is a time consuming task, especially 
within a disaster area. The Assessor is the linchpin of RTAT and is responsible for a very 
high workload as multiple runs incurred assessor utilizations of over 90 percent. In some 
instances this may raise concerns; however, as noted previously in the RTAT scenario of 
a large scale disaster the Assessor is exclusively focused on the RTAT process and will 
complete as many assessments as possible during a limited time, therefore whether an 
assessment team completes 1 assessment per day or 20, Assessors’ is still completely 
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occupied by the assessment process. Since making assessments is their primary function 
their utilization in this process is expectedly high. Due to this high tempo (100 
assessments) and short duration (approximately 13 days) workload the assessor is well 
compensated, earning $28,442.37 for their participation in this assessment mission. Of 
note this compensation includes pay for a 24-hour workday that incorporates reserved 
time for food, lodging and transportation while in the disaster area. 
“As Is” Recommendations 
Some delaying factors such as travel time, breadth and scope of the disaster that 
affect assessment time, are environmental and not subject to RTAT control. Other factors 
such as connectivity are caused by the environment but can be mitigated with additional 
gear or resources (in this case the addition of portable Broadband Global Area Network 
(BGAN) terminals). However, many factors, such as staffing, process management, 
automation, and tool functionality are controllable inputs to success.  
Within the controllable factors multiple areas can be significantly improved. The 
largest of which are manpower and automation. As noted in the results section, the “As 
Is” RTAT process includes a sub-process detour within the UN to process and check 
assessment data before posting followed by a second review. By eliminating this step, 
through the replacement of the excel document with a more user friendly Android based, 
scalable mobile device application, the overall RTAT process was significantly 
improved.  
This app which effectively walks novice assessors through a multi-step process 
that identifies key infrastructure, potential damages, and utilizes available GPS to auto 
update positions beneficially affects RTAT two fold. In addition to eliminating the excess 
sub-process at the UN, the app opens the assessor category to a potential influx of 
volunteers. By using a train the trainer model, skilled RTAT assessors can conduct an 
inventory RTAT class to novice volunteers who will then be able to conduct independent 
assessments, which greatly increases the assessor’s overall output without increasing 
cost.  
“As Is” to “To Be” 
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Based on the recommendations made from the “As-Is” process analysis, the 
RTAT process was re-designed into a “To Be” model. Goals for the “To Be” model 
included: increasing the assessment capacity to 200 and reducing costs by 25 percent, 
wait time by 75 percent, and assessor utilization rate to <= 70 percent.  
RTAT “To Be” Model of Operation 
The RTAT “To Be” model follows the “As Is” model of “rapidly deployable, 
small, nimble, multi-organizational, multi-national integrated assessment teams of 
specialists in key ICT” (Steckler, 2012), but it also incorporates training capability and 
utilizes host nation volunteers to [potentially] increase manpower available for 
assessments. Key to the success of this duplicative manpower model is the function of 
RTAT as an assessment team concept, capable of gathering and relaying information, to 
entities capable of repairing said infrastructure. RTAT does not seek to fix the situation 
but rather to provide an accurate picture of the current situation. As such, detailed 
knowledge of the ICT infrastructure is beneficial but unnecessary for the RTAT assessor. 
An assessor in the “To Be” model merely relays the status of an ICT node to those 
capable of taking further action. This makes it possible for a lay volunteer to follow the 
simple Android application instructions and still provide valuable data that is the basis 
and beginning of the newly automated “To Be” process.  
RTAT “To Be” Scheme of Maneuver 
(BOOM!!!!!) Disaster Strikes  
 NGO request IT assessments from UN 
 RTAT assessors dispatched to conduct assessments via UN 
 RTAT Responsible for coordinating all travel arrangements  
 Assessors conduct training of volunteers qualifying them as assessors 
 Assessors conduct assessments utilizing Android application 
 Upload assessments to Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) servers remotely 
 Assessment data is shared with the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) servers  
 Assessments are posted to an interactive PDC website that NGO’s and 
Governments can visit to obtain the latest disaster information 
Assumptions 
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The following are some assumptions, derived from the Fighting Hellfish’ 
experience and resident knowledge of the RTAT process for this new model.  
 Salary is based on the 2013 GS Salary Table. 
 (10) UN Employees all at a GS 9 Step 6 level ($23.23)  
 (3000) NGO volunteers who receive no pay. 
 (3) Assessor/Trainer RTAT members all at a $40/hour (roughly GS 12 
Step 5 level) 
 (17) Volunteer assessors who do not receive monetary compensation. 
 All volunteer assessors will be met at the area of operation and will 
receive an initial 12-hours of training by the Assessor/Trainer team prior 
to any assessment mission.  
 Travel to assessment area will be simultaneously coordinated during the 
training time.  
 200 assessments will be conducted, with assessment requests arriving in 
10-minute intervals.  
 All Assessors (non-volunteers) are paid exclusively for time spent making, 
processing, traveling or training volunteers from RTAT mission 
acceptance until mission completion. 
 Assessors do not receive pay for hours of non-assessment activities (i.e. 
rest and refit).  
 For the safety of Assessors, they are authorized to work only 12 hours in 
one 24-hour period.  
RTAT “To Be” Process via Savvion 
The RTAT “To Be” process incorporates 4 key performer groups including: 
NGO/ UN (Customer), Assessor and Volunteers (Facilitator), NPS Server (Facilitator) 
and PDC Server (Provider). Assessors and Volunteers are broken up into 9 teams 
identified by 9 parallel process routes (outlined in Figure 4). Each team will have a 
BGAN assigned for data transmittal.  
All requests originate from the UN/NGO group and are forwarded to the Assessor 
electronically. These requests are broken equally into three parallel tracks and further 
broken down into three travel times, netting a total of 9 parallel processes that represent 
the aforementioned 9 teams. Travel time is broken down into three possible time frames 
(1, 3 and 9 hours with standard deviations of 15, 30 & 60 min respectively). This is 
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contingent on the Assessors’ current location and the location of the assessment as well 
as the mode of travel (Commercial Air, Military Air, Vehicle etc.). Upon completion of 
the assessment, BGANS are utilized to ensure the forms (.XML format) with GPS data 
are transmitted back to the NPS servers. 
The NPS servers receive, aggregate, store, and forward the forms to the PDC 
servers. The PDC servers utilizes the information and GPS enabled fields in the form to 
display the information to the correct region thereby disseminate the information via their 
website to interested NGOs, UN personnel, and host nation officials.  
In order to compensate for the addition of (unpaid) volunteers the number of 
assessors was increased to 20 while the pay per hour in Savvion was simultaneously 
decreased (3 @$40/hour =$120/hour = 20 @6/hour). The assessors remain compensated 
for a high workload short duration process and are expected to have significant off time 
between disasters.  
“To Be” Savvion Results 
The Savvion analysis (Figures 4 and 5) below was run with the 200 and 500 
assessment goal.  
 




Scenario (default)     
Instances 200     
  Time  38.333 hrs   
 
Activity  Performer  Occur Waiting Time 
Time Time To Complete Time 
 




Assess 1 Any member of Assessor 51 289:13:00 12:45:00 301:58:00 12.75 1.33 0.25 
Assess 2 Any member of Assessor 13 75:14:00 3:15:00 78:29:00 3.25 0.34 0.25 
Assess 3 Any member of Assessor 4 23:12:00 1:00:00 24:12:00 1 0.10 0.25 
Assess 4 Any member of Assessor 44 239:53:00 88:00:00 327:53:00 88 1.15 2.00 
Assess 5 Any member of Assessor 12 68:28:00 24:00:00 92:28:00 24 0.31 2.00 
Assess 6 Any member of Assessor 10 57:47:00 20:00:00 77:47:00 20 0.26 2.00 
Assess 7 Any member of Assessor 49 269:37:00 98:00:00 367:37:00 98 1.28 2.00 
Assess 8 Any member of Assessor 13 74:45:00 26:00:00 100:45:00 26 0.34 2.00 
Assess 9 Any member of Assessor 4 22:13:00 8:00:00 30:13:00 8 0.10 2.00 
      281 5.22 12.75 
Travel 1 Any member of Assessor 51 214:35:00 52:37:00 267:12:00 52.62 1.33 1.03 
Travel 2 Any member of Assessor 13 50:22:00 26:01:00 76:23:00 26.02 0.34 2.00 
Travel 3 Any member of Assessor 4 15:14:00 37:59:00 53:13:00 37.98 0.10 9.50 
Travel 4 Any member of Assessor 44 180:34:00 22:44:00 203:18:00 22.73 1.15 0.52 
Travel 5 Any member of Assessor 12 49:43:00 24:18:00 74:01:00 24.3 0.31 2.03 
Travel 6 Any member of Assessor 10 43:23:00 92:29:00 135:52:00 92.48 0.26 9.25 
Travel 7 Any member of Assessor 49 205:15:00 25:37:00 230:52:00 25.62 1.28 0.52 
Travel 8 Any member of Assessor 13 52:01:00 26:01:00 78:02:00 26.02 0.34 2.00 
Travel 9 Any member of Assessor 4 16:06:00 37:59:00 54:05:00 37.98 0.10 9.50 
      345.75 5.22 36.34 
UpLoad 2 Any member of Assessor 13 67:52:00 3:16:00 71:08:00 3.27 0.34 0.25 
UpLoad 3 Any member of Assessor 4 17:04:00 1:21:00 18:25:00 1.35 0.10 0.34 
UpLoad 4 Any member of Assessor 44 214:16:00 11:45:00 226:01:00 11.75 1.15 0.27 
UpLoad 5 Any member of Assessor 12 57:19:00 3:14:00 60:33:00 3.23 0.31 0.27 
UpLoad 6 Any member of Assessor 10 35:06:00 2:56:00 38:02:00 2.93 0.26 0.29 
UpLoad 7 Any member of Assessor 49 235:16:00 13:13:00 248:29:00 13.22 1.28 0.27 
UpLoad 8 Any member of Assessor 13 63:58:00 3:16:00 67:14:00 3.27 0.34 0.25 
UpLoad 9 Any member of Assessor 4 13:23:00 1:21:00 14:44:00 1.35 0.10 0.34 
UplLoad 1 Any member of Assessor 51 256:08:00 13:55:00 270:03:00 13.92 1.33 0.27 
      54.29 5.22 2.55 
      681.04 15.65 51.64 
Delay Any member of NPS Server 200 0:00:00 6:46:00 6:46:00 6.77 5.22 0.03 
Forward Assessment Any member of NPS Server 200 0:00:00 6:40:00 6:40:00 6.67 5.22 0.03 
ReceiveAssessment Any member of NPS Server 200 0:00:00 6:40:00 6:40:00 6.67 5.22 0.03 
      20.11 15.65 0.10 
Display Any member of PDC Server 200 0:00:00 6:40:00 6:40:00 6.67 5.22 0.03 
Receive Any member of PDC Server 200 0:00:00 6:40:00 6:40:00 6.67 5.22 0.03 
      13.34 10.43 0.07 
Request Any member of UN/NGO 200 0:00:00 33:20:00 33:20:00 33.33 5.22 0.17 
      33.33 5.22 0.17 
 
Resource Unit Cost/Unit Threshold Usage Cost Total Converted 
Work time (hr) # People Utilization 
Any member of NPS Server Hour 0.2 0 20 $4.00 20.11 50 1.05% 
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Any member of PDC Server Hour 0.2 0 13 $2.60 13.34 50 0.70% 
Any member of Assessor Hour 6 0 680 $4,080.00 681.04 20 88.83% 
Any member of UN/NGO Hour 13.71 0 33 $452.43 33.33 1 86.95% 
H/(K*$D$3) 
worktime/(people*duration) 
Performers Queue Length and Utilization 
      
Name Average Min Max Utilized(%) Idle(%) 
Any member of NPS Server 0 0 0 1.05 98.95 
Any member of PDC Server 0 0 0 0.7 99.3 
Value of ‘Creator’ 0 0 0 0 100 
Any member of Assessor 75.85 0 137 88.82 11.18 
Generic 0 0 0 0 100 
Any member of UN/NGO 0 0 0 8.7 91.3 
  
Figure 5 Costs and Bottlenecks 
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The completion time required for the 200 assessments by 20 assessors/volunteers 
was 38.33 hours. With irreparable bottlenecks due to the Assessors’ travel time. Despite 
the refinement of the assessment definition (exclude food/ refit/ rest etc.) the assessor 
remained heavily utilized at 89%; however of note the assessor’s utilization was reduced 
by 7.4%. The unlimited assessments needed with limited time available model remains in 
effect and the assessor remains solely focused on assessments which accounts for the 
high utilization, however, the slowed assessment input value (10 min vice 2 min) may 
account for the reduction of 7.4%. Assessors are still compensated for their high 
workload but pay is now restricted to a 12-hour workday which includes transportation 
but excludes life support while in the disaster area. 
“As Is” “To Be” Comparison 
Despite doubling the number of assessments to 200, the “To Be” model expenses 
dropped 87%, wait time decreased by 81% and it took only 1/5 the time to complete. 
Unfortunately, Assessor utilization remains high (89%), but is unlikely to be significantly 
reduced due to the nature of the disaster scenario. Assessors can rest during the allotted 
travel times between assessments. When stretched further, the “To Be” model shows over 
500 assessments are possible in approximately 1/3 the time required in the original “As 
Is” model, while still reducing costs by nearly 70%. Critical changes made proved to be 
the addition of portable SATCOMs via 9 BGAN terminals, and the train the trainer 
model, which both greatly improved speed and efficiency. The addition of the user-
friendly app also eliminated a redundant internal cycle and enabled additional manpower 
all of which drastically improved the RTAT capability that will hopefully significantly 
improve HADR in the future.  
CONCLUSION 
Responding efficiently and effectively to large-scale disasters is difficult in the 
U.S. and near impossible in third world countries. Compounding the difficulty to relief 
efforts is an inability to effectively collaborate due to the nonexistence of or damage to 
host nation ICT infrastructure. International relief organization respondents often don’t 
know the status of the ICT infrastructure nor what would normally be available. RTAT 
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may not be able to completely eliminate the uncertainty of post disaster recovery 
operation, but it can possibly provide answers to some questions such as, “What kind of 
communication infrastructure can I expect upon arrival” and what should the respondents 
repair first to get the most communication “bang for the buck”?  
For RTAT to effectively benefit the international relief community it must 
effectively and efficiently communicate accurate ICT assessments. The problem of relief 
effort collaboration in a chaotic post-disaster environment is complex and requires an 
intricate solution. A requirement to have boots on the ground is essential at this point to 
gather information on an areas infrastructure; however, by automating as much of the 
RTAT process as possible costs are dramatically reduced and the process is significantly 
sped up providing an effective and efficient way to provide vital IT infrastructure status 
to the proper officials. Additional improvements such as the inclusion of remotely piloted 
or autonomous vehicles could benefit RTAT in the future, however, in the near term the 
improved “To Be” RTAT process has proven to be of valuable benefit in both cost and 
time savings in HADR.  
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APPENDIX D. TERRESTRIAL SYSTEMS FORM 
Appendices E–H represent the starting point for the data collection form efforts. 



























































































APPENDIX H. RTAT V6 TRAINING POWERPOINT 
Appendix H was created by the author to help explain and teach how to use the 
RTAT mobile data collection tool. A similar document was used to train volunteers in the 
Philippines and for JIFX 2014–04. 
This appendix is included to give the reader a better understanding of how the 
RTAT mobile data collection tool works and to give a better understanding of how 















































































APPENDIX I. RTAT QUICK LOOK REPUBLIC OF THE 
PHILIPPINES SEPTEMBER 2013 V2 
Appendix I is a report done by Marine Forces Pacific and is not readily available 
(Chang, 2013). Figures, photos, supporting after action/experimental results are contained 
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SEP 2013. The RTAT project is a partnership between United States Pacific Command 
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Experimentation Center (MEC), the Naval Postgraduate School, the national and regional 
government early responder community of the Philippines, and the Armed Forces of the 
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MEC and Naval Postgraduate School and does not necessarily represent the official 
position of the Marine Corps or the Department of the Navy. 
This report is approved for public release, distribution unlimited. The use of trade names 
in this document does not constitute an official endorsement, approval, or the use of such 
commercial hardware or software. This document may not be cited for purposes of 
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The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific Experimentation Center (MEC) conducted the 
Rapid ICT Assessment Teams (RTAT) activities with support from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) to engage the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and 
selected members of the Philippines government disaster early responder community. 
The focus of this RTAT event was to test and demonstrate the use and effectiveness of 
the RTAT hardware, software and web based tools, techniques, and practices (TTPs) in a 
real-world environment partnering with real-world disaster early responders. 
Climate Change in recent years has been a significant contributor to a huge increase in 
the number and severity of natural disasters around the world. Stronger and more 
frequent major weather related events (Typhoons, hurricanes, tropical storms, rain-caused 
flooding and landslides, tornados, etc.) have challenged the global early responder 
community as well as the donor base for Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), 
United Nations, and other non-profit international organizations that focus on 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). One key aspect of providing adequate 
response to these disasters is the status of the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) infrastructure in the affected communities. One glaring gap in the tool 
sets of the global early responder community is that they do not know what the status of 
the ICT infrastructure is immediately after a disaster. They do not know if or how they 
will be able to communication internally or externally once they arrive in a disaster zone. 
The purpose of RTAT is to conduct fast, thorough assessments of the ICT infrastructure 
immediately after the disaster and on an ongoing basis in the first weeks or months post-
disaster. These RTAT ICT assessments are made available to the global early responder 
community as soon as they are conducted. RTAT assessment teams are made up of ICT 
subject matter experts who come from academia, industry, UN, NGO, foreign 
government/military, and affected nation government/military. RTAT assessments 
include reporting status of the disaster zone’s copper/fiber landline systems, cellular 
networks, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), UHF/VHF radio infrastructure, RF broadcast 
networks (AM and FM for example), and the power grid. 
The U.S. RTAT facilitation team’s advance party (four people from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS)) spent 21–22 Sept 2013 in Legazpi City, Philippines 
conducting RTAT target site surveys and briefing various regional/local Philippines 
government and military personnel. 23 Sept was spent with personnel from various 
sectors transiting to Legazpi City Philippines - the most disaster-prone city in the entire 
country - and obtaining RTAT tools familiarization and training by the NPS team. The 
complete RTAT team included: NPS, MEC, AFP, national, regional and local 
government personnel, local academia and the RTAT event host Bicol University. After 
training, the entire RTAT team conducted actual RTAT assessments from 24–26 Sept in 
Legazpi City Philippines. These RTAT personnel divided into 6 teams of 7–8 personnel 
each and drove vans to the various pre-designated RTAT locations and conducted the 
RTAT surveys for those three days. During these RTAT tests and training sessions, the 
team also interacted with numerous local government leaders including the Albay 





The first hours and days after the onset of major global disasters are typically fraught 
with chaos and lack of situational awareness. While there are existing disaster assessment 
teams from major organizations that deploy to such events, these teams primarily focus 
on sector specialty areas other than Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
and Information Sharing. The ICT sector is critically important as it enables and supports 
all others.  
The arrival of the global response community usually brings a welcome and powerful 
ICT capacity resource, but sometimes their arrival and the accompanying ICT equipment 
and capabilities do not link effectively with the host nation ICT and power suppliers. This 
can mean that the effectiveness of the combined available resources are not maximized, 
leading to gaps and duplication when there may be enough technical solutions present to 
accommodate all requirements. 
Recent disasters have shown the reluctance of the affected host country to request 
international assistance, this trend is expected to continue. These disasters were managed 
internally with only very specific host nation assistance requests being made. 
Unfortunately these disasters revealed that the needs outpaced the host nation’s resources 
and the affected nation was unable to provide an accurate assessment of ICT and power 
needs to responding international efforts. As stated, this information is critical to enable 
collaborative relief efforts that lead to focused and timely support to the affected 
population. This vital information will directly reduce suffering and the overall recovery 
time for the affected nation.  
Specific problems include: 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of a major disaster there is often a gap in the 
knowledge of ICT infrastructure status and a lack of communication between 
the International Humanitarian Community (IHC) arriving on scene and the 
affected state’s national infrastructure stakeholders.  
 We do not know how to get the overall ICT infrastructure Common Operating 
Picture in the hands of the effected state and the IHC as well as to the 
ISP/GSM/Telecom Ministers, etc. 
 We do not know how to discover the methods and resources being used in a 
disaster for sharing information up and down the chain between the national, 
government, and infrastructure providers. 
 There is no coordinated approach today of establishing a common situational 
overview of this ICT infrastructure 
 Current assessment methods are limited as no single agency has the resources 
to perform a comprehensive assessment of the ICT situation 
  
What Exists Now: 
There are teams that currently perform some very basic ICT assessment functions 
including ( i) the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) 
international emergency response system whose core mandates are assessment, 
coordination and information management to assist the UN and governments in an 
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emergency; (ii) the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC); ( ii) the International 
Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC) First Assessment and Coordination Teams 
(FACT); and iv) ICT based NGO’s such as NetHope and TSF have some assessment 
responsibilities. Some of these teams are on standby to deploy rapidly (in 12–24 hours) as 
required.  
The Requirement: 
A proposed solution is to create/ fund RTAT teams - creating the ability to rapidly deploy 
ICT Assessment Teams—small, nimble, multi-organizational, multi-national integrated 
teams of specialists in key ICT areas (wireless data communications, voice 
communications, radio technologies, power, information sharing, social networking, 
etc.). The real niche this program represents is that the teams can be made up of experts 
from a variety of different organizations –industry, UN, NGO, academia, IO, affected 
nation government and military, and international governments/militaries.  
Once a comprehensive overview of the ICT situation has been established, a priority list 
of ICT needs can then be drawn up in coordination with the host nation.  
The RTAT team will also be requested to provide specific ICT disaster assessments in the 
event that full International assistance has not been requested by the host Nation. 
RTAT Teams Provide: 
Field data containing both Host nation and IHC information and communications 
technology and power needs and capabilities. 
Quality assessment of this information by experts and the distribution of reliable, trusted 
information. 
This Initiative does not seek to duplicate any existing process but to reinforce and enable 
the existing internationally accepted processes by meeting a need that is recognized but 
that is not currently effectively being met. Concentrating on human interfaces and not 
technology, the team of highly trained inter-organizational personnel will identify and 
find answers to specific questions, compile a common operations plot and link with the 
host nation and the IHC enabling fast early recovery. 
Specific requirements or capabilities include: 
 Having the ability to quickly deploy (within 24 hours) 
 Having direct links to local industry and government 
 The ability to stay in the disaster zone 1–2 weeks, then reassess need to remain 
longer or to rotate in new teams 
 The team having access to ICT expertise across the functional spectrum (ISP, 
cellular, data networks, power, etc.) with both the international technical 
community as well as local/national citizen experts 
 To have a keen understanding of the need to work in close collaboration with 
existing teams on the ground 
 
Who the RTAT teams are made up of: 
Ideally these small teams of experts are composed of 1–2 representatives from each of the 
following organization types: UN, NGOs, IGOs, academia, industry, military and 
government agencies from around the world. The formal/legal/business organizational 
makeup of the overall program and teams themselves would be determined by the 
founding member organizations.  
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The leadership of the teams should be: 
 Team Leader (from either the global or regional technical community) 
 National (affected state) Member (National Disaster Management Agency 
or Ministry of Communications or equivalent organizations affiliated for 
example) 
 
What the RTAT teams readiness status should be: 
Small teams of qualified/trained experts from across the ICT spectrum on 24x7 stand-by 
to deploy as soon as possible but likely for 1–2 weeks in shifts.  
We believe that before being ready and able to deploy to a specific disaster zone there 
should be a BASELINE ICT/Info Sharing assessment capability in place. These 
assessments should be accomplished well ahead of time in each country prone to regular 
disasters at a minimum. Such assessments could be done by RTAT supporting entities 
such as industry and academia. The benefits for such assessments, which would be 
provided to the host nation government, would go well beyond the RTAT concept and be 
able to point out potential general ICT vulnerabilities and resilience gaps to all concerned 
parties. 
Where the RTAT team members should be located:  
RTAT teams should be stationed at key locations around the world, perhaps modeled 
after the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams program, or possibly as 
associate members of NetHope, the UN UNDAC, ETC or other similar teams. These 




Legazpi City 24–26 September RTAT Assessment Concept of Operations (CONOP): 
WHO: Led by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) Center, 
this initiative to conduct a baseline Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
assessment in Legazpi City, Albay Province, Philippines between 24 and 26 SEP 2013, 
included a number of people from the Philippine government and military communities. 
The invited participants included people from Manila and locally in the Albay Province / 
Legazpi City area from NDRRMC, DOST, OCD, Manila Observatory, Philippines 
National Police, University of the Philippines, Bicol University (project hosts), the NGO 
consortium NetHope, the Japanese Civil Response community, U.S. military and 
academia, and others. 
WHAT: The group divided into up to 6 teams of approximately 8 members each. Each 
team was equipped with vans, drivers, security and the teams featured mixed subject 
matter expertise to conduct these ICT baseline assessments in the most disaster prone 
region of the Philippines (Legazpi City and Albay Province region). The SME’s 
conducted baseline assessments of cellular, UHF/ VHF, land lines such as copper and 
fiber, Internet service provider provided access, satellite communications, meshed Wi-Fi, 
wireless bridges with WiMAX or LTE, and alternate power systems to better prepare the 
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community for the next catastrophic event. Having a completed baseline ICT assessment 
will smooth host nation and international responses during the next real world disaster. 
The local/regional early responder community will already have critical information on 
the communications infrastructure and will not have to try to dig this information up 
while in the chaos of a real-time disaster. 
WHEN: The baseline ICT assessment was conducted in Legazpi City between 24 and 26 
September 2013.  
WHERE: In the vicinity of Legazpi City, Albay Province, Philippines with Bicol 
University as the base of operations. Bicol University has also volunteered to be our host 
and to provide classrooms for training sessions and meetings as well as their contact 
network to help determine exactly where in the area we will be conducting the baseline 
ICT assessments. 
WHY: Since RTAT has never before been used to conduct actual pre- or post-disaster 
ICT assessments, this opportunity to do a real-world, real country assessment is very 
important to the overall RTAT development process. The RTAT ICT assessments 
conducted this week also coincides with one of the agreed upon projects of the year-old 
Kabalikat Science and Technology Innovation Initiative (STI2) that involves the same 
organizations listed above (NDRRMC, DOST, OCD, Manila Observatory, AFP, PNP, 
UP, Bicol University, etc.). 
HOW: The RTAT effort will utilize a U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) created 
hardware/software application system called Lighthouse to do the data collection and 
dissemination. This Lighthouse application is Android based, and heavily leverages 
standard Android smart phones and tablet computing devices during the week to 
document the ICT status and information collected. The data was sent in real time (via 
Wi-Fi or cellular connections) up to a data server housed at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California, U.S.A. 
Timeline of RTAT activities in the Philippines in September 2013:  
21 September, Legazpi City, Bicol Province, Philippines 
The U.S. RTAT Advance Team (Naval Postgraduate School personnel including faculty 
member Brian Steckler and students, Major Travis Beeson, Capt Jennifer Gladem and LT 
Jason Chamberlain) transited from Metro Manila to Legazpi City, Albay Province, 
Philippines to conduct initial site surveys of the six locations pre-determined to be 
assessed using the RTAT process later in the week. The NPS RTAT Advance Team was 
met at the Legazpi Airport by the Bicol University personnel who were to be our hosts 
for the RTAT week. After checking into the hotel, the team and commenced the site 
surveys at three of the six pre-determined RTAT locations, briefing Barangay Captains 
(local communities and the senior elected official in each community) on what RTAT is 
and what we would be doing later in the week with the full RTAT assessment effort with 
about 50 RTAT assessors in 6 teams of 7–8 people. 
 251 
 
Figure 1 - Bicol University Welcoming Party 
 
Figure 2—RTAT Team receives a local briefing by the Oro Barangay Captain 
22 September, Legazpi City, Bicol Province, Philippines 
The U.S. NPS RTAT Advance Team continued site surveys at the final three Barangays, 
briefing Barangay Captains on RTAT concepts, and training Bicol University and 
Barangay personnel on the operation of RTAT applications.   
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Figure 3 - Major Beeson briefing local Barangay leadership on RTAT 
 
 
Figure 4 - Barangay Captain using RTAT Android App 
 
 
23 September, Legazpi City, Bicol Province, Philippines 
Full RTAT participation group from Manila transit to Legazpi City from Metro Manila 
and are greeted by our Bicol University hosts. The RTAT participants transiting to 
Legazpi City from Metro Manila included personnel from the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, Manila Observatory, University of the Philippines, Department of Science 
and Technology, Office of Civil Defense, National Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
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Center, and Philippine National Police. After checking everyone into the hotel (The 
Oriental) there was an all hands orientation and training session on the use of the RTAT 
application (combination of NPS’s Lighthouse data collection app and android phones). 
 
 
Figure 5 - NPS Lighthouse Android RTAT Data Collection Application 
 
  
5.  Type of Information  6.  How will you input location 6.a. Device GPS:  select   
Communication Technology (ICT)- ‘Device’ requires imbedded GPS ‘record location’ when accuracy 
Fill out separate forms for multiple  is displayed. 
services at the same location 




24 September, Legazpi City, Bicol Province, Philippines 
 
The full contingent of RTAT assessors (U.S., Filipino, other international volunteers) was 
now in place in Legazpi City and ready to commence the actual RTAT assessments.  
The 24th started with an RTAT kickoff session at Bicol University in which the Albay 
Province representative made opening comments. The Legazpi City Mayor welcomed 
everyone to town and thanked everyone for conducting the RTAT assessments in his city 
and the Bicol University President welcomed everyone. Then the NPS faculty lead, and 
RTAT overall coordinator, Brian Steckler, provided a RTAT presentation and the week’s 
concept of operation plan. Major R. Travis Beeson (USMC) finished the meeting by 
providing detailed RTAT application training to all attendees. The participation at this 
initial RTAT meeting was very impressive and very well attended and included 81 
participants from 42 organizations. 
 
Figure 6 - Mr Steckler (NPS) presents RTAT to local community at RTAT Kickoff 
Meeting 
After the opening meeting, participants were divided into 6 teams of 7–8 people. Each 
team received assignments of which Barangay to go to for their RTAT assessments. 
EACH team van had working cell phones, and cellular and or on-the-move satellite 
Internet connectivity. Command & control between the lead van (Brian Steckler) and the 
team van leadership was enacted primarily through Skype chat, with cell phone and text 
as back up. This enabled real time coordination for all team movements.  
The evening of the 24th featured a Welcome Dinner hosted by the Legazpi City Mayor.  
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25–26 September, Legazpi City, Bicol Province, Philippines 
The teams rotated through the different Barangay sites on the 25th and 26th to conduct 
their baseline RTAT assessments and to brief the local Barangay leadership. The teams 
got together nightly for next day planning and hot wash. Lasting up to two hours, the 
teams went over all of the lessons learned, command and control issues, site assessment 
discoveries, and identified several RTAT application areas for improvement.  
 
Figure 7 - RTAT Hot wash 26 September 
The evening of the 26th was a farewell dinner hosted by the Governor’s office (he was 





The RTAT baseline ICT assessment effort conducted from 24–26 September was very 
successful. We had the full support (and participation) of national, regional and local 
leadership from the very beginning. The U.S. RTAT leadership from NPS and the MEC 
were well received and welcomed throughout the week by all levels of leadership and 
everyone understood how this RTAT effort could significantly enhance their disaster 
preparedness and improve their key capabilities in disaster risk reduction and resilience. 
The event was very well attended with as many as 81 participants coming from 42 
different entities including those from academia, industry, UN, NGO, U.S. government, 
military, and law enforcement as well as Philippines national, regional and local 
leadership and other government agencies. U.S. participants made up about 20 percent of 
the people for the overall event. Defense related entities (U.S. and Philippines) made up 
about 15 percent of the total entities.  
 
The RTAT effort successfully began a much longer and far reaching process of base-
lining ICT infrastructure in this community and provided experience and understanding 
of the RTAT process to key leaders up and down myriad national and local government 
organizations. The RTAT baseline assessment process conducted this week also enhances 
the overall RTAT program by providing many lessons learned and identifying many 
tweaks to the Lighthouse RTAT data collection application that will help with all future 




APPENDIX J. TYPHOON HAIYAN AFTER ACTION REPORTS 
Appendix K is an internal RTAT after action report written by both RTAT waves 
during Typhoon Haiyan (Steckler, 2013). This supporting information is not available by 
any other means. Figures, photos, supporting after action/experimental results are 











After Action and Lessons Learned Report: 
RTAT Lighthouse Application Deployment in Support of Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)  
Republic of the Philippines  
28-29 November 2014 
 
R. Travis Beeson 




On 8 November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) made land fall in the Republic 
of the Philippines (ROP). “Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was one of the strongest typhoons 
(cyclones) to strike land on record. Over a 16 hour period, the ‘super typhoon,’ with a 
force equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane and sustained winds of up to 195 mph, directly 
swept through six provinces (Lum & Margesson, 2013). This storm affected over 16 
million people displacing 4.1 million people through the destruction of 1.1 million homes 
and resulting in over 6,200 deaths (United States Agency for International Development, 
2014).  
Background 
Prior to Typhoon Haiyan, a team from Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) traveled 
to the Legazpi City, ROP in order to introduce, test and validate the Rapid Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) Assessment Team (RTAT) concept and a 
developed mobile data collection form (more below) for ICT assessment. Bicol 
University, as well as, numerous other volunteers from academia, government officials, 
representatives from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and experts from the 
disaster response community helped refine the RTAT concept and the ICT assessment 
form.  
The resultant mission of RTAT became “To conduct and distribute baseline and 
post-disaster ICT infrastructure assessments, in order to facilitate host nation and 
international disaster relief efforts,” (Steckler, 2012). To ‘facilitate’ now included the 
management and dissemination of a shared common operational picture and ICT 
recovery prioritization recommendations. To facilitate the common operational picture 
aspect, data collected from Lighthouse on NPS servers would be shared with the Pacific 
Disaster Center (PDC) to be displayed on their Emergency Operations DisasterAware 
website.  
The RTAT Concept of Operations was refined to be:  
Deploy ICT experts to the disaster zone 
Obtain local support/volunteers 
Assess the ICT with Lighthouse 
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Aggregate the data on servers back at NPS 
Share (manually/automated) this data with Pacific Disaster Center for display on 
their disaster website 
Disaster responders could then access this website to obtain the latest ICT status 
information to aid in disaster recovery efforts. 
The aforementioned mobile data collection form is based on the Open Data Kit 
suite of tools. “Open Data Kit (ODK) is a free and open-source set of tools which help 
organizations author, field, and manage mobile data collection solutions. ODK provides 
an out-of-the-box solution for users to:” Build data collection forms (surveys), collect the 
results from mobile platform to a central server, and aggregate/transform the data into 
other useful format (http://opendatakit.org/, accessed 2/13/14). ODK is facilitated through 
the NPS developed Lighthouse application and is compatible with any Android based 
device. The RTAT concept and Lighthouse was refined during/after the September 2013 
Legazpi City test in preparation for a future disaster deployment. The ODK developed 
form residing on the Android device and facilitated through the Lighthouse application 
will be referred commonly in the rest of this report as ‘Lighthouse’ or ‘Lighthouse 
application’. 
Overarching concept of operations is: Deploy a team of competent IT experts and 
obtain local support/volunteers. Assess ICT infrastructure utilizing Lighthouse.  
Typhoon Relief Efforts 
Prior to typhoon Haiyan making land fall on 8 November, US forces were already 
responding in anticipation of the damage resulting from the extremely high wind and 
storm surge. Within days of the response, a team from Naval Postgraduate School was 
requested to aid in the US DOD relief efforts then known as Operation Damayan. 
Providing initial satellite communication support to 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 
the team was re-tasked to support Joint Task Force JTF-505 on approximately 25 
November and assign to assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Upon transitioning to 
the JTF, the NPS team was joined by a group from the Roddenberry Foundation and 
faculty from Bicol University, who participated in the September RTAT event, in order 
plan and execute the first real world deployment of RTAT and the developed Lighthouse 
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application. On 26 November the entire team moved to Mactan Air Base, near Cebu City, 
ROP in order to be better positioned for operations in the Tacloban City disaster area. In 
Mactan, RTAT operationally supported Brigadier General (BGen) Santiago (AFP). Not 
coincidently BGen Santiago participated in the September Legazpi City event and was a 
proponent of the RTAT concept and was ready to get RTAT into the disaster zone to help 
with assessments. Connections with BGen Santiago and a local volunteer group known as 
‘Team Patola’ netted over 40 volunteers that showed up for training on the 27th. Training 
consisted of approximately three hours of classroom instruction and two hours of 
practical application utilizing the Lighthouse tool. Classroom training included: What is 
RTAT and the Roddenberry Foundation, how to visually identify ICT and Power 
infrastructure and conduct ICT assessments, what to expect in a disaster zone, life 
support and safety and how to utilize the Lighthouse tool. Two hours of practical 
application paired five (+-) students with a trained person and walked around the local 
area practicing the collection and transmission of assessments. Lessons learned from the 
training: 
Local Audio/Video and power compatibility was an issue with the presentation. 
Brings lots of power plug and HDMI to XX adapters. 
Volunteers for the training were acquired through a Team Patola Facebook post. 
24-48 hour notice would be optimal, but the 12am post still netted more volunteers than 
we could handle at the 12pm training (15 + volunteers).  
Many Volunteers had no idea how to identify various ICT equipment and 
technical background/expertise highly varied amongst the volunteers. As a result an ad 
hoc class was added to the curriculum and given after the practical application training. A 
handbook with pictures of antennae and power infrastructure should be developed for use 
by inexperienced volunteers. One weatherproofed handbook per team should suffice. 
Education certificates are a big deal in the ROP and certificates should be printed, 
signed and given out to those participating in the training. 
On 28 November the 14 RTAT personnel were transported on a South Korean C-
130 into Tacloban City. This Military Air (MILAIR) flight was arranged through BGen 
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Santiago. The personnel were organized into 2 main teams with one team having the 
option to further split into two teams. Two main teams were led by the Roddenberry 
Foundation and the optional team was led by Bicol University. The teams started out 
visiting the local government officials, the Philippine National Police (PNP) local 
headquarters, AFP contingent, and the United Nations (UN) Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) coordination center. Each of visited locations netting critical local 
conditions, security and needs information. Minimally courtesy visits should be paid to 
each of the above before operating in the area. The UN updated local ICT conditions and 
requested assessments be made in the local area and to the south of Tacloban City along 
Maharlika/Pan-Philippine Highway to Abuyog, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 4 Screen shot from PDC EMOPS with RTAT Assessments accessed 2/13/14  
Transportation and shelter in an available gym was arranged through Team 
Patola. Security was a layered approach-A loose courtesy over watch was arranged 
through the PNP with AFP personnel organic to each team. Each van had a local guide 
and the numerous local volunteers provided the needed language interpretation. There 
was one team member that remained behind in Mactan to coordinate team evacuation 
should the need arise. Lessons learned. 
Cultural differences in regards to diet and expectation led to a couple of faux pas 
that could be avoided. Tell the driver to ‘pack lunch’ and he’ll bring his own food. You 
are expected to stop for lunch, not eat on the way between locations. Local diet consists 
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mainly of rice with some vegetable and maybe a little meat. The RTAT carried 
powerbars and heavier meat rations were not as well received as thought. 
Water was a significant issue. Teams carried water purification bags and a couple 
of liters each into Tacloban, but there were no fresh water procurement sources and the 
teams didn’t have 8 hours in a secured sunlit area to use while the bags purified the water 
if fresh water was available. Unfortunately the RTAT had to rely on another NGO for 
water.  
Communication was an issue as the Broadband Global Area network (BGAN) 
satellite data system was left in Mactan and the local cellular data collection was 
intermittent. Data from the Android devices could not be uploaded to the NPS servers 
until they returned to Mactan hotel on 29 November.  
Tracking the team was difficult via intermittent text and voice. However, the Spot 
GPS tracker was used as a tertiary means of tracking the teams and worked quite well. 
 
 Figure 5 Spot GPS tracking of Team 1 
Data transfer to PDC was thwarted by form changes and the lack of server Letters 
of Agreements to share data in an automated fashion. PDC was able to post data to their 
website Late in December after the data from two separate forms were joined to a single 
submission. The process of putting a data set onto the website takes minimally 3 hours 
and adding a new form requiring a new website layer could take up to 3 weeks with the 
current PDC work load. Bottom line the form needs to be finalized before PDC can 
commit to creating yet another RTAT layer on the DisasterAware website and this 
process needs to be automated to meet end user expectation. 
Lighthouse application feedback.  
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Users were a little frustrated with the order of questions. Assessors could get the 
GPS location early in the form but then have to remain at the location, often in the rain, 
until the end of the form to snap a photo before completing the form.  
Assessments could’ve been completed when enroute to the next location if the 
form was more efficiently structured. While interviewing the local expert or caretaker for 
the ICT site there were long breaks between questions that needed their input. This 
resulted in awkward pauses requiring another team member to carry the conversation, to 
keep the person from leaving, while the assessor answered other form questions.  
Query structure was such that only one type of ICT infrastructure could be 
assessed per form. This lead to lengthy pauses at one location when for example a 
cellular tower also held a VHF radio antenna and was linked via fiber optic cable. This 
example would require three separate assessments for the physical structure. 
Weather was a significant factor. One phone (Lighthouse application device) was 
lost due to rain. The devices need to be waterproof. The Otterbox Defender cases worked 
well to ruggedize the cases, but were not water proof. 
Power to charge the phones was an issue. CrisisSignal.apk was installed on the 
phones to aid in another post disaster assessment project. The application would send the 
cell signal strength and send data to an aggregate server on a regular basis. The settings 
should have been modified to lower the power usage and only one phone per team should 
have been running CrisisSignal in order to conserve battery strength. Additionally, the 
teams didn’t think until late on day one to keep all the phones off except the one in use to 
elongate their ability to assess. Power to recharge was available on a limited basis, but 
would require a team member to stand ‘gear guard’ while the phones charged at a public 
recharging point (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 6 Public Charging Station 
Specific recommendations for improving the Lighthouse application and the 
utilized Android devices were: 
GPS should start sensing as soon as the application opens, not when the user 
selects the ‘GPS’ option on ‘How will you record the location’ question. This led to 
significant delays.  
Place the Picture and GPS (location) at the beginning of the form. 
Restructure the form to be able to assess more than one type of ICT infrastructure 
on each form. 
Form needs to be rapid and more focused to the point. Where are you, what’s 
wrong, what do you need to fix it.  
Remove redundant questions. For example there is no need for the address if you 
have the GPS coordinates, and no need to assess, primary, secondary and tertiary power 
if none of them work. 
Waterproof/ruggedize the device. Continue to use the Otterbox defender phone 
case to protect the phone, but switch the device to the Samsung S4 Active (waterproof 
Android based phone), or utilize a clear touchscreen compatible waterproof bag for 
optimal protection in wet conditions. 
Phone should have AM/FM broadcast radio receiver capability to assess where 
the broadcast are able to reach. 
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Extra batteries with a means to charge them off grid needs to be procured before 
the next mission. Vehicle cigarette lighter adapter with enough cell phone charge cables 
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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
RAPID INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) 
ASSESSMENT TEAMS (RTAT) 
FOLLOW-ON ASSESSMENT - CEBU, TACLABON AND LEYTE PHILIPPINES 
RTAT IN THE PHILIPPINES 8-11 DEC 2013: 
Mr. Brian Steckler 
 
WHO: Led by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) Center, 
this initiative, which will take place from Dec 8th to Dec 11th, and is designed to conduct 
continued assessment of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) from 
Tacloban to Borongan in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda). The assessment 
teams will consist of US DoD personnel, a number of civilian personnel from Manila, 
local government agencies from Tacloban, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and 
Philippine National Police (PNP) entities.  
WHAT: The group will divide into 2 teams of 5-6 people with vans/drivers and the 
teams will feature mixed Subject Matter Expertise (SME) to conduct the ICT assessments 
in the areas still suffering communication gaps from Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda). The 
SMEs will conduct assessments of the primary nodes which are significantly degraded or 
none operational to include cellular, UHF/ VHF, land lines such as copper and fiber, 
Internet service provider provided access, satellite communications, meshed WiFi, 
wireless bridges with WiMAX or LTE, and alternate power systems to better prepare the 
community for the next catastrophic event. Assessing the ICT within this area will help 
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evaluate the network and provide vital information for future responses during real world 
disaster(s). The local/regional government will have critical information on the 
degradation of the communications infrastructure as well as an assessment of where to 
focus resources to restore communications and provide valuable information on what 
infrastructure needs to be hardened in the event of future disasters.  
WHEN: The ICT assessment will be conducted in vicinity of Tacloban up to and may 
include Borongan between 8 and 11 December 2013.  
WHERE: The Tacloban airport will be the base of operations for the assessment teams. 
The assessment team will arrive at Cebu on 8 December and conduct training at the 
Marriot in Cebu from 1830 to 2130. On 9 December the assessment team will depart 
Cebu/Mactan Airbase and travel to Tacloban city. Due to DoD restrictions prohibiting 
DoD personnel traveling on foreign military aircraft all DoD personnel will depart Cebu 
utilizing commercial aircraft. Civilian assessment team members will depart utilizing 
military aircraft. They will all meet up at the Tacloban airport. The assessment team will 
billet at Tacloban airport on December 9th utilizing established tents on premises. On 
December 10 the assessment team will depart Tacloban airport and proceed north on Pan-
Philippine Highway (AH26) by vehicle to Guiuan via Basey, Marabut, Balangiga, 
Gilorlos, Quinapondan turning southeast after Quinapindan towards Salcedo to Guiuan. 
From Guiuan the teams will proceed back north to Salcedo to General MacArthur, 
Llorente Balangkayan, Maydolong to Borongan City. All teams will travel east to Guiuan 
and then proceed north towards Borongan. At the conclusion of assessments on 
December 10 all teams will retrograde to a designated location along the route and 
billeting. All members will be billeted in tents with security provided by PNP personnel. 
The location of the billeting area will be dependent on assessment teams progress.  
WHY: RTAT has limited exposure to post-disaster ICT assessments in this area, this 
opportunity to do a real world, real area assessment is very important to the overall 
RTAT development process. The RTAT ICT assessments to be conducted also coincided 
with one of the agreed upon projects of the year-old Kabalikat Science and Technology 
Innovation Initiative (STI2) that involves the following organizations NDRRMC, DOST, 
OCD, Manila Observatory, AFP, PNP, UP, Bicol University. For this specific assessment 
the AFP has requested us to travel in and around the Tacloban area gathering information 
in order to understand the vulnerabilities present within their communication 
infrastructure in order to properly prepare for future disasters 
HOW: The RTAT effort will utilize a US Naval Postgraduate School created 
hardware/software application system called Lighthouse to do the data collection and 
dissemination. This Lighthouse application is Android based, and we will heavily 
leverage standard Android smart phones and tablet computing devices during the week to 
document the ICT status and information collected. The data will be sent in real time or 
near real time (via WiFi or cellular connections) up to the CORE Lab’s data server 
housed at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, USA. The CORE lab 
will then process the data and forward all data to Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) who in 
turn will populate all data on their website (www.pdc.org).s All data will then be 




RTAT Background and Executive Summary 
Overview. 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and power sectors are critical to the 
response after major disasters. Currently existing post disaster assessments focus on areas 
other than ICT, power and Information Sharing. A rapid assessment of the ICT status will 
enable the host nation and the International humanitarian community to provide a 
targeted allocation of resources and result in a reduction of gaps and duplication of effort. 
The Rapid Technology Assessment Teams (RTAT) concept seeks to provide a pool of 
multi-disciplinary experts who will rapidly deploy to the disaster zone to provide this 
information. The RTAT concept is supported by many organization and individuals 
within the ICT disaster response community and is in the process of obtaining further 
funding. A crucial part of the development of the initiative is to gather support for the 
adoption of the concept by key disaster prone countries. Their involvement will enable 
RTAT to tailor responses based on specific country needs and to ensure that processes 
and operations will be as effective as possible.  
The Problem: 
The first hours and days after the onset of major global disasters are typically fraught 
with chaos and lack of situational awareness. While disaster assessment teams exist from 
major organizations that deploy to such events, these teams primarily focus on sector 
specialty areas other than ICT and Information Sharing. The ICT sector is critically 
important as it enables and supports all other relief efforts.  
Arrival of the global response community usually brings a welcome and powerful ICT 
capacity, but sometimes their arrival and the accompanying ICT equipment and 
capabilities do not link effectively with the host nations ICT or each other. This means 
that the effectiveness of the combined available resources are not maximized, leading to 
gaps and duplication.  
Additionally, the host country often does not request international assistance after a 
disaster. In this case, the disasters have often been managed internally with international 
requests only made for specific assistance which can cause the host nation’s resources to 
be stretched and unable to provide an accurate assessment of ICT and power needs thus 
creating a significant gap in ICT assessments. Complete ICT information is critical to 
obtaining targeted support that will enable the response, business recovery, and minimize 
the effects of the disaster on the population.  
Specific problems include: 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of a major disaster there is often a gap in the 
knowledge of ICT infrastructure and a lack of communication between the 
International Humanitarian Community (IHC) and the host nation’s national 
infrastructure.  
 We do not know how to get the overall ICT infrastructure Common Operating 
Picture in the hands of the affected state and the IHC as well as to the 
ISP/GSM/Telecom Ministers, etc. 
 We do not know how to discover the methods and resources being used in a 
disaster for sharing information between the national, government, and 
infrastructure providers. 
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 There is no coordinated approach today of establishing a Common Operating Picture 
(COP) of this ICT infrastructure. 
 Current assessment methods are limited as no single agency has the resources to 
perform a comprehensive assessment of the ICT situation. 
  
What Exists Now: 
There are teams that currently perform some very basic ICT assessment functions. Some 
of these teams are on standby to deploy rapidly in 12 -24 hours.  
1. The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) 
international emergency response system whose core mandates are assessment, 
coordination and information management to assist the UN and governments in 
an emergency. 
2. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) 
3. The International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC) First Assessment 
and Coordination Teams (FACT) 




The proposed solution would create the ability to rapidly deploy small, nimble, multi-
organizational, multi-national integrated assessment teams of specialists in key ICT areas 
such as wireless data communications, voice communications, radio technologies, power, 
information sharing, social networking, etc. The real niche this program represents is that 
the teams can be made up of experts from a variety of different organizations such as 
industry, UN, NGO, academia, International Organizations, affected nation 
government/military, and international governments/militaries.  
Once a comprehensive overview of the ICT situation has been established, a priority list 
of ICT needs can be drawn up in coordination with the host nation.  
The RTAT teams can also be requested to provide specific ICT disaster assessments in 
the event that full international assistance has not been requested by the host nation. 
The Teams Will Provide: 
Field data containing both host nation and IHC information as well as communications 
technology and power needs and capabilities. 
Quality assessment of this information by experts and the distribution of reliable, trusted 
information.  
This Initiative does not seek to duplicate any existing process but to reinforce and enable 
the existing internationally accepted processes by meeting a need that is recognized but 
that is not currently being effectively met. By concentrating on human interfaces and not 
technology, the team of highly trained inter-organizational personnel will identify and 
find answers to specific questions, compile a common operating picture and link with the 
host nation and the IHC enabling fast early recovery. 
 
Specific requirements or capabilities include: 
 Having the ability to quickly deploy (within 24 hours) 
 Having direct links to local industry and government 
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 The ability to stay in the disaster zone 1-2 weeks, then reassess need to remain 
longer or to rotate in new teams 
 The team having access to ICT expertise across the functional spectrum (ISP, 
cellular, data networks, power, etc.) with both the international technical 
community as well as local/national citizen experts 




Ideally these small teams of experts would be composed of 1-2 representatives from each 
of the following organization types: UN, NGOs, International Government Organizations 
IGOs, academia, industry, military and government agencies from around the world. The 
formal/legal/business organizational makeup of the overall program and teams 
themselves would be determined by the founding member organizations.  
The leadership of the teams should be: 
 Team Leader (from either the global or regional technical community) 
 National affected state Member (such as National Disaster Management Agency, 
Ministry of Communications or equivalent affiliated organizations ) 
 
We still need to determine: 
 Skill sets, qualifications and exact number of people to make up each team 
 Current thinking is to have government and/or industry experts from the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) industry, the GSM/other cellular/landline industry, the 
power infrastructure industry, the wireless broadband industry, and the satellite 
communications industry. 
 
Teams Readiness Status: 
Small teams of qualified/trained experts from across the ICT spectrum on 24 X 7 stand-
by to deploy as soon as possible but likely for 1-2 weeks in shifts.  
 We believe that before deploying to a specific disaster zone there should be a 
BASELINE ICT/Info Sharing assessment capability in place. These assessments should 
be accomplished well ahead of time in each country prone to regular disasters. Such 
assessments could be done by RTAT supporting entities such as industry and academia. 
The benefits for such assessments, which would be provided to the host nation 
government, would go well beyond the RTAT concept and be able to point out potential 
general ICT vulnerabilities and resilience gaps to all concerned parties. 
 
Team Locations:  
RTAT teams would be stationed at key locations around the world, perhaps modeled after 
the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams program, or possibly as associate 
members of NetHope, the UN Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC Cluster) or 
other similar teams. These teams could be called on by the host nation, UN agencies such 
as OCHA, WPF , or a regional entity such as ASEAN. 
Timeline of RTAT Concept Development: In late 2011 we began work on a process of 
developing the concept, identifying founding member organizations, outlining team 
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member qualifications forming the teams, training and exercising these teams, and 
iteratively refining the program. We believe that if a real-world disaster event happens 
any time in the near term future, and if the teams have been identified and the roles, 
responsibilities and operating procedures are sufficiently advanced that an opportunity to 
“jump start” the entire process by deploying to that real -world event is possible. Caution 
of course would be needed to ensure this would not hinder but rather enhance the overall 
response efforts. 
Organizations That Have Helped Develop the RTAT Concept: 
UN/NGO Community: 
 UN (UN-OCHA)       
 UN (UN-World Food Programme/ FITTEST)  
 UN (Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC))  
 NetHope  
 Demining NGO community  
 Telecoms Sans Frontieres 
 -New Zealand Red Cross  
 InSTEDD  
 CrisisMappers.Net 
Industry: 
 Cisco Systems 
 Microsoft 
 Global VSAT Forum 
 Delorme 
 Inmarsat Government Services, US, Inc 
 Oceus Networks 
 -MEDWEB 
Academia:      
 Naval Postgraduate School (US) 
 University of Texas 
 San Diego State University 
 National Defense University (US) 
Government/Military Community: 
 US Department of Defense 
 Pacific Disaster Center 
 -Japan Resiliency Initiative 






Point of Contact: 
Brian Steckler, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA USA 
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APPENDIX K. JOINT INTER-AGENCY FIELD EXERCISE 2014–04 
AFTER ACTION REPORT 
Appendix L contains an internal draft after action report written by the RTAT 
team after JIFX 2014–04 written by Dr. Rebecca Goolsby and Mr. Brian Steckler (2014). 
This supporting information is not available by any other means. Figures, photos, 





JIFX After Action Report (AAR) 
JIFX Experiment Number (X-00): B- 11 
Experiment Title: Socio-Technical Information Operations (STIO) and Hastily Formed 
Networks (HFNs) in Austere Environments  
Organization:—Naval Postgraduate School(NPS), Office of Naval Research(ONR), 
Arizona State University(ASU), and Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) 
Experiment Lead/Point of Contact: Brian Steckler (+1.831.402.1584, 
steckler@nps.edu); Dr. Rebecca Goolsby (+1.phone.number, preferred@email) 
Quantitative Results : N/A 
 208 synthetic tweets successfully merged into a secure twitter environment using 
CrisisTracker technology for deployment into the environment 
 50 synthetic tweets and 20 “live” tweets were injected into the scenario itself  
 1 alternative power demonstration (wind and solar) accomplished  
 7 remote wireless networks established 
 7 Rapid IT Assessments conducted using the RTAT mobile data collection tool 
 Rapid, on-the-fly training in communications and power were accomplished for 
five new users who had no benefit of previous exposure to HFN or RTAT 
processes.  
Qualitative Results (please be as descriptive and detailed as possible): The Socio-
Technical Information Operations and Hastily Formed Networks in Austere 
Environments Project has three different areas of focus: (1) Crisis Tracker—Led by ASU; 
(2) Hastily Formed Networks (HFN)—Led by NPS; (3) Rapid IT Assessment Tool 
(RTAT)—Led by NPS.  
CrisisTracker Effort. This effort successfully trained 17 people in the use of a novel 
technology for communications, information sharing and coordination. The technology 
enabled the development and initiation of a novel exercise concept that integrated real-
time rapid IT assessment, alternative power team deployment, and alternative 
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communications (mesh-networks) in an austere field setting. Crisis Tracker overcame 
initial obstacles in connectivity in an austere environment; the technology was able to be 
used to start, stop and coordinate team activities in the field over two days of 
experimentation.  
Hastily Formed Networks. This effort put into practice pre-event training on the 
deployment of alternative power and communications in austere tactical or Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) environments. A variety of communications 
techniques were used for command and control, coordination, trouble-shooting, and 
reach-back, including radios and CrisisTracker with mobile phones. Intense hands-on 
field training for new users who lacked the pre-event training was successfully 
accomplished on site, with five entirely new users to all of the technologies.  
RTAT assessment. Experienced and novice users demonstrated the capability to perform 
rapid assessments of the information and communication technology (ICT) environment 
at 25 locations under austere conditions.  
Scenario Development. A full, 208-Tweet scenario divided into 4 Master Scenario 
Events List (MSEL)s (subdivided into multiple, flexible vignettes) was developed for this 
effort. Since this was a highly novel integration with brand new technologies, it was not 
expected that the full 208 tweet scenario would be played. Many vignettes within the 
scenario were developed to accommodate from 10 to 100 participants. The 208 synthetic 
tweets were available and demonstrated to be easily launched to assist in developing a 
flexible scenario environment. Tweets were available for review; other participants could 
have submitted synthetic tweets for this event if desired.  
 
Note: generating synthetic tweets by hand is very difficult and requires quite a bit of 
training and knowledge. Developing a full exercise, even as small as this, requires weeks 
of effort. A full three to six months of lead time is ideal, depending on the size and scope 
of the exercise. A year’s lead time for an advanced exercise would be recommended. 
 
Monday 11 AUG 2014 Objectives: Set up of communications equipment, initial 
deployment and tear down of alternative power equipment, preparation for follow-on 
exercise events.  
1. Crisis Tracker 
 Set up of mobile Crisis Tracker platform in the command station. 
 Training of new users. 
 Registration and testing of mobile phones (note: Crisis Tracker could be 
used by all mobile smart phones, regardless of brand. No download 
needed).  
 Initial test uses and communications checks.  
 Initial tests of information flows with the protected Twitter account.  
 All synthetic tweets were made available within Crisis Tracker for pushing 
out to exercise participants as “injects.” 
 Synthetic test tweets were initialized and pushed into the Crisis Tracker 
environment.  
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Hot Wash Issues: The main problem for Crisis Tracker was connectivity. Local WiFi 
capabilities were constantly being challenged by the number of users at Camp Roberts 
McMillan Field NPS location and the load these users placed on the radio frequency 
spectrum and WiFi channels. A number of minor bugs were discovered and fixed on the 
fly, including problems in connecting people to chat rooms, problems in sending and 
receiving Short Messaging System (SMS) messages, and general issues of dropping off 
the WiFi. Later use of a Very Small Terminal Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite 
broadband connection on the following day predominantly solved this issue.  
2. Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) 
 Alternative power sources were set up:RENEWS–a wind turbine, flexible 
solar panels, rigid solar panels, and fossil fuel generators.  
 COMMUNICATIONS: VIA SATS / (HOW MANY) WAVE MESH 
NETWORKS WERE ESTABLISHED  
 Six working radios were tested. 
 
Hot Wash issues: Difficulties in range of the radios—several times the range of the 
radios was not adequate due to a lack of line of sight. In addition, a problem was 
discovered in frequency assignments—2 of the 6 radios were on the wrong frequency.  
 
2. Rapid ICT Assessment Tool (RTAT) 
 Set up beforehand, SIX ANDROID DEVICES WERE CHARGED AND READY  
 
Hot Wash issues: Android devices were not able to send/receive SMS due to 
lack of Subscriber Information Module (SIM) cards. Personal phones had to 
be used for Crisis Tracker. The VSAT brought with the team did not have built 
in WiFi capability bringing the SIM card issue to light. 
Tuesday 12 AUG 2014Objective: Have all systems up and running for scenario injects/ 
deploy teams in scenarios 
1. Crisis Tracker 
 Thirty-five synthetic tweets were successfully sent out over CrisisTracker 
as injects 
 Chat and sms were utilized to further push scenario events.  
 Synthetic tweets also sent out to Protected Twitter account.  
 CrisisTracker connectivity was intermittent. 
 Crisis Tracker successfully sent out SMS messages, tweets, and chats.  
 Skype Chat room established as per scenario requirements; very useful for 
trouble shooting.  
 
Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) 
 Problems with Via Sat (brand) VSAT terminal; careful examination 
showed primary issues were cable connections.  
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 Radios—intermittent due to the large number of other ongong projects 
during JIFX. These issues dealt with signal transmisstion, line of sight 
issues, and range deconfliction.  
 TWO MULTI-PERSON TEAMS DEPLOYED, WERE ABLE TO SET UP TWO WIFI 
“HOT SPOTS” WITH VIA SAT AND ONE WITH 3G CELLULAR ENHANCED HFN 
 Reassessed situation at operations meeting at noon—afternoon was 
executed more effectively. TWO TEAMS WERE AGAIN DEPLOYED, 
ESTABLISHED THREE HOT SPOTS?  
 
2. Rapid ICT Assessment Tool (RTAT) 
 Six RTAT assessments were made & successfully submitted 
Hot Wash issues. Connectivity issues continued to be a problem for Crisis Tracker (a six 
month old technology) but were ironed out by the end of the day by switching to a fast 
VSAT Internet environment versus a much slower 3G cellular Internet connection. This 
enabled the movement from the main site to the mobile site (Nemesis van) from which 
Crisis Tracker was easily deployed and stable (using the ViaSat connection). Lesson 
learned: Crisis Tracker will not always have stable connectivity; in the real world, Crisis 
Tracker is just as likely to be deployed from a field station as from a more robust 
communication or command center.  
Novice users especially—but everyone needed to be reminded to check gear and cables. 
Crisis Tracker successfully used to solicit assistance needed to overcome novice 
problems. Injects were successful in directing activities and moving scenario forward. 
Skype Chatroom meeting was especially useful in sorting out issues and problems. Crisis 
Tracker and Skype overlapped but were not redundant; they handled different problems. 
Crisis Tracker security (using SMS) enabled real-time communications but was limited 
by connectivity issues in the morning events.  
 
 Wednesday 13 AUG 2014Objectives: Execute Scenarios with Small, Novice Team; In-
Depth After Action Meeting (Since most of the NPS students were required to return to 
NPS for class Wednesday, the exercise went forward with a single small team of six 
people (total), incorporating untrained personnel (ASU students) who previously had no 
experience. This day’s activities built on the performance of the previous day, with 
remaining students now showing new proficiency and giving them the opportunity to 
train others “on the fly” as part of the exercise, just as they might do in a real disaster).  
1. Crisis Tracker 
 Novice dispatchers had no trouble in sending injects and managing the 
smaller cadre of deployed users.  
 Connectivity issues were largely solved.  
 25 more injects were sent out using Crisis Tracker.  
 Sms issues were largely solved.  
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 Teams reported back using photographs posted on Protected Twitter.  
 
2. HFN 
 HFN SET UP OF MESH NETWORK WAS EASILY ACCOMPLISHED BY 
SMALLER TEAMS, EVEN WHEN INCORPORATING NOVICE ASSISTANTS 
AND TRAINING THEM AT THE SAME TIME 
 SET UP ONE MESH NETWORK (WIFI HOTSPOT) UTILIZING THE 




 ONE RTAT ASSESSMENT COMPLETED WITH NOVICE TEAM MEMBERS 
ASSISTING.  
 
In Depth After Action Meeting / Hot Wash with Collaborators  
Crisis Tracker  
 A “fly away kit” (FLAK) for Crisis Tracker is needed. FLAK should 
contain instructions for registration, use, trouble-shooting, and instructions 
for dispatchers as well.  
 Crisis Tracker may have real utility in mobile command settings but needs 
to be able to deal with spotty connection problems more gracefully.  
 Still uncertain whether the SMS capability as useful as the Internet-based 
communications capability; needs more testing. Users noted that options 
are good; data connection may not be available, but SMS may be more 
robust. SMS often was better than the radio—nice to have both in case one 
fails.  
 Many people wanted a “proper app” rather than a web service. 
 Notifications when one got an sms would be useful; perhaps this can be 
done if made into a “proper app.”  
 Incorporation of Ops View application would be helpful, was suggested 
by a partner collaborator—to check on network capabilities and load.  
 
4. Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) (Lessons Learned) 
 Collaborators needed more pre-exercise introduction.  
i. Introduction of PEOPLE 
ii. Introduction of GEAR and GEAR capabilities and limits 
iii. Introduction of the SCENARIO 
iv. Introduction of each team’s SPECIFIC and GENERAL 
OBJECTIVES 
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 ViaSat instructions needed to be updated. 
 Pre-event preparation was adequate but would have been greatly improved 
with more time spent doing set ups and teardowns.  
 More documentation for gear (serial number, weight, support information) 
should be included with the cases for each item. Current spreadsheet 
method good for in-lab monitoring but not sufficient for deployment 
monitoring of equipment.  
 Advance labeling of fly away kits would be a distinct advantage.  
 MESH GEAR SOP—FLASH THEM BACK TO A BASIC CONFIGURATION 
 Need a logistics package - including contact list for exercise participants 
AND for the collaborators; phone numbers, email lists needed to be 
distributed ahead of time to promote pre-exercise planning and 
coordination.  
 Pre-event travel plan also needs to be developed and distributed pre-event.  
 Two operations being prepped at the same time created challenges (one 
group was packing for Nepal and one was packing for JIFX). This 
accounts for some of thedisconnects in planning. In future, methods for 
coordinating multiple operations might be addressed.  
 BGANs would be the recommended equipment for future exercises of this 
kind. 
 Discussion on frequency management was substantive.  
i. Recommendations: Use a WiFi analyzer to de-conflict. JIFX 
participants were stepping on each other on WiFi channels. 
ii. Communication frequency manager for JIFX should include pro-
active WiFi management.  
 
5. Observations & Comments: 
Collaborative member from CISCO provide the CISCO Rapid Response Travel 
Kit (RRK). It was very well received and added value to the event. Comment was 
made that there should be photos of the different levels to assist in repacking this 
gear in pelican case. 
 
Only two people signed up to participate in Crisis Tracker; every one was pretty 
busy with their own experiments. However, interest in the use of Protected 
Twitter was high. In the future, perhaps a white paper could be circulated to (1) 
explain Protected Twitter; (2) provide instructions on how to use it; and (3) 
consider use of Protected Twitter in a short demo prior to the event, to enable 
people to try it out for themselves during the weeks leading up to the JIFX event. 
 
Additional Questions: 
Did you receive constructive end-user feedback on technology? 
 End users had many questions about the Crisis Tracker technologies and showed 
considerable interest in the Protected Twitter concept of operations. HFN and 
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RTAT teams were often in the field and thus, got less feedback. In the future, 
more outreach might be considered for explaining, demonstrating, and interacting 
with users.  
Did you perform any on the fly development of your technology during the JIFX week? 
 
 HFN and RTAT were able to collaborate with CISCO, ViaSAT, TrustComm, 
while the Joint Vulnerability Assessment Branch team (JVAB) did a wireless 
environment threat assessment of the systems used. These collaborative efforts 
assisted in the development of improved concepts of operations and greater 
understanding of how technologies could be used in tandem or in substitution for 
one another (such as when one system failed or had issues).  
Were you provided with additional data necessary to conduct your experiment? 
 No. 
Were you provided with support services necessary to conduct your experiment? 
 The tent provided was extremely useful. The tent provided a cool place for the 
computers and other devices we used and functioned as headquarters for our 
exercise. 
Did you engage in ad-hoc experimentation or collaboration with other experimenters? If 
so, include names of those experiments for purposes of identification. 
 We collaborated with Rakesh Bharania from Cisco and were able to set up a 
network at the remote site.  
 Progeny Systems and ASU developed a concept of operations for integration of 
their systems that will be pursued in future; actual code hacking was prevented 
due to firewall issues. If firewall issues had not presented themselves, those two 
systems would have had data flowing between them 
Did members of the JVAB look at your experiment? If so, please describe the interaction. 
 Yes, Joint Vulnerability Assessment Branch conducted a vulnerability assessment 
of the Rapid Response Kit (RRK). POC David Rohret do89261@jricp.osis.gov, 
drohet@csc.com, 210-925-4477. 
What, if any, are the uniquely valuable aspects of this event? 
 The ability to collaborate on the fly among many kinds of innovators (technical, 
software, and end-user innovators).  
 
 The interaction with end users and discussions  
 The ability to try out highly novel, likely-to-not-work-the-first-time, bleeding 
edge technologies in a realistic environment.  
 JIFX is a significant boon to education, training, and innovation research with a 






Antennae Hill—RTAT Assessment 
 
 
CrisisTracker Screen Shots 
CrisisTracker Screen Shots from an iPhone (above images). Pressing on an icon 
reveals information, such as the tweet message in the right image. This is from day 
3, Aug 13, 2014. This deployment used a Cisco Rapid Response Kit 101 satellite 
device. It did not have as good of signal strength as using the Cisco Explorer 500 for 
partly unknown reasons. Rakesh said that the Kit 101 had lower bandwidth service 
compared to the Explorer 500. The available AT&T 4G signal was used at times to 
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confirm that the Kit 101 had a bad signal and not a problem with the Crisis Tracker 
loading pages in this instance. This does show the functionality of the Crisis Tracker 
First Responder application that shows first responder locations, event locations, 





Deployment team in the afternoon of Aug 12, 2014 (above photo). Team leader 
…Anibal… configured a correct Wave Rider wifi device for a mesh network (upper 
right) while Rakesh from Cisco showed the ease of setting up the Cisco Explorer 500 
digital satellite antenna (next to the left tail light of the SUV). Also shown on the 






Day 3 Deployment, Aug. 13, 2014, Team leader Major Beeson on a radio device. 
Most of the Cisco Rapid Response Kit 101 parts are out of the travel cases and 
ready to be connected. At this point a member of the team posted in a message that 
the team arrived at the assigned destination. In this simulation the destination is a 
location in Pink Rhino City to give network connectivity to a medical team. The Kit 
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101 is later placed out of the shade in the background to try to improve signal 
strength. 
 
Day 3 deployment. A USB device is being connected to the Kit 101. The Kit 101 is 





Deployment of the Cisco Rapid Response Kit 101 on day 3, August 13, 2014. This 






Part of the deployment team of day 3, August 13, 2014, along with part of the 
network vulnerability team working in the background. The Cisco Rapid Response 
Kit 101 on the Goal Zero battery can be seen in the background to the right. 
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